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GLOSSARY OF HAUSA AND ARABIC TERMS 
Burukutu Locally brewed beer made from fermented sorghum 
Dungurun    Zungeru (Lugard’s initial headquarters before its  
     relocation to Kaduna) 
Eid al adha    Greater Eid or festival of sacrifice 
Fadamomi (sing. Fadama)  Flood plains 
Fatake     Long-distance trader 
Fulani     Pastoralist 
Gandaye (sing. Gandu)   Plantations 
Gayya     Collective farm work 
Gidan magajiya   Brothel 
Hajj     Pilgrimage 
Haram     Forbidden 
Injin mazarkwaila   Brown sugar crushing machine 
Kafir      Non-believer 
Karuwai (sing. Karuwa)  Prostitutes 
Karuwanci    Prostitution 
Kirari     Praise song 
Kofofi (sing. Kofa)   Gates 
Kulle     Purdah practice 
Kulli Kulli    Groundnut cake 
Leburori    Labourers 
Magajiya    Leader of prostitutes / madam of a brothel 
Maguzawa    Non-Muslim Hausa population 
Makarantun boko   Western-education schools 
Mamaki    Wonder 
Man shanu    Cow butter / ghee 
Masu unguwanni    Ward heads 
(sing. Mai unguwa)    
Mazarkwaila    Brown sugar / jaggery 
Mukuli    Keys 
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Nasara     Whiteman 
Osomalo    Ijesha women traders 
Pito Locally brewed beer made from fermented millet or 
sorghum 
Rumada (sing. Rinji)   Slave farms/villages 
Sabon Gari    New town / strangers’ quarters 
Sabulun sallo    Local soap from Bida 
Sarkin kofa    Gate chief 
Sikwati    Sleepers 
Soro     A rectangular mud house with a flat or round roof 
Tasha     Station 
Tashi      Forced migration 
Tsoro     Fear 
Tudun Wada    Strangers’ quarters for northerners 
Turkudi    Local woven cloth 
Wakar diga    Song of diga or railway 
Wakar jirgin kasa   Train song 
Wakar reluwe    Railway song 
Wakilin tasha    Representative of station settlement 
Yanbita    Labourers 
Yandoka    Native Authority police 
Yan mirgine    Train bandits (the phrase yan mirgine was coined from 
     the way they rolled down their loot from trains) 
Yan kwadago    Migrant labourers 
Yan tauri    Vigilantes or tough people 
Yan ture    Train bandits (the phrase yan ture was coined from the 







AHAK    Arewa House Archives 
BCGA     British Cotton Growing Association 
CFAO     Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale 
CMS     Christian Missionary Society 
CO     Colonial Office  
DO     District Officer 
GBO     G. B. Ollivant 
GCL     Gimi Community League 
HMSO    Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
KSHCB    Kano State History and Culture Bureau 
LBA     Licenced Buying Agent 
NAK     National Archives, Kaduna 
NNDC     Northern Nigerian Development Company 
PRO     Public Record Office 
PWD     Public Works Department 
PWD&R    Public Works Department and Railway 
SNP     Secretariat of Northern Provinces 
UAC     United African Company 
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Using extant literature, archives, oral interviews, and new tools of historical analysis such as 
songs, poems, and photographs, this study describes the experience of railway development 
in the rural communities between Kano and Zaria, from 1908 to the 1970s. Also subsumed in 
this study is a history of these communities seen through the lens of the railway. Built with 
the imperialist motive to transport cotton for the metropolitan industries, the railway had 
enormous effects on the social and cultural landscape of the local communities. The effects 
not only differed among the communities; some of the outcomes also differed from what the 
British had anticipated. 
The railway was the single most important innovation for change and gave rise to 
initial encounters marked by mixed reactions of fear and awe, owing to lack of familiarity; 
but as familiarity increased and people came to understand its benefits, they quickly 
appropriated the railway in distinctive ways. It transformed the experience of travel and trade 
in the communities and gave them direct access to markets and the sea, connecting them 
more closely to the world economy than was previously possible. 
Not only did the line affect mobility, it also activated production in traditional 
agricultural products that previously would not have entered the world market. As the study 
shows, the anticipation that people would grow cotton did not materialize, as the local 
producers appropriated the railway to grow other export crops not contemplated during the 
planning process. Export trade started at the initiative of local merchants who had been 
contacted by commercial firms. The activities of these firms also had enormous effects on the 
local economy; but the effects differed among the communities, as the firms concentrated at 
the main centres, contributing to these centres’ expansion and popularity. The railway also 
had limitations: it stimulated production in distant areas but could not intensively exploit it. 
This limitation was circumvented by professional donkey transporters, who exploited the new 
production to their own advantage. The export trade benefited producers, though not 
everyone prospered. 
The railway also influenced the emergence of new settlements and the intermingling 
of Nigerian cultures along the rail line. These settlements were established by the colonial 
authority to house migrants attracted by the opportunities presented by the railway and the 
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export trade. As the study shows, the migrants concentrated at the main centres with high 
economic opportunities, thereby contributing to those centres’ expansion. Despite attempts by 
the colonial authority to isolate the migrants into rigid compartments, social relations brought 
them into direct contact with locals, a development which not only eroded official barriers 
but also led to integration of some of them into the communities. As the study shows, the 
migrants were agents of change in the localities. 
The railway is something of a paradox. It opened new frontiers of opportunities to the 
locals and at the same time indirectly endangered many, most especially those engaged in the 
indigenous crafts. It forced some operators into criminality, such as stealing of iron from the 
rail lines and train robbery. As the study also shows, this criminality was a reaction to the 
poverty and unemployment engendered by the advent of British colonialism and their 
transport innovation. 
Though there have been many works on the railway, there is no critical and 
comprehensive work on its social and cultural effects. Despite their importance in 
highlighting the effects of the railway and the economic history of Kano and Zaria, previous 
works have totally overlooked most of the studied communities. This study is an attempt to 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
This study interrogates the experience of railway development in the rural communities along 
the rail line between Kano and Zaria in Northern Nigeria, from 1908 to the 1970s. It looks at 
the ways the local inhabitants perceived, appropriated, and domesticated the rail line and how 
their lives were transformed by it. The communities in question are eight in number and 
located in the two most important emirates of Kano and Zaria. These communities are 
Challawa, Kwankwaso, Madobi, Yako, and Dangora in Kano Emirate, and Auchan, Gimi 
Dabosa, and Likoro in Zaria Emirate. Although there were 11 railway towns along the line, 
the focus is on these eight, the most important ones between Kano and Zaria. With the 
exception of Dangora, the communities were nineteenth-century creations. They became 
economically significant with the building and operation of the railway. Dangora was a 
creation of the railway itself; it was established during the construction of the line and 
became important almost overnight. 
Also subsumed in this study is a history of the communities seen through the lens of 
the railway. The railway, as I argue, was the most important factor for change, transforming 
the communities from almost nothing to economically significant centres on the rail line. For 
nearly eighty years or so, the railway played a critical role in their social, economic, and 
cultural life. It transformed their experience of travel and brought a more radical reduction in 
travel time and cost than was previously possible. The railway stimulated the production and 
export of cash and food crops, which in the long run had multiplier effects on the local 
economy. It also facilitated the penetration of imperialist trading firms and populations, 
which in turn influenced the communities’ expansion and growth. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
some of the studied communities were among the important passenger and freight centres on 
the system. Given their present state of neglect, it is difficult to imagine they were once 
important centres. This study not only situates them within the wider literature and the 
national economy, it also indicates their importance. 
Previous studies, whether on the railway or economic history, focused almost 
exclusively on cash crops, minerals export, and labour and political aspects, as well as on 
urbanization and diseases, among other important themes, with a focus on the main centres of 
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production.1 The experience of smaller towns, however, and especially the studied 
communities, is neglected in those analyses. Also missing in the literature is a critical 
examination of the social and cultural aspects of the railway. It is this void in the literature 
that this study seeks to fill. 
Drawing from old and new data, some of which were not accessible to previous 
researchers, this study critically reinterprets the history of the Nigerian Railway in relation to 
the development of railway technology and the transportation, production, consumption, and 
export of cash and food crops. The focus of the study is on social and cultural changes and on 
the transformations and ruptures engendered by the railway. An assumption accepted in the 
study is that the railway was an imperialist-motivated creation, one which brought 
development as well as underdevelopment. 
Three factors motivated my interest in this study. First, there is the need to deepen 
scholarly understanding of the experience of railway development and its transformative 
effects. The second is my own interest in the history of transport and its role in the 
consolidation of the colonial economy. And third, there is the recent upsurge of academic 
interest in railway studies and railway’s critical role in economic development and growth. 
The study is also topical and pertinent in view of the total neglect of the communities in the 
                                                 
1 Some examples of the extant literature are as follows: T. N. Tamuno, “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway I”, 
Nigerian Magazine, 83, (Dec. 1963): 279-292, and “Genesis of the Nigerian Railway II”, Nigerian Magazine, 
84, (Mar. 1965): 84, 31-43; W. Oyemakinde, “Railway Construction and Operation in Nigeria, 1895-1911: 
Labour Problems and Socio-Economic Impact”, Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria, VII/2, (1974): 303-
323; M. Mason, “Working on the Railway: Forced Labour in Northern Nigeria, 1907-1912”, in: Robin Cohen, 
Jean Copan and Peter C. W. Gutkind, African Labour History, (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1978), 56-79; O. Oshin, 
“Developing the Infrastructure of Exploitation: The Example of Colonial Transport on the Bauchi Tin Fields, 
1902-1914”, Trans African Journal of History, 17, (1988): 123-138; O. Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”, in: 
Toyin Falola and Steven J. Salm (eds), Nigerian Cities, (Trenton, N, 2004/2003), 101-126; J. S. Hogendorn, 
Nigerian Groundnut Export: Origins and Early Development, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, 1978); F. A. 
Okediji, “An Economic History of Northern Nigeria 1900-1939”, (PhD Thesis, Indiana University, 1972); M. O. 
Ijewere, “The Impact of Nigerian Railways on Agricultural Development”, The Nigerian Geographical Journal, 
2 (Dec. 1973): 137-143; R. N. Oyewuenyi, “Railway Development and the Growth of Export Agriculture in 
Nigeria the 1900-1950s Period”, (Master’s Thesis, Ottawa University, 1981); A. O. Anjorin, “Cotton Industry in 
Northern Nigeria during the Colonial Era”, in: I. A. Akinjogbin and Osoba (eds), Topics on Nigerian Economic 
and Social History, (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1980), 115-127; A. O. Anjorin, “The Politics of the Baro-
Kano Railway”, being a Cyclosted Paper presented at the 16th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of 
Nigeria, (Dec. 1970): 1-14; J. M. Carland, The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1895–1914, (Stanford, Calif 
Hoover Institute Press, 1985), 56-79; I. F. A. Uzoechi, “The Social and Political Impact of the Eastern Nigerian 
Railway on the Railway on the Udi Division 1913-1945”, (Kent University, PhD Dissertation, 1985); T. A. 
Ayoola, “The Price of ‘Modernity’? Western Railroad Technology and the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in 
Nigeria”, in: T. Falola and E. Brownell (eds), Colonial Environment, Domestication, Medicine and Technology, 
(New York: Routledge 2012), 148-169; P. A. Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths and the Great Train Robbery: Iron 
Theft and the Moral Economy of technological Change in Northern Nigeria, 1910-1935”, in: Robert W. Harms, 
Joseph C. Miller, David S. Newbury and Michele D. Wagner (eds), Paths Towards the Past: Historical Essays 
in Honor of Jan Vansina, (African Studies Association Press, 1994), 371-393; S. Abayomi, “The Consequences 
of the Construction of Railway on the Economy and Society of Zaria Province, 1902-1945”, (Master’s Thesis, 
University of Jos, 1991). 
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literature, and all the more so now that stakeholders (government and the public) are 
concerned about the Nigerian Railway in view of its decline. 
This study is a critical re-examination of the history of the Nigerian Railway in 
relation to the development of railway technology and the transportation, production, 
consumption and export trade. It contributes particularly to an understanding of how the 
Nigerian communities perceived, appropriated, and integrated the railway into daily life, and 
of how Nigerian initiatives resulted in unexpected uses of the railway. It furthers 
understanding of how the railway bred criminality and provided a platform for criminals to 
operate. It also sheds light on how the railway led to the emergence of new settlements and 
the intermingling of Nigerian cultures—people, goods, and ideas—along the rail line. These 
aspects are in addition to a re-examination of the cash crop production and trade engendered 
by the advent of the railway. 
The central arguments in this study are as follows: (1) the railway had enormous 
effects, much more so than was previously recognized; (2) it made a very strong impression 
on its arrival; (3) some of its consequences unexpectedly differed from what the planners had 
anticipated; and (4) the effects differed among the communities.  
The study set out to answer the following questions: Why was the railway built? How 
was it built? How was it perceived, appropriated, and domesticated? What socio-economic 
effects did the railway have? What were its effects on indigenous crafts? To what extent did 
the railway influence the communities’ expansion? 
 
1.2 Literature review 
The effects of railways on the economy and society of Nigeria have attracted a fair amount of 
interest in the literature.2 For the most part, the focus is on the main centres of production, 
with little or nothing devoted to the smaller centres, including the studied communities. 
Common in the literature is the tendency to present a somewhat one-sided and sometimes 
misleading impression about the railway and its consequences. There is a tendency to assume 
the experience of railway development was painless. Also observed is a near absence of 
                                                 
2 See for instance Tamuno, “Railway I” and “Railway II”; Oyemakinde, “Railway Construction”; Mason, 
“Working on the Railway”; Anjorin, “Politics” and “Cotton Industry”; Carland, Colonial Office; Oshin, 
“Developing the Infrastructure”; Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”; Ijewere, “Impact”; Ayoola, “Price of 
Modernity”; Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”; Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut; Okediji, “Economic History”; 
Oyewuenyi, “Railway Development”; Uzoechi, “Social and Political Impact”; Abayomi, “Consequences”; A. 
Ayoola, “The Political Economy of Railway Construction in Nigeria: The Bornu Railway Extension”, Lagos 
Historical Review, 6, (2006): 148-171. 
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serious work on the studied communities, whether in the nineteenth or the twentieth century. 
In reviewing the extant literature, I focus mainly on problematic issues and those issues not 
well covered. 
There is no way to write a history of the railway without reference to such works as A. 
O. Anjorin’s “The Politics of the Baro–Kano Railway”;3 Michael Mason’s “Working on the 
Railway: Forced Labour on the Northern Nigeria Railway, 1907–1912”;4 J. M. Carland’s The 
Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1895–1914;5 Wale Oyemakinde’s “Railway Construction and 
Operation in Nigeria, 1895–1911: Labour Problems and Socio-Economic Impact”;6 and 
Tekene Tamuno’s “Genesis of the Nigeria Railway I & II”.7 These works, which are 
considered mainstream, were invaluable sources from which insights into the Nigerian 
Railway could be garnered, though none focuses on the studied areas. While the literature 
furthers understanding of the railways, their origin, and their effects, some of the assumptions 
and findings are somewhat one-sided. This is understandable given the type of sources 
available to the authors at that time. 
Tamuno, Anjorin, and Carland’s works are invaluable on the development of the 
Baro–Kano railway, especially on the rivalry and controversies surrounding its extension to 
Kano; but their claim that the rivalry was due to the lack of a general transport policy is less 
convincing, because railway development worldwide is always a contentious matter—due to 
the initial investment or sunk costs, the expected returns, and the issue of control. This study 
shows that because it is a political as well as economic endeavour, railway development, as 
well as the ‘idea of a railway’, is always controversial. This is so because the decision to 
build the line under study, the choice of a route, junctions, and terminals, as well as rates and 
control, were political and economic matters which provoked rivalry and controversy. Even 
after the line had been completed, the railway required government subsidies. The claim by 
Anjorin that the Northern government opted for a tramway because its rail proposal was 
rejected is also misleading. Chapter 2 shows, among other things, that the proposals were 
mooted almost simultaneously, even though Lugard, the High Commissioner at the time, 
confused readers of his annual reports and correspondence with what exactly his preferences 
were. 
                                                 
3 Anjorin, “Politics”.  
4 Mason, “Working on the Railway”.  
5 Carland, Colonial Office. 
6 Oyemakinde, “Railway Construction”.  
7 Tamuno, “Railway I” and “Railway II”. 
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None of the studies from Tamuno, Anjorin, Oyemakinde, Carland, and Mason 
consider how Nigerians encountered the railway work. In their different analyses, Mason and 
Anjorin in particular furthered understanding on the use of forced labour on the Baro–Kano 
line and the opposition it generated. However, they overlooked how Nigerians public 
encountered the railway work. They also overlooked the fact that the railway work resulted in 
the establishment of a new town near Kano. Despite the labour shortage encountered when 
constructing the line, Oyemakinde speculated that labour from the South was not employed 
on the Baro–Kano railway and that the Northern Authority preferred to delay the work rather 
than allow southerners to do it. Using a new tool of historical analysis which was not 
accessible to previous writers, Chapter 2 of this study extends our knowledge by 
demonstrating that encounters with railway work produced, because of the locals’ 
unfamiliarity with this new technology, mixed reactions of fear, apprehension, and awe, far 
more so than scholars have previously recognized. It also suggest that Nigerians perceived 
the railway as sublime. Contrary to the narratives of a smooth collaboration between railway 
and locals in previous analyses, the chapter demonstrates that even the local authorities 
themselves were fearful of the work. Some Hausa poetry (waƙar diga: poem on diga, or song 
of railway) and the works of Mohammad S. Umar (Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual 
Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigerian to British Colonial Rule), Yusuf Nadabo 
(Tarihin Garin Kaduna), and Brian Larkin (Signal and Noise: Media Infrastructure, and 
Urban Culture in Nigeria) have been invaluable in this respect.8 The chapter also shows that 
southerners were employed on the railway construction and that the work led to the 
establishment of a new town (Dangora), one of the studied communities. 
In the  same manner, there is a common assumption among scholars, particularly 
Tamuno and Oyemakinde, that Nigerians appropriated the railways immediately they were 
completed. This classical narrative, so accepted and consumed by many writers, is not only 
misleading but one-sided. This is so because appropriation of the railway was not as sudden 
as previously assumed; instead, it was something worked out over time. Chapter 3 
demonstrates that Nigerians encounters with the locomotives and trains were marked by 
mixed reactions of fear, apprehension, and awe, because many did not understand what the 
system or its advantages were, much less to immediately appropriate it. Similarly, none of the 
                                                 
8 Northern Nigerian Publishing Company (hereafter NNPC) NNPC, Wakokin Aliyu Dan Sidi Sarkin Zazzau, 
(Zaria: NNPC, 1980); M. S. Umar, Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern 
Nigerian to British Colonial Rule, (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Y. Nadabo, Tarihin Garin Kaduna: Hedkwataer 
Arewa, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2010/1998); B. Larkin, Signal and Noise: Media Infrastructure, 
and Urban Culture in Nigeria, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).  
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literature has considered the socio-economic disruptions that accompanied the railways. Even 
Tamuno’s longue durée analysis overlooked this important topic. Chapter 6 of this study 
demonstrates that the railway was a double-edged sword, with both positive and negative 
consequences. The coming of the railway, as the chapter indicates, was marked by 
disruptions and ruptures which forced many into criminality. It also provided platforms for 
criminals to operate 
Jan Hogendorn’s Nigerian Groundnut Export: Origins and Early Development9 and 
Florence Okediji’s “An Economic History of Hausa-Fulani Emirate of Northern Nigeria 
1900–1939”10 further understanding on how British colonialism and its transport system 
stimulated cash crop production and trade. Their claim that cotton was immediately grown 
for export in northern Zaria where some of the studied communities are situated, however, is 
misleading. This can be understood given the type of sources available to them at the time. 
Also misleading is Hogendorn’s assertion that slave labour did not play an important role in 
cash cropping, though he modified the claim elsewhere.11 Besides a passing reference to one 
or two of the studied communities, none of these authors visited the relevant communities. 
Chapter 4 shows that though cotton was grown in northern Zaria (where some of the studied 
communities are situated), it was not offered for export, owing partly to the low price and the 
fact that the crop had always been grown for industrial use in the indigenous textile industry. 
It did, however, become popular overtime. The chapter also shows that slave labour expanded 
production. 
The focus in some of the literature is on the effects of British colonialism and its 
transport system on indigenous crafts. Phillips J. Jaggar’s ethnography, The Blacksmiths of 
Kano City,12 and Peter A. Rogers’s work, “The Hausa Blacksmiths and the Great Train 
Robbery: Iron Theft and the Moral Economy of Technological Change in Northern Nigeria, 
1910–1935”,13 further understanding on how colonialism and its transport system accelerated 
the decline of rural mining and smelting, as well as the accompanying tensions involved. 
Their claim that iron was abundant in rural Kano, however, is misleading. Jaggar, for 
instance, claimed that blacksmithing expanded owing to the abundant iron brought by the 
railways. As far as he was concerned, the shift to imported iron was a painless process for the 
                                                 
9 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut. 
10 Okediji, “Economic History”. 
11 P. E. Lovejoy and J. S. Hogendorn, Slow Death For Slavery: The Course of Abolition in Northern Nigeria 
1897-1936, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
12 P. J. Jaggar, The Blacksmiths of Kano City, (Cologne: Rodiger Koppe Verlag, 1994). 
13 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”. 
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local iron workers. He also overlooked how stolen iron from the rail lines served as raw 
materials to blacksmiths and the accompany tensions aroused by this theft. Rogers followed 
in Jaggar’s footsteps, stating that iron was abundant in Kano until the 1920s. According to 
him, iron workers in the state got their supplies from the traditional sources that had supplied 
them in the nineteenth century. This study shows that the advent of British colonialism was in 
fact hostile to the iron-working crafts. Chapter 6 shows that iron was generally scarce in the 
countryside. The iron brought by the railway did not circulate widely in the countryside, 
forcing rural blacksmiths to steal from the rail lines to compensate for the shortage. The 
chapter also contributes to the expansion of knowledge by showing how the railways bred 
criminality and provided a platform for criminals to operate. 
Shoyebi Abayomi’s work, “The Consequences of Construction of Railway on the 
Economy and Society of Zaria Province, 1902–1945”,14 is an interesting analysis of the role 
of the railways in the underdevelopment of Zaria. The work, however, is one-sided and full of 
misleading and generalized assumptions. Despite the title’s misleading impression that the 
work is on the emirate as a whole, the focus is mainly on Zaria metropolis. This work (about 
225 pages) overlooked the strategic importance of the smaller railway towns across the 
province. Besides the sweeping references to those in the southern part, only once does the 
author mentioned Gimi, despite its importance. The history of the railway, as the author 
suggested, is the history of poverty, famine, hunger, and disease, as well as exploitation. As 
far as he was concerned, the railway was not beneficial to the local people. Also common in 
his analysis are a number of sweeping generalizations which were not substantiated with 
evidence. This present study takes exception to this one-sided narrative. On the one hand, its 
focus is on the smaller communities along the rail line between Kano and Zaria. On the other 
hand, it suggests that irrespective of the exploitative logic of the railroad, it had both positive 
and negative impacts which cannot be ignored. Contrary to the reductionist narrative, this 
study shows that Gimi and the others centres on the line were important railway towns in 
Zaria Province. 
In my book, The Impact of the Railway on Kano Emirate: the Case of Madobi and 
Kwankwaso Towns, c. 1903–1960s,15 I looked at the railway’s stimulation of agricultural 
production and export, the movement of commercial firms and migrants to the communities, 
and the attendant effects. However, the claim that the stations were established in 1918 and 
                                                 
14 Abayomi, “Consequences”.  
15 S. T. Yusuf, The Impact of the Railway on Kano Emirate, c. 1903-1960s: The Case of Madobi and 
Kwankwaso Towns, (Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). 
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1919 was incorrect, and the claim that the Tudun Wada settlement in Madobi was established 
in the 1950s is misleading. The book contained a passing remark on iron theft, a subject 
which is well discussed in this current study, and it also differs from the present study in 
many other respects. On the one hand, this study focuses on eight communities rather than 
two, all situated along the same rail line. At another level, this study looks at how the 
Nigerian communities encountered and reacted to railway work and the locomotives, and 
how they integrated them into daily life. In addition to the cash crop production and trade, it 
also considers how subsistence food production fared in the face of cash cropping. Unlike the 
book, this study also looks at how the railways fuelled criminality.  
In a similar manner, my essay, “Toward New Approaches To Nigeria’s Railway 
History: the Rural and Agricultural Alternatives”, looked at how the railway activated cash 
crop production and trade and how the trade in cash crops in turn attracted commercial firms 
and migrants to Madobi. It also looked at how the influx of the migrants led to the 
establishment of Sabon Gari settlement in Madobi.16 Here, as with the book, the problem is 
the same. This is understandable given the type of sources at my disposal at the time.  
Salihu Umaru’s dissertation, “A History of Tudun Wada Madobi in Kano Emirate 
from c. 1953–2010”,17 is an interesting reading of the development of Tudun Wada 
settlement in Madobi, another product of the railway. As Chapter 5 of this current study 
shows, the settlement of Tudun Wada was established in the same year as Sabon Gari, but it 
did not become important until the 1950s, when the whole area was renamed Tudun Wada. 
M. B. Dottridge’s essay, “Aspects of Social and Economic Development in Kura 
District before the Implementation of the Kano River Project Irrigation Scheme”,18 though 
focused on Southern Kura, provides some invaluable information on Madobi, one of the 
studied communities. That work shows that Madobi was the most important centre in Kura 
District. It also comments on the use of donkey transport in the groundnut trade and how the 
construction of the Kano–Zaria road shifted attention away from the railway. However, the 
author’s claim that buying points were not established in Kura District until the 1960s and 
1970s is incorrect. Also misleading is the claim that Challawa and Yako were under Kura 
                                                 
16 S. T. Yusuf, “Toward New Approaches To Nigeria’s Railway History The Rural And Agricultural 
Alternatives”, in: Saheed Aderinto and Paul Osifodunrin, The Third Wave of Historical Scholarship on Nigeria: 
Essays in Honor of Ayodeji Olukoju, (New Castle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 207-223. 
17 S. H. Umaru, “A History of Tudun Wada Madobi in Kano Emirate from c. 1953-2010”, (BA Dissertation, 
Bayero University, Kano, 2010). 
18 M. B. Dottridge, “Aspects of Social and Economic Development in Kura District Before the Implementation 
of the Kano River Project Irrigation Scheme”, Series Research Paper No. 7, (Zaria: Centre for Social and 
Economic Research, 1980). 
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District. These notions need to be corrected, and Chapter 1 of this current study shows that 
Challawa and Yako, although at one time under Kura, were transferred to Kumbotso and Kiru 
districts respectively in the 1920s. Chapter 4 shows that buying points were established at 
Kura, Kwankwaso, and Daburau as early as the 1950s. 
The title of Hamisu Ibrahim’s dissertation, “A History of Makarfi District in Zazzau 
Emirate”, gives the impression that it is on the district as a whole, but in fact it focuses 
mainly on Makarfi town, the district headquarters. That study made only a passing remark on 
Gimi and Likoro towns.19 The only work so far that I have come across on Gimi is John 
Wiseman’s work, “Structural and Ideological Tension in a Rural Hausa Village”.20 
Notwithstanding the focus on post-colonial events, it provides some useful information on the 
decline of the migrant settlement at Gimi Tasha. The author noted that the decline was partly 
a result of the Civil War, the decline of the railway, and the development of road transport; 
but he ignored one other important factor: the decline of the cash crop export, which was the 
main attraction to the town. 
And finally, Folashade Ayodele’s work, “A History of Likoro”, focused on the history 
of the town in the nineteenth century.21 This present study is on the twentieth century and 
particularly on how the colonial railroads transformed the countryside between Kano and 
Zaria, countryside of which Likoro was an integral part. 
From the review so far, it is evident that the studied communities have not featured 
prominently in the literature. Of the eight communities considered, only three or four have 
attracted some attention; the remaining are essentially understudied. Also, the literature on 
the railway not only has important gaps, it also has overlooked small communities, including 
the studied ones. In consequence, many things are still unknown about these communities 
and about the railway. This study is an attempt to fill in the gaps and to situate the 
communities within in the wider literature and .in a proper historical context. 
 
1.3 Sources and methods 
This study employs a blend of mixed methodologies and evidence from primary and 
secondary sources, some of which were rarely used in previous studies. The primary sources 
                                                 
19 H. A. Ibrahim, “A History of Makarfi District in Zazzau Emirate”, (BA Dissertation, Bayero University, 
Kano, 2008). 
20 J. A. Wiseman, “Structural and Ideological Tension in a Rural Hausa Village”, African Studies Review, 22/2, 
(Sept. 1979): 1-11. 
21 A. Folashade, “A History of Likoro 1808–1902”, (BA Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, 2008). 
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include command papers, Blue Books, correspondence among colonial officials, annual 
reports, district records, travelogues, and periodicals, as well as oral data. The study also 
creatively uses innovative primary sources such as poems, songs, and photographs, which 
were rarely used in previous accounts. The secondary sources include books, articles, and 
theses/dissertations. 
The primary records were obtained from several research centres, some of which I 
have personally visited or obtained through a contact or via online digital archives. The 
provincial annual reports, district records, and Railway records, as well as the marketing 
boards’ records used in Chapters 1–6 were obtained from the archives of the Kano State 
History and Culture Bureau (KSHCB), the National Archives Kaduna (NAK), and the Arewa 
House Archives, Kaduna (AHAK). The bulk of the materials were from the NAK and 
KSHCB. This is not to suggest that those from the AHAK were not important; they were, but 
most were not germane to this study. This genre of records, although illuminating official 
perspectives, also provides insights on the several issues discussed in the various chapters. 
The period covered in the records is from the early colonial period to the 1950s. The district 
records, in particular, contained valuable information on the studied communities which is 
not available in other records. 
The Nigerian and Northern Nigerian Annual Reports utilized in Chapters 2–6 were 
obtained from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Digital Library (known as 
“Illinois Harvest”). The information contained in the records covers the period 1900–1938. 
Parliamentary transcripts from the UK/Parliament, Digital Repositories/Hansard were also 
utilized in Chapter 2. These records contained invaluable information on the development of 
the railway. And, finally, the Railway Annual Reports used in Chapters 3, 4, and 6 were 
obtained from the British National Archives/Public Record Office (PRO), London. The 
records, though few in number, provide vivid information on the railway and the 
communities. In addition to official records, old periodicals such as newspapers and 
magazines were used in Chapters 2 and 3. These periodicals were invaluable, for they 
provided critical perspectives on some of the issues covered, although the period covered is 
the early colonial period. 
It would have been virtually impossible to write this thesis without African-centred 
sources. Oral interviews formed the bulk of the primary sources used. Interviews were 
conducted across 25 villages situated along the rail line between Kano and Zaria. Two sets of 
informants were interviewed. The first set comprised community leaders and elders, some of 
whom were introduced to me by my contacts, and some of whom I approached directly on 
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my own initiative. The questions I asked them focused on village histories, the experience of 
the railway, and its relationship to development. The second set comprised informants who 
were knowledgeable about the various events discussed in the chapters. This category was of 
diverse background, comprising farmers and traders, as well as retired and serving railway 
workers. Some of them were introduced to me by the community leaders. The railway 
workers also introduced me to their colleagues or asked me to mention their names to them. 
Unlike the first set, this set of informants were diverse both in status and background. 
I am aware that the informants did not form a true representation of the populations, 
as the southern migrants who were the principal actors and eye witnesses to events described 
in Chapters 4 and 5 were not interviewed. Many of them had relocated many years before, 
while some had died. Besides the five interviewed, most of those I met were recent arrivals 
and so were not interviewed. Also, women were not represented in the populations, as all the 
informants were men. Nevertheless, this inadequacy does not affect the conclusions of the 
study, as it was remedied by recourse to other sources. 
In addition to the sources described above, the study also made use of innovative 
sources such as poems, songs, and travellers’ narratives. These sources, rarely used in 
previous studies, have proved invaluable to this study. They not only filled the silence left in 
other sources; they yielded the rich materials which the archival and oral records could not 
provide. 
Unpublished photographs were also utilized. Some of the photographs are from my 
own personal collections, while others are from private collections and archives, as well as 
from periodicals. Some of the photographs on railway construction in Chapter 2 were 
obtained from the British National Archives photo project, “Africa through a lens,” via 
Flickr/Yahoo websites.22 Permission to use the photographs has been obtained from the 
image librarian of the archives. Others were copied from old periodicals like the Engineer 
Magazine and the Graphic Newspaper, as well as from websites like Live Auctioneers23 and 
the Ijaw Nation.24 Those on trains in Chapters 3 and 6 and on produce transport by animals in 
Chapter 4 were obtained from the Facebook page of the Nigerian Nostalgia, 1960s–1980 
Project.25 Permission to use the photographs has been obtained from the owners. The 
                                                 
22 http://www.flickr.com/photos/31575009@N05/5415949209/in/photolist-9fAa1D-9fAadM-9fDiHb, 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/31575009@N05/5415949913/in/photolist-9fAadM-9fDiHb [ Accessed on 12 
November 2012]. 
23 http://www.liveauctioneers.com/item/1985580 [Accessed on 12 Februaryr 2013]. 




photographs have generally proved invaluable in illustrating some of the narratives. 
However, some of them were problematic, as detailed information regarding the author, 
provenance, motive, and date, which could have assisted in their analysis, was not always 
available. This does not undermine their importance, however, as the inadequacy was 
remedied by recourse to archival and secondary records. 
Finally, all the sources have been complemented by secondary sources such as books, 
journal articles, theses, and dissertations. Evidence from these combined sources offered 
much broader insights and perspectives than one or two sources alone could have offered. 
 
1.4 Settings 
Situated in a region referred to as the “close-settled zone”, bordering Kano City from the 
south-west and Zaria City to the north, this study is set in the rural communities situated 
along the rail line between Kano and Zaria in Northern Nigeria (see Map 1.1 below). They 
comprise eight communities, which, with the exception of Dangora, were established in the 
nineteenth century. The communities are Challowa (Challawa), Kwankwaso, Maidobi 
(Madobi), Yako, and Dangora, located in Kano Emirate, and Aucheng (Auchan), Gimi 
Dabosa (Gimi), and Likoro in Zaria Emirate.26 Some of these communities had been founded 
as fiefs of the ruling class, some as reservoirs of slave labour and military or defensive posts. 
The communities were representative of the close-settled zone due to their high population 
density and intensive farming. In his report on the survey of the railway in 1901, Gee noted 
that he saw large farms between Zaria and Kano and that no unoccupied land was available.27 
In the nineteenth century, most of the communities were dispersed, with the population 
denser around Kano.28 By the late nineteenth century, they lived in walled towns, which 
                                                                                                                                                        
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Fsearch&_rdr [Accessed on 27 November 2012]. 
26 National Archives Kaduna (hereafter referred to as NAK) NAK ZarProf 5280 Makarfi District Note Book 
1943; NAK ZarProf MLG 22289, Makarfi District Reassessment Report; NAK ZarProf 1712 Ikara Assessment 
of Representative village Area 1933–4; NAK ZarProf 1706, Makarfi District Assessment of Representative 
Village Area; Kano State History and Culture Bureau (hereafter referred to as KSHCB) KSHCB MLG 
9117/1929, Kura District of Kano Emirate Reassessment; KSHCB Acc. 68, Kura Inspection Notes vol. 1. 
27 Nigeria, Correspondence Relating to Railway Construction in Nigeria, (London: HMSO, 1905), 83. 
28 In his report on the railway survey in 1901, Mr. Gee estimated the population of the towns as follows: Likoro, 
4,000; Anchau, 5,000; Faiki, between 8000 and 10,000; and Bebeji, 25,000. Nigeria, Correspondence, 76 and 
83. P. Hill, Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano, 1900-1970, (London: Cambridge Press, 1977), 55; 
M. J. Mortimore, “Settlement Evolution and Land Use”, in: M. J. Mortimore, Zaria and Its Region: A Nigerian 
Savannah City and Its Environs, Occasional Paper No. 4, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University, 1970), 102-122, 
103-8; Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut. 
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served as focal points of agricultural settlement and defence against slave raiding.29 
Strategically, they were situated on a network of trade routes, the most popular being the 
Kano–Madobi–Zaria road, which the railway roughly followed. In addition to contributing 
greatly to the communities’ expansion, their location on the trade routes provided outlets for 
manufacturing and agricultural production.30 
Map 1.1 Map of the study areas 
 
In terms of the natural environment, the communities are situated on an undulating plain, 
with little variation in the scenery between Zaria and Kano. The region possesses a tropical 
                                                 
29 NAK ZarProf 5280 Makarfi; Yusuf, Impact of the Railway; Mortimore, “Settlement Evolution”, 108-10; W. 
B. Baikie and J. Kirk, “Notes of a Journey From Bida in Nupe, to Kano in Haussa, Performed in 1862”, Journal 
of the Royal Geographical Society of London, 37: 91867), 92-108. 
30 NAK ZarProf 5280 Makarfi; KSHCB Acc. 68 Kura; P. Staundinger, In the Heart of the Hausa States, 
(Athens: Ohio, 1990), 302-3. 
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climate marked by distinct wet and dry seasons. Situated on fertile and tillable land, the 
environment supports the cultivation of a variety of crops, such as cotton, indigo, groundnuts, 
and food crops. The soil type varies from the red laterite in northern Zaria to the light sandy 
loam in south-western Kano, with variations which affect the type of crops grown across the 
areas. The rainfall regime is also suitable for growing crops and evenly distributed, though it 
is a little higher near Zaria.31 
The existence of seasonal rivers (i.e. the Challawa, Kano, and Galma rivers), streams, 
and flood plains (fadamomi; sing. fadama) which traverse the area supports agricultural 
production and settlements (see Map 1.1 above). The flood plains were intensively exploited 
for dry season crops, such as sugar cane, onion, and various other vegetables, as well as 
providing grazing land for the pastoralist Fulani.32 Trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) was 
prevalent across the areas, especially around Gimi, Makarfi, and Ikara, as the flood plains 
bred tsetse flies, the disease carrier. In the nineteenth century, a whole village at Durum was 
wiped out or abandoned owing to a tsetse infestation.33 
In this area, as elsewhere in the Sokoto Caliphate, agriculture was the main economic 
activity, providing both subsistence and exchange requirements—notwithstanding the vent 
for surplus claims that the African economy was largely subsistence. An interesting feature of 
agriculture in the area was that everybody, including traders and the industrialists, were 
involved in it. Land was not scarce and could be accessed individually, and those without 
land could also access it on demand. In the nineteenth century, land was communal property, 
held in trust by the Emir and his representatives. In practice, the Emir granted it to members 
of the aristocracy, royal slaves, the merchant class, craftsmen, and immigrants. Once granted, 
a piece of land could be inherited, leased, bought, and sold.34 
The basic unit of production was household-based, although the aristocrat and 
merchant classes employed slave labour. Slave farms/villages (rumada; sing. rinji) and 
plantations (gandaye; sing. gandu) belonging to the aristocrat and merchant classes in the 
                                                 
31 Mortimore, “Settlement Evolution”, 103; R. K. Udo, Geographical Regions of Nigeria, (Berkeley: California 
Press, 1970), 157; Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 40-43; Yusuf, Impact of the Railway, 20-1; NAK ZarProf 
5280 Makarfi.  
32 Mortimore, “Settlement Evolution”, 103. 
33 NAK ZarProf 2900 Sleeping Sickness Existence of in Christian Village of Gimi; NAK ZarProf 1712 Ikara; 
NAK ZarProf MLG 22289 Makarfi; NAK ZarProf 395 Paki District Affairs; NAK ZarProf 1706 Makarfi; NAK 
ZarProf 5280 Makarfi; Mortimore, “Settlement Evolution”, 103 and 108. 
34 Lovejoy and Hogendorn, Slow Death. 
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cities were scattered across the areas, most especially around Zaria.35 Lovejoy and 
Hogendorn pointed out that there were two types of slave estates: those attached to political 
offices or controlled by the aristocrats, and those owned under various relationships.36 For the 
merchant class, the “plantations were meant to support their industrial activities by 
maintaining full granaries.”37 Many of the merchants dealt in kola nuts, textiles, and slaves. 
Cotton and indigo were the popular items on the plantations, as they were grown for 
industrial purposes. Unlike other crops, their production required a large amount of labour, 
which explains the utilization of slaves on plantations. Compared with other crops, the cost of 
growing cotton was high. It should be noted that not all the areas were suited to large-scale 
cotton production. Those bordering Zaria were most suited, owing to the soil type and the 
existence of slave labour. In the nineteenth century, this part of the close-settled zone was the 
main cotton and textile belt in the caliphate.38 
European travellers who passed through the area from the fifteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries lauded the flourishing cotton industry.39 It was to this same area that the British 
partly looked for cotton when they conquered the caliphate at the turn of the century. The 
existence of fertile land, slave farms, and plantations stimulated production and settlements 
across the areas. In the late nineteenth century, there was an influx of population, mostly 
farmers, traders, industrialists, and pastoralists into the areas. This increased population was 
advantageous to the communities, as it supported sedentarization and production as well as 
trade.40 
Industrial activities such as leather-working, iron works, and textile manufacture were 
popular across the region. These were mostly hereditary occupations, each with its own guild 
system. The conditions generally supported industrial production, as raw materials and 
markets for industrial products were available. The most notable industrial activities were 
weaving and dyeing, with production largely household-based, although the merchants, 
industrialists, and aristocrats depended on slave labour. Paul Staudinger, who travelled 
                                                 
35 For instance, slave farms and plantations were scattered around Challawa, Madobi, Bebeji, Kudan, Makarfi, 
Durum, Nassarawa, Likoro, and Dan Damisa, among other locations. See for instance M. G. Smith, The 
Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria, (London: HMSO, 1955), 80-2; P. E. Lovejoy, “Plantations in the 
Economy of the Slave Caliphate”, The Journal of African History, 19/3, (1978): 341-368, 353-4. 
36 Lovejoy and Hogendorn, Slow Death. 
37 Lovejoy, “Plantations”, 356. 
38 M. Condotti, “Cotton Growing and Textile Production in Northern Nigeria from the Caliphate to 
Protectorate”, being a preliminary paper presented at the African Economic History Workshop-London School 
of Economics (May 2009), 4-5 
39 See for instance E. D. Morel, Nigeria: Its People and Its Problems, (London: Faber, 1912), 239. 
40 Mortimore, “Settlement Evolution”; Hill, Population, 64-5; Yusuf, Impact of the Railway, 23-4. 
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through the area in the nineteenth century, wrote that weaving and indigo dyeing were 
popular industries there.41 However, Kano Emirate was the textile and indigo centre, while 
Zaria was the cotton centre. A large proportion of the raw cotton so produced in Zaria was 
exported to Kano where demand was high. The concept of comparative advantage applies to 
the textile industry, as it was tightly integrated with the plantations. The industry was always 
sited near plantations. For instance, weavers depended on plantations for raw cotton, while 
dyers depended on the plantations for indigo. In the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, 
centres like Kudan and Fatika were famous cotton markets, while Kura was known for its 
indigo.42 
As with other places, trading was an important economic activity in the area. People 
engaged in both local and distance trade. In most villages, the farmers and industrialists 
combined their jobs with trading. The village markets served as avenues for exchange of 
goods. From the accounts of European travellers, caravans were found at the important 
markets where traders exchanged their goods.43 Products from the industries and plantations 
entered the markets through the industrialists, who themselves were long-distance traders 
(fatake).44 As was the tradition in the caliphate, products from the plantations were oriented 
to the regional markets, while those from the indigenous industries were oriented to the 
international markets. Proceeds from the sales of such products were also reinvested in raw 
materials and other products that could be sold back at home.45 However, this form of trade 
was constrained by an inefficient transport system, which prevented its full integration into 
worldwide markets. 
As is obvious from the foregoing discussion, transport and communication were not 
mechanical-based and used methods such as human portage and pack animals. These forms 
of transport were the oldest. The function of transport in any society is to move goods and 
services from demand to supply point and vice versa. Pre-colonial Nigerian society did not 
develop wheeled transport. Instead, it relied on human carriers and pack animals, not only for 
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transporting goods from farms to the markets, but also for long-distance journeys and trade. 
The most common pack animal was the donkey. Nearly every household owned a donkey, 
and those without one hired the services of professional animal transporters.46 Camels were 
also used, but they were most suited to desert or trans-Saharan journeys, because of their 
ability to do without water for at least two weeks and without food for a week.47 
Although these forms of transport performed the traditional function of transport in 
the traditional economy, they were inadequate because their performance, and capabilities 
were in practice constrained by weight, speed, and distance. Carrier transport is not only 
costly for long-distance journeys; it is also time-consuming. For instance, a caravan of 
women traders who tried to attach themselves to Henry Barth’s party on the Katsina–Kano 
route were left behind because they could not keep pace with the party, owing to the weight 
of their loads.48 Pack animals, especially donkeys, are easy to breed, cheap to maintain, and 
have the patience and endurance which other animals lack (hence the Hausa proverb, hakurin 
kaya sai jaki: “only a donkey shows patience under a load”), but they have a lower carrying 
capacity and can be stubborn at times.49 When the British arrived at the turn of the century, it 
was on these same traditional transport methods that they depended when they were faced by 
transport needs during the first ten years of their arrival. For instance, in 1907–1908, 
approximately 3,000 pack animals were hired to the British administration in Northern 
Nigeria by professional animal transporters.50 
The imposition of British rule on the Sokoto Caliphate by Captain (later Sir) Fredrick 
D. Lugard at the turn of the century brought dramatic changes to the existing socio-political 
arrangements. British imperialism was a response to the problem of industrial revolution in 
Britain, which required Britain to seek new markets and new sources of raw materials. In the 
late nineteenth century, Britain’s pre-eminence was challenged by the rise of other industrial 
powers, most notably the United States of America, France, and Germany, who encroached 
on her markets. Added to this was the raw materials crisis, particularly the raw cotton crisis, 
which required urgent attention.51 British industrialists with vested interest in textiles, 
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especially the chambers of commerce of Liverpool and Manchester and other imperial-based 
organizations, lobbied and pressured the home government to open up Africa to British 
industrialists, capital, and goods.52 The imposition of British rule was therefore partly a 
response to the raw cotton hunger. The conquest was achieved by surrender and war. Zaria 
surrendered in 1902 without a fight, while Kano was taken the following year, after a major 
confrontation with the British.53 
British colonialism marked a new phase in Northern Nigeria’s political and economic 
history. The colonial authority stripped the traditional rulers of their powers and subordinated 
them to the British-appointed Residents. The British introduced an indirect rule system which 
decentralized administration and power to the lowest political units. Hitherto, power was 
concentrated in the hands of absentee landlords, who resided in the state capitals. In the 
ensuing scenario, the studied communities were brought firmly under British control. Under 
the new arrangement, Challawa, Kwankwaso, Madobi, Yako, and Dangora were brought 
under the newly established Turaki Manya or Kura District, which comprised Kura and Kiru 
and part of Kumbotso districts, until their separation in the 1920s. In the same manner, 
Madobi was made a sub-district, but this was abrogated in 1908. Gimi and Likoro were 
brought under Galadima/Makarfi District, while Auchang/Auchan was made the 
administrative headquarters of Magajin Gari/Auchan District.54 
In the course of this development, the British also made transformative alterations to 
the existing social relations of production, which they considered too primitive and 
inadequate to satisfy their own imperial agenda, and they introduced policies with the aim of 
expanding the economy. They abolished slavery and removed all obstacles to free trade. They 
monetized the economy and enforced payment of taxes in the new currency, which in the 
long run facilitated cash crop and mineral export. The colonial authority also introduced a 
land policy which not only dispossessed people of their rights to land and its resources, but 
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also forced many into wage labour. As was the British imperial policy everywhere, they 
introduced a mass import policy to carve out markets for British-manufactured goods.55 All 
these factors not only undermined indigenous crafts; they also rendered the crafts people 
redundant and forced them to depend on European manufactured substitutes. 
However, the colonial policies were full of contradictions. Their anti-slavery law did 
not abolish slavery outright, as the authority felt it might ruin the aristocrat and merchant 
classes. The law discouraged wholesale flight of slaves and prescribed procedures through 
which slaves could gain their freedom. Since the colonial state denied slaves access to land, 
even if they obtained their freedom most slaves remained with their masters; and so slavery 
and its institution continued up to the 1930s. As Robert Shenton, Louis Lenninham, Michael 
Watts, and others have argued, the anti-slavery and land laws technically favoured the 
aristocrat and merchant classes, with whom the British had forged a new alliance. According 
to these authors, the initial land law was not popular and so was modified in 1906 and 1910 
to provide incentives to smallholders.56 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The narrative movement of the study is structured into seven chapters, which collectively tell 
a story of how the steam engine transformed the countryside between Kano and Zaria into 
economically significant and complex settlements along the rail line. The study contributes to 
social history on how northerners first encountered the railway and how they later 
appropriated it in distinctive ways to transform their lives. The narrative also helps to explain 
how Nigerian initiative and agency resulted in different uses of the railway. It offers new 
insights into and interpretations of the history of the Nigerian Railway in relation to its 
development. 
The study is divided into the following chapters:  
Chapter 1, this introductory chapter, introduces the study and highlights the general 
context in which the railways and the studied communities have been discussed and 
represented in the literature. It also provides a brief overview of the studied communities in 
the nineteenth century. 
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Chapter 2, “The Politics and Construction of the Baro–Kano Railway”, examines the 
controversy and rivalry which surrounded the extension of the railway to the North. It also 
explores how the northern communities encountered its construction. 
Chapter 3, “Perception, Appropriation and Domestication of Transport Innovation”, 
looks at how the railway was perceived, the reactions it generated, and how it was 
appropriated and integrated into daily life.  
Chapter 4, “Transport Advance, Marketing and Reactions of Local Producers”, looks 
at how the railroad activated cash crop production and trade and the opportunities it offered. 
It also looks at how subsistence food production was maintained in the face of cash cropping. 
Chapter 5, “The Emergence of New Settlement Patterns and the Intermingling of 
Cultures”, discusses how the railway influenced population movement, the emergence of new 
settlement patterns along the rail line, and the effects of this on national integration. 
Chapter 6, “The Railway and Criminality”, examines how the railway bred criminality 
and provided a platform for criminals to operate. 
 Chapter 7, “Conclusion”, ties together the findings in the various chapters. In this 




CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICS AND CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE BARO–KANO RAILWAY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the imposition of British rule, the colonial authority in Northern Nigeria was 
concerned about the state of the region, which it considered “unexplored” and 
underdeveloped. In official circles, a modern transport system, particularly a railway, was 
seen as the mechanism that would not only open up the territory, but also provide the critical 
link it needed to break away from its dependency on Southern Nigeria. The proposal to 
construct the rail line provoked a prolonged rivalry and controversy, pitting the Lagos and 
southern authorities against the Northern Authority. 
This chapter does two things. First, it analyses the “great” longing for a railway on the 
part of the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria and the rivalry and controversy 
among the provincial colonial administrators over the extension of the railway to Kano. The 
chapter argues that railway development is by its very nature a controversial project, because 
it is both a political and an economic endeavour. Second, it examines the construction of the 
railway and the reactions it generated. It argues that the local inhabitants along the rail line, 
because of their lack of familiarity with western technology, encountered the construction 
work with mixed reactions of fear, apprehension, and awe. 
 
2.2  Diplomatic conflict and controversy 
 
History records that in the early days of railroad building in all countries the pioneers met 
with considerable opposition. As in other countries, so it was in Nigeria. 
Nigerian Railway Jubilee, 1911. 
 
With the formal establishment of British rule, the colonial authority in Northern Nigeria—
under Frederick Lugard, the High Commissioner (1900–1906)—focused on improving the 
existing transport system with the aim of expanding the economy. The subsistence society 
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over which Lugard superintended had a problem with overland transport.1 At the time of the 
conquest, transport and communication were traditionally based, and pre-colonial Northern 
Nigeria had not developed wheeled transport. The existing transport was based on human and 
animal transport over narrow footpaths. This traditional transportation was considered 
inadequate owing to its low speed and low carrying capacity. It may have satisfied the 
traditional function of transport in pre-colonial days, but under the new dispensation such 
transport was considered primitive and inadequate to satisfy the main objective of 
colonialism. Besides their numerous limitations, including low speed and capacity, which 
Lugard noted, he disliked the carriers’ transport services for their tendency to steal and to 
charge high rates.2 Although the region had two main rivers, the Niger and Benue rivers, 
which could be used to further its development, these were not navigable for large vessels all 
year round, owing to natural impediments such as sand bars. In view of the existing 
inadequacies, the opening of the territory to British goods, capital, and trade—to which 
Lugard’s administration was committed—might be jeopardized.  
Lugard considered the situation as requiring urgent attention. He believed that a 
modern transport system was required, not only to open up the region which he considered 
unexplored to British trade and the civilizing influence of modern commerce, but also to 
extend his influence, because some enclaves were yet to be brought under effective control. 
Added to his anxiety was the financial position of his administration. The region over which 
he ruled was landlocked and insolvent and barely survived on the imperial treasury and 
annual grants in aid from the more buoyant Lagos and Southern Protectorates, a situation 
which Lugard resented, in spite of the fact that being landlocked can be an advantage to levy 
tariffs on cheap imports.3 Modern transport was considered essential, Lugard felt, not only to 
develop the commercial potentials of the region, but also to enhance its revenue capacity and 
make it less dependent on grants. The trade routes that could have added to the state coffers 
also were not safe, due to the high tolls and the activity of robbers, which he considered 
inimical to free trade and the Pax Britannica to which his administration was committed.4 
                                                 
1 F. Shelfdord, “Ten Year’s Progress in West Africa”, The Royal African Society, 6/24, (1907): 341-49, 348. 
2 Colonial Report-Annual, Northern Nigeria, Report for 1902, 56-7; Colonial Report-Annual, Northern Nigeria, 
Report for 1904, 103. 
3 P. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About it, (New 
York: Oxford Press, 2007), 56/57. 




In order to expedite the opening up of the region and to strengthen his 
administration’s influence, Lugard proposed an improvement to the transport facilities. As he 
asserted, “the material development of Africa may be summed up in one word—Transport”.5 
That is to say, a modern transport was required to fast track Africa and in this regard 
Northern Nigeria development. He envisioned a modern transport system that would dislodge 
the caravan trade routes and divert the trade to the new centres of administration, while also 
preventing Britain’s rivals (the French and Germans) from diverting the trade to their own 
colonies.6 Lugard considered railway the most practical solution and the only means that 
could serve the major objective of colonialism more satisfactorily and more conveniently 
than other transport methods. W. W. Rostow has asserted that railways were the single most 
important cause of industrial take-off in Europe, the Americas, and elsewhere.7 Unlike other 
forms of transport, rail had the advantage of discounting space, and it could do the work of 
13,000 carriers at one time.8 
Lugard could not recommend road transport, for it required good roads, which were 
lacking in the country. Although a road could be built cheaply and quickly with local 
materials, it was not a viable option because it could not withstand the large-scale economic 
activities envisioned by the authorities. While roads could aid the export economy, they could 
not act independently.9 Besides, road transport was still in its infancy at this time even in 
Europe. It was not until after World War I that American Ford trucks began to make their 
appearance in the country.10 Also, Lugard did not propose river transport, for, as mentioned 
earlier, the existing rivers in the country were not navigable for large vessels all year round.11 
In view of the advantages the railway had over other forms of transport, Lugard therefore 
proposed building a railway, not only because he believed the economic development of the 
region depended on it, but also because he saw it as the critical link to the sea, a link which 
Northern Nigeria needed in order to break away from its dependency on Southern Nigeria.12 
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From the outset, the call for the railway came from the colonial authority and not 
businessmen or speculators who wanted government guarantees. Although railways were 
expensive to build—as the permanent ways, rolling stock, and other facilities had to be 
imported and had to be made strong—this was the best economic option, because railways 
were always built ahead of demand, unlike roads.13 Even before Lugard’s posting to Northern 
Nigeria, the Niger Committee constituted by the Colonial Office in 1898 had recommended 
the construction of railways as the most practical mechanism for developing the three British 
Niger territories.14 The General Act of the Brussels conference, to which Britain itself was a 
signatory, had also imposed upon member countries an obligation to construct railroads as 
evidence of effective control.15 However, Lugard’s proposal was for a separate railway, one 
which would be independent of the Lagos Government Railway—or put another way, a rail–
river transport system from port Baro on the Niger to Kano, the northern entrepôt. He also 





Map 2.1 Map of Nigeria in 1900 
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Although it has been often claimed that Lugard opted for a tramway because his 
railway proposal was rejected, this common view is somewhat misleading16 and needs to be 
corrected. The evidence indicates that he proposed the two systems almost simultaneously— 
even though he confused readers of his annual reports and corresponce as to what exactly his 
preferences were, because they give the impression that his interest in a tramway was only 
secondary. I argue that both the railway and tramway were at the heart of his administration, 
although he had different motives for the two. The problem with Lugard was that he was 
somewhat difficult to understand. His first interest and reference to the tramway dated back 
to 1900, which was when he formally assumed office and began to propagate his “railway 
idea”, though he did not push the tramway proposal as forcefully as the railway one.17 The 
tramway was merely a temporary expedient, meant to obviate the administrative difficulties 
at his new headquarters at Zungeru dungurun, while the railway was for “opening up” the 
region as a whole.18 
The need for a tramway, as Lugard articulated it, was for administrative purposes. The 
line, according to him, would obviate the transport difficulty between his new proposed 
headquarters at Zungeru and Wushishi on the Kaduna River. This line would facilitate river 
navigation during low water volume while also allowing bulky stores to be brought with little 
difficulty during the flood season.19 He argued that connecting the new headquarters with 
Barijuko by a short tramway would facilitate the complete pacification of the belt between 
the Niger and the hinterland.20 Lugard was anxious to extend his full control into the 
hinterland simultaneously with the relocation of his headquarters. As far as he was 
concerned, the tramway and relocation of his headquarters were inseparable. Lugard’s hatred 
for Lokoja stemmed from its unhealthy condition, which he considered was unsuitable for 
European habitation.21 The tramway, a short ten-mile run from Zungeru to Barijuko, was 
approved by the Colonial Office late in 1900 and was completed in 1901.22 
The proposal for the railway, on the other hand, was mooted in the same year as the 
tramway, though differently. The rail line was conceived as a separate line, independent of 
the Lagos Government Railway. As studies indicate, the Baro–Kano railway or the rail–river 
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proposal was not Lugard’s original idea; it was the Niger Committee’s idea. This committee 
was set up by the Colonial Office to consider the future development of the British Niger 
Territories. Lugard was just an army officer then under the Royal Niger Company (RNC), an 
imperialist company that was mandated to rule over the Northern Territory at that time on 
.behalf of Britain.23 Having assumed control of the region, he was fascinated by their report. 
He believed that a vast region such as Northern Nigeria, which occupies approximately two-
thirds of the total land mass of the country (see Map 2.1 above), could not be developed 
except by having its own railway. Lugard asserted that the commercial development of the 
region was dependent on a separate railway and not on a connection with the Lagos 
Government Railway. He noted that since Northern Nigeria had waterways of its own, a 
railway should be developed for the benefit of the region. As far as he was concerned, the 
Lagos Railway has nothing to offer the North, and he emphasized that every yard of the 
railway from Niger to Kano would supersede caravan transport and promote trade.24 
This view differs from the one he had expressed earlier in 1899 and recapitulated in 
1900, when he expressed the need for a general railway policy and the necessity for three 
separate lines. The first would be a western line from Lagos to Sapele- a good port town. He 
cautioned that the extension should be determined by a comparative cost advantage and 
called for its extension to Ilorin, but that its extension to Jebba should be determined by a 
survey. Should the Lagos Railway extend to Kano, he urged that the point at which it crossed 
the Niger be decided in view of the cost of bridging the Niger, while he also suggested a 
survey of alternative routes. Second, he proposed an eastern line from Old Calabar to Lake 
Chad. In addition to proposing a general railway policy for the country, Lugard proposed 
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surveys and road-making to prepare the way for these railways. This would help provincial 
administrators determine the line of development and progress. Third, Lugard crowned the 
proposal with his rail–river transport system, which, according to him, should be independent 
of the Lagos Government Railway.25 This was the controversial Baro–Kano railway, which 
was to become a source of diplomatic rivalry and controversy with the other two provincial 
administrators. 
In justifying the railway, Lugard based his arguments on political, administrative, 
commercial, and strategic reasons. He argued that railway construction was essential for the 
purposes of internal administration and communication, as government officials could move 
from one post to another with minimum difficulty. From the commercial and economic 
standpoint, he believed the railway would stimulate agricultural production, commerce, and 
movement of goods from inland to the coast, all to the benefit of the home country (Britain). 
The railway, as he further asserted, should be seen as part of the scheme of imperial defence, 
facilitating rapid concentration of troops and supplies if necessary, in view of the French and 
German presence on the Nigerian frontiers.26 
However, Lugard’s proposal did not sail through as one might have expected. It 
provoked reactions of rivalry and controversy between Lugard and the other local provincial 
administrators’ (i.e. Governor of Lagos Colony Sir William McGregor and High 
Commissioner of Southern Nigeria Sir Ralph Moor), pitting them against one another. 
Writers who commented on this rivalry and controversy—T. N. Tamuno, A. O. Anjorin, J. 
M. Carland, and others—expressed the view that it was fuelled by the lack of a general 
transport policy to guide the administrators. This popular argument, so consumed and 
accepted by many, is misleading and needs to be corrected. Although the argument sounds 
convincing, it is too simplistic to explain why a mere idea of a railway provoked such rivalry 
and controversy. I argue that regardless of the policy guideline, railway development 
worldwide is always controversial because it is a political as well as an economic matter. This 
is so because of the initial sunk costs, expected returns on investment, and the issue of 
control. The decisions to build a line, the choice of junctions and terminals, and the freight 
rate, etc. are all controversial matters which are determined by the financiers and not the 
promoters of a rail line. After completion, a rail line also requires government subsidies.27 
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Hence, the rivalry among the administrators was based on their own regional interests, trade, 
and control, which were at cross purposes.  
As Ronald Robinson argues, railroads are the cause of imperial rivalry. The idea or 
mere rumour of a railway in a sensitive place could generate conflict.28 And, as Jamie 
Monson states, “[t]o construct a rail line was to command a region and [to] control a region 
[…] was to keep rivals out.”29 As the evidence indicates, the idea of a railway, even within 
one political entity, was a matter of political rivalry and controversy.30 And, as G. Pirie 
pointed out, a poorly managed railroad conflict could even result in armed struggle.31 
It is against this backdrop that the rivalry and controversy may be seen, and the lack 
of a policy guideline was merely a contributing factor. As came to be seen, Lugard’s proposal 
conflicted with the other administrators’ agendas. McGregor, in particular, was against the 
proposal because he saw the proposed railway as a rival one, which would compete with his 
own agenda of extending the Lagos Railway to Kano and Lake Tchad. He saw the Northern 
Nigeria as his own natural hinterland and believed that Lagos should be the sole outlet of the 
country to the sea. Therefore, to suggest an alternative port, as Lugard did, would undermine 
Lagos’s pre-eminence.32 This was the same view his predecessor Sir Henry McCallum had 
expressed while as a member of the Niger Committee. Right from the inaugural ceremony of 
the railway at Ibadan in 1901, McGregor had proposed its extension northward as far as Kano 
for strategic reasons, owing partly to the parallel railway development in the French Territory 
of Dahomey, and for the commercial development of Lagos and Northern Nigeria.33 
Ralph Moor, on the other hand, though somewhat neutral and more objective than the 
other two, cleverly avoided reference to Lugard’s proposal. Instead, he proposed a general 
railway policy for the country. He noted that any attempt to develop the country by railroads 
should be comprehensive from the start so as to determine the number of trunk lines required 
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for the proper opening up and development of the country. This was the same view he had 
expressed three years earlier as a member of the Niger Committee. Like Lugard, he believed 
the country required more than one trunk line. However, he proposed two main railways, 
namely, a western and eastern railway, with the Niger and Benue rivers playing important 
roles. First, he proposed a western line from Lagos and Sapele to Kano, to be joined by 
branch lines to Bauchi and Sokoto from Zaria. Second, he proposed another line from Old 
Calabar to the upper waters of Cross Rivers, and thence to Ibi, Benue, and Bauchi, with a 
branch line to join up with the mainline and extend as far as Kuka near Lake Tchad.3435 
However, he suggested that the financial cost of the project should be borne by the Colonial 
Office, because the colonial state itself could not afford the project. While indirectly spiting 
Lugard, he called for the provincial administrations to be self-supporting.36 
With regard to the extension of the Lagos Railway northward, Moor suggested that it 
should be determined by the suitability of the Lagos port and the fitness of Lagos itself. He 
discouraged the extension of the line beyond Oshogbo, however, until the main depot for the 
interior had been determined—since, according to him, the extension of the line to Oshogbo 
would determine the course of the line to the interior.37 On the question of the main port or 
harbour for the country, Moor recapitulated the views he had expressed in 1897, when he 
opposed the choice of Lagos as gateway to the country. He pointed out that of the nine 
coastlines in the country, Lagos was “distinctively the worst” terminus of any railway, as it 
could not accommodate a large vessel drawing more than nine feet of water, owing to a sand 
bar. Instead, merchandise had to be taken by branch steamers to Forcados, a deeper port. 
Unlike Lagos harbour, the other harbours could accommodate large vessels, with Forcados 
and Warri drawing 20 feet, Sapele 18 feet, Akassa 14 feet, Brass 14 feet, Bonny 21 feet, 
Opobo 14 feet, and Old Calabar 20 feet. And, he pointed out, “in all of these ports, the 
steamers lie in still water”. While admitting that the Lagos sand bar could be removed at a 
great cost, he pointed out that Lagos did not have a suitable depot. The Lagos depot, situated 
as it was on Lagos Island i1nstead of the mainland, was not a suitable depot for the country. 
Besides its low-lying, insalubrious conditions and lack of drainage facilities, it lacked a good 
water supply.38 Based on a comparative assessment of the various harbours, Moor 
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recommended Old Calabar as the best port on account of its ability to draw 20-foot steamers, 
ample accommodation for large vessels, ample space for a town or city of any size, good 
water supply, and sanitary conditions which were lacking in the other ports, including 
Lagos.39 
Looking at the debates, it is obvious that Lugard’s proposal was not only 
controversial, it also pitted the three administrators against one another. Neither McGregor 
nor Moor supported Lugard; they did not see the Baro port as capable of opening up the 
northern region. Although they agreed that the Lagos Railway should go to Kano, each of 
them saw their own region as the best outlets for the opening up of Northern Nigeria. While 
Moor and Lugard believed that the country required more than one trunk line, they differed in 
the actual number required; but they were united in opposition to the idea of Lagos being the 
sole outlet for the country. The three also subscribed to a unified rail network but wanted 
regional control of the lines. They could neither arrive at a consensus nor come up with an 
acceptable alternative proposal. The Colonial Office was aware of the rancour and always 
acted as a bridge between them. It should be noted that this same rancour occurred during the 
sittings of the Niger Committee, as the provincial administrators on the committee at the time 
were campaigning for their respective regions. The members could not collectively reach a 
consensus, though some en bloc unanimously proposed the rail–river railway (which was to 
become the subject of controversy) and also opposed the idea of Lagos as an outlet for the 
country. As is clear from the above, the rivalry continued even after the end of the Niger 
Committee’s activities.40 
Despite the several meetings organized to resolve the rivalry, it dragged on for six 
years. Part of the reason it lasted for so long was the lack of funds. The Colonial Office had 
reduced its financial commitment to the colony, and the Northern government that wanted the 
railway was not in a position to finance the project. As mentioned earlier, the administration 
was poor and barely survived on an imperial treasury and annual grant from the more 
buoyant Southern Protectorate. Southern Nigeria (already merged with Lagos Colony), which 
wanted the extension of its own railway northward, could not afford it either. The Colonial 
Office did not consider it creditworthy enough to warrant a loan for its extension project. The 
Lagos Railway, already extended as far as Ibadan, had yet to pay its way, as a half-
constructed line rarely pays its way until finally completed. It is also clear that from the start 
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the Colonial Office had made up its mind to push the line to Kano but had yet to issue a 
policy statement on the matter. Another important reason for the delay was the insufficient 
knowledge about the Northern Provinces at that time and the projected routes through which 
the railway would pass. Between 1900 and 1905, no less than five surveys had been carried 
out under Lugard to determine the course of the railway, in addition to the boundary and 
other forms of surveys.41 At one such survey, the parties were even driven back at Bebeji, 
which led to the death of one of their carriers.42 
When Lugard realized that the Colonial Office was not ready to commit itself to the 
project, he allied himself with the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) in 1904. 
Established by a consortium of British merchants with vested interests in textiles and the 
British government, the BCGA’s aim was to further cotton imperialism in British West 
Africa.43 As Arthur Hutton, the Chairman of BCGA in Manchester, asserted, any effort to 
broaden the basis of the supply of cotton was true imperialism. Disappointed by its 
experience in Southern Nigeria, the BCGA was on the lookout for a new source of cotton  in 
the North. Lugard wanted to use his new-found romance with the BCGA to curry favour for 
his pet project. He assured the BCGA of the cotton potentials in the region and of his 
administration’s assistance. He pointed out to them the inadequacy of the transport situation; 
and unless it was improved, Lugard warned, cotton could not be exploited in commercial 
quantities.44 In the same manner, his Forestry Officer, W. R. Elliott, also noted that cotton 
could be exported in large quantities only if the transport system could be improved.45 Kano 
and Zaria, particularly the close-settled zone between Kano and Zaria (where the studied 
communities are situated), attracted the attention of the colonial authority owing to its cotton 
potential.46 Impressed by Lugard’s support, the BCGA assured him of its readiness to 
promote cotton and of its support for the railway, with a promise to take the matter up with 
the home government.47 
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In 1906, the BCGA together with the Chamber of Commerce of the United Kingdom 
sent a powerful deputation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, 
concerning the Northern Nigerian Railway and why the government should support it. By 
1907, Parliament had approved the construction of a railway, known in official parlance as 
the “pioneer railway”, from Baro to Kano, bringing to an end six years of rivalry and conflict. 
The approval was justified on the basis of administrative and military difficulties and for the 
purpose of opening up trade as well as the development of cotton.48 
The transfer and construction of this imperial railway technology was to be carried 
out by the Northern Nigeria’s Public Works Department (PWD), restructured to become the 
Public Works Department and Railway (PWD&R), under the supervision of Sir Percy 
Girouard, a Canadian Royal Engineer who had previously built inexpensive railways in the 
Sudan, South Africa, Central South Africa, and East Africa.49 Girouard was specially 
recruited in 1906 to draw up a general railway policy for the country and to determine the 
standard gauge, method of construction, and the cost. He was also made a High 
Commissioner following Lugard’s departure, a departure that bore the mark of Lugard’s 
frustration over his pet project. Girouard was to be assisted by J. E. Eaglesome, another 
railway engineer, who himself was Lugard’s Director of PWD. The Zungeru–Barijuko 
tramway mentioned earlier was built under his supervision. 
During this prolonged rivalry, the Southern Provinces lost out, as its Eastern Railway 
was not approved, although the extension of the Lagos Railway to meet up with the Baro–
Kano railway was approved. Funding for the Baro–Kano railway was to be provided by the 
Southern Protectorate, since the Northern Protectorate could not afford to fund the project. 
Simon Heap pointed out that the railway was built with liquor money.50 It was also 
recommended that the line, when completed, should be taken over by the Southern 
Protectorate. Also sanctioned was the improvement of the Lagos harbour, in view of the 
approved railway. Equally authorized was the amalgamation of the two railways and the 
administration of the two protectorates in principle when the projects were completed. From 
the colonial authority’s point of view, amalgamating the two railways and the administration 
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of the two protectorates would provide a pool of revenue for financing the railway and might 
also rescue the Northern Protectorates from its treasury control.51 
A fact not often recognized in the literature is that the railway was conceived as a 
“pioneer line”, to be built as cheaply as possible. The principle of a pioneer railway was to 
build a cheap railway that would be developed to standard when traffic developed. As 
Girouard himself asserted, a good pioneer line, with a hauling capacity of 20,000 to 30,000 
tons a year each way, was adequate for developing the Northern Territories; and, as traffic 
developed, additional rolling stock and other facilities capable of handling 200,000 tons per 
annum would be required.52 This temporary nature of the system was to create difficulties 
later for the system when traffic developed. On this type of system, earthworks were of the 
lightest description, and not many stations were required, except at the more important 
centres where traffic was anticipated. The stations were to be a single building with simple 
platforms; otherwise, small iron sheds and rail-level platforms were the required structures 
befitting a pioneer railway. There would also be small stations at intervals of 12–14 miles and 
crossing stations every 35 miles.53 
Although the line had now been approved, construction had yet to commence because 
Girouard was yet to submit his report, and little survey and earthworks had been undertaken. 
By the time he submitted his report, it did not differ much from Lugard’s original plan, 
though he modified some aspects. Like Lugard, Girouard believed the North could be 
developed by a rail–river system, with the Baro River to serve as its main outlet to the sea—
and not Lagos. The line was to be built at a cost of £3,000 a mile, a total cost of £1,230,000, 
and an additional £30,000 for a dredger to keep the river open all year round.54 Also proposed 
was the construction of the railway by the PWD&R, to be assisted by government officials in 
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other departments. Integral to this was the use of local or political labour, a method conceived 
by Lugard. This method supposed that the line should be built by local labour recruited 
through the local authorities / traditional rulers. The thinking behind building the railway 
through the PWD&R and the use of local labour itself centred on economics. The best way to 
build a cheap and inexpensive railway was through the PWD&R.55 Girouard also 
recommended the construction of a 3 ft. 6 in. line, which was the West African standard 
gauge at the time, as opposed to the 2 ft. 6 in., suggested by Lugard. 
The Colonial Office accepted Girouard’s report and sanctioned the immediate 
planning and recruitment of labour and experts for the work.56 The Colonial Office also 
recommended a review of the existing land tenure system so that the region could benefit 
from any advantage resulting from building the railway. Right from the start, Girouard 
nationalized the land to prevent land speculators reaping the benefits of increased land values, 
and the practice of leasing land to European traders or non-indigenous Africans for long 
periods was prohibited.57 
 
2.3 Fear, marvel and the construction of the imperial railway 
Now that the railway had been approved for construction, how was it constructed and 
domesticated? How did the local population perceive it? What reactions did it generate? 
These are some of the questions this section will answer. 
The main construction of the railway was performed by indigenous labourers, 
comprising peasants, slaves, and prisoners that were recruited through force. This labour 
recruitment was the first stage in the construction and domestication of the railway. 
Recruitment was conducted through the combined efforts of the European Political Officers 
and the local authorities, comprising the traditional rulers. Although the colonial authority 
referred to the labour as voluntary, in actual fact it was not. When labour was required, the 
European Political Officers instructed the traditional rulers on the numbers so required from 
each district. The local authorities in turn forced the labourers to go to the construction sites 
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against their will. Whole villages and farms along the rail line were torn apart to recruit 
labour. Many were not paid, and many were underpaid. Forced labour was adopted for the 
Northern Railway partly because of labour shortages (both skilled and unskilled), partly 
because people were not willing to work for the white man (nasara), and partly because it 
was the best way to build a cheap railway.58 
In theory, the labourers were supposed to work for a few weeks, supervised and paid 
directly by the European Political Officers, after which they were to be replaced by another 
group. This, according to the colonial state, would save them from exploitation; but in 
practice, they worked longer than required and were paid a paltry sum, in addition to being 
forced.59 This method differed from the one used on the Lagos Railway and its extension 
northward, namely the contract method, in which private contractors supplied the labour.60 
Right from the start of the work in the North, the local authorities there acted as the labour 
contractors. Instead of allowing labour to voluntarily come to the site, the villages along the 
line were raided to recruit labour for survey, earth, and construction works. This massive 
labour recruitment, the movement of high-tech construction materials, and the aura which 
marked the construction of the railway provoked mixed reactions of fear and awe, much more 
so than has been previously recognized.  
The manner in which the construction of the railway has been represented in the 
literature says nothing about how the Nigerian communities along the rail line encountered or 
perceived and reacted to the work, or about how they appropriated the work. This inadequacy 
is understandable given the sources available to the writers at the time. Another reason is that, 
as Collin Dival and George Revill pointed out, transport historians rarely conceive of the 
railway as technology. “[I]f they do they conceptualize it as hardware, the development of 
which was a purely economic phenomenon and ignored its wider semiotic qualities”.61 This 
needs to be corrected, because new technologies are always accompanied by mixed reactions. 
Michael Mason and A. O. Anjorin discussed the reactions to the labour recruitment, and 
Mason in particular commented on the uprising (discussed later) connected with this 
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recruitment; however, in their different analyses, the reactions they focused on did not go 
beyond flight. I will argue that during this period of technology transfer, when northerners 
first encountered or came into contact with the railway technology, their reactions were rather 
more mixed and profound.  
Using an old Hausa poem entitled Waƙar Diga (song of diga, or railway)—composed 
by Aliyu Dansidi, the first British-appointed Emir of Zazzau (1902–1924), and dating to 
1908/9—a poem translated and analysed by Sani Umar, Yusuf Nadabo, and Brian Larkin,62 I 
argue that the domestication of the railway was perceived as colonial sublime and produced 
mixed reactions of fear, terror, and awe, as well as anti-colonial feelings. Umar’s work on 
Muslims’ intellectual responses to colonialism and Larkin’s work on northerners’ reactions to 
Western technology have been invaluable in this respect. Couched in allegorical form to give 
force and urgency to the message,63 Wakar Diga is a discourse on colonialism, the 
psychological and economic effects of the domestication of railway technology, and 
Muslims’ encounter with Western railway technology during the colonial period, “when eyes 
had not opened”. The poem was composed at the onset of the railway construction. 
To understand why the domestication of the railway provoked mixed reactions, it is 
useful to think of it as colonial sublime. The colonial sublime is a mixed reaction of anxiety, 
fear, and awe, as well as the struggle the mind experiences when confronted by grand, man-
made objects which it cannot comprehend.64 Under the British colonial regime, the sublime 
was produced through infrastructural development. The essence of this was to arouse feelings 
of the sublime and to demonstrate the power of Western civilization and modernity to the 
colonized.65 In this regard, the massive labour recruitment, the building of the tracks, roads, 
viaducts, and bridges, the ability to reclaim rivers and streams, and the levelling of rocks and 
hills, as well as the tearing apart of villages to make way for the railway were some of the 
ways the sublime was produced as a spectacle of colonialism.66 Brian Larkin argued that the 
colonial sublime sought to create feelings of total submission to colonial rule.67 
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Right from the start of the work in Bida Province (the first province on the rail line), it 
was obvious that the whole work required close political attention, and High Commissioner 
Percy Girouard personally toured the districts along the line. During the tour, he impressed on 
the emirs the importance the administration attached to the project and why they must support 
it. The support of the emirs was necessary because the recruitment and organization of labour 
rested squarely on their shoulders.68 As Michael Mason pointed out, the emirs were 
remunerated for their services.69 The districts on the rail line were reorganized with resident 
district headmen appointed for the purpose of labour recruitment. A new district of Baro was 
created for the purpose of labour supplies by merging Baro and Katcha under the Makum of 
Bida.70 Nupe Province itself was renamed Niger Province, and the districts of Kuta and 
Kwongoma under Zaria Province were transferred to Niger Province in 1908.71 
This massive labour recruitment, administrative reshuffling, and the penetration of 
construction materials which marked the period were not only novel by local standards; they 
also provoked deep reactions. For instance, the Assistant Resident of Nupe Province, E. G. 
Dupigny, reported that the labour recruitment “was not popular, as the Nupe is intensely 
attached to his house, and does not like leaving it even for two or three months”.72 The 
Director of PWD&R, J. N. O. Eaglesome, recognized the fright and suspicions of the 
labourers.73 The emirs and their officials were also terrified by the situation, but they could 
not complain, for to do so would amount to protest which might lead to removal from office. 
On a broader level, whole towns and farms were torn apart for labour and construction work. 
The presence of high-tech construction materials and the aura which filled the air combined 
to produce great reactions of fear (tsoro) and awe (mamaki).. 
The Waƙar Diga—a 70-verse poem composed after Dansidi’s visit to the construction 
site—captured the fright and terror of the time. Dansidi represented the advent of the railway 
as sublime. He showed that the domestication of the railway evoked fear and terror. People 
were pressed to work on the railway against their wills. Contrary to the smooth collaborative 
narratives in previous analyses, the poem indicates that the local authorities, from the emirs to 
the village headmen themselves, were terrified by the massive labour recruitment and 
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construction work because they were not familiar with Western technology. They had been 
compelled to produce the labour, whole towns and villages disrupted and farmers compelled 
to leave their farms for railway work, thereby causing population dislocation. Dansidi’s sense 
of fright can be seen in the following verses: 
 
4) O Allah protect us, we pray morning and evening, 
Against the [railway], indeed we were terrified by the advent of the railway.74 
6) Indeed we were frightened and terrified75 
23) District and village headmen were frightened and 
 terrified by the railway.76 
 
During this period of transformation by railway technology, people perceived the 
construction work differently because they did not understand its import. Rumours were 
generally making the rounds that towns, villages, and farms would be dispersed to make way 
for the railway, and that Muslims should have nothing to do with it, for it was an alien 
innovation brought by non-believers (kafir). It was also rumoured that working for the white 
man is forbidden (haram) in Islam and that colonialism itself was a sign of the end of time.77 
These rumours had strong effects on Muslims, for they appealed to their religious 
sensibilities. Brian Larkin pointed out that the construction site was a climate of anxiety in 
which rumour flourished.78 Michael Adas argued that Africans always resort to superstitious 
                                                 
74 Ga Allah tutur duk nufi ke tafe,  
Ina bisa roƙo maraice da safe, 
Shi tsarshe mu sharrin da duk ke tafe, 
Da munka ji ance yana nan tafe, 
Ƙwarai mun ji tsoron sa aikin diga. 
75 Da munka ji labara zumai ‘yan uwa, 
Ƙwarai munji tsoro muna kaɗuwa, 
Abin ga ashe ba wurin rabakawa, 
Ciki na kaɗawa jiki na rawa, 
Mukan ce ba ma iya aikin diga 
76 Ina addua’a Jalla domin fiyayye, 
Ka ban sahibi wanda ya zama tsayayye, 
Ya taimake ni duniya ko da ya janye, 
Daɗa hakimai har saraki na kauye, 
Fa sun firgice bisa aikin diga. 
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and religious belief to explain the situations they cannot comprehend.79 It should be noted 
that British colonial rule was not very popular, and resistance to British rule was widespread 
and came in different forms. During this period, Muslim intellectuals used Islamic legal 
discourse to incite people against the colonial authority. The Satiru and Hadejia’s revolts 
were popular examples of Muslims’ reactions to colonialism.80 As M. S. Umar pointed out, 
Wakar Diga was a discourse against colonialism.81 Northern Nigeria, Yusuf Nadabo noted, 
was divided between those who understood and those who did not. Those who understood 
were the traditional rulers—like Dansidi, who tried to calm everyone despite being frightened 
himself.82 
As the poem also indicates, while some were terrified, others marvelled in 
wonderment. They perceived the elaborate construction materials, the train, and the tracks 
with a sense of awe and wonder. Dansidi says that he himself marvelled at the construction 
materials, the trains, and the rail line. He marvelled at the large amount of iron offloaded 
from trains; and the sight of long trains and tracks and the ways the iron were cut and 
processed instilled awe in him, for he had never seen such thing before. Dansidi’s sense of 
wonder and awe can be understood against the following verses: 
 
18) O Brother, what a wonder I saw:  
Steel cutting steel (…)! [train carrying steel] 83 
19) Here trains without limit,  
More limitless was the cutting of steel for railways.84 
20)  Steel for constructing bridges, 
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83 Daɗa ka ga an kama aiki safe, 
Ana bisa yi wansu na nan tafe, 
Jiragen ƙasa ga su ɗauke da karfe, 
Fa ya ajaban dan uwa na ga karfe, 
Yana yanke ƙarfe ga aikin diga.  
84 Fa ya Rabbi kai ne kayi babu shakka, 
Nufin duk da kai yi garai sai shi dauka, 
Fa komi ya so dole ne babu shakka, 
Daɗa ga jirage daba su iyaka, 
Bare yanke ƙarfe ga aikin diga. 
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 And another steel for striking.85 
 
Dansidi recognized the mixed reactions and commotion, which was why he decided 
to visit the construction site himself. As for the rumours that were making the rounds 
concerning the Europeans, colonialism, and their railway, Dansidi enjoined the public to 
disregard the rumours as baseless and unfounded. Concerning the rumour that the railway 
would disperse towns, Dansidi himself downplayed the power of the colonial state by 
assuring the public that the presence of British army cannot move the forest, “much less for 
the rural areas to be dispersed because of [the railway]” (verses 24–25).86 He calmed 
everyone by assuring them that all was well and appealed to them on why they should 
participate in the work. He particularly encouraged everyone to participate in the work so as 
to acquire the colonial coin. In verse 49, he states that everyone desired the coin (kowa yana 
sonta matar diga), including himself. He likened the coin to a woman (matar diga) who, 
according to him, was everyone’s desire, and he said that the only way to acquire it was to 
participate in the work. In this period of major transformation by cash, the importance of the 
colonial coin cannot be overestimated. It was the legal tender and the medium for paying tax. 
Dansidi described the coin as shiny and silver-like and said that people engaged in all sorts of 
work, such as trade, farming, and hard labour like railway work, just to acquire it. In 
Dansidi’s account, the railway construction facilitated the circulation of the colonial coin.87  
However, the reactions to the railway work were temporary, for as David Nye pointed 
out, a technology that instilled fear and awe at one time soon lost its novelty as it was 
domesticated.88 The people were not passive recipients of transport innovation: after the 
initial reactions, and having discovered the advantages or benefits of colonial modernity in 
the form of wages, they quickly participated in the work of their own accord. After all, 
Dansidi had appealed to them to participate in the work in order to acquire the coin. This did 
not mean the absence of resistance, for this was part and parcel of construction work, 
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especially where exploitation and exactions were the case. Dansidi and his counterparts in 
Sokoto, Kano, and elsewhere ensured that the requirements for labourers and food supplies 
were met without the construction work having to suffer. 
Besides the free labour that found employment on the railway, slaves, former slaves, 
and domestic servants also found employment. As studies by H. J. Pedraza, Paul E. Lovejoy, 
J. S. Hogendorn, and several others have demonstrated, railway work offered large numbers 
of slaves an opportunity to earn cash to gain their freedom.89 When the British arrived, they 
abolished the institution of slavery alongside the legal status of slaves. New relations 
whereby slaves could sell their labour to earn their freedom and raise cash for tax emerged.90 
A fact not often recognized in the literature is that prisoners also found employment 
on the railway. Prisoners whose sentences were commuted to hard labour terms were also 
employed, because earthwork was considered hard labour.91 Contrary to the popular 
impression that only men worked on the line, Wakar Diga suggests that women and even 
children also engaged in some types of work on the railway. 
The initial survey and earthwork was hampered by the lack of working tools, owing to 
the financial conditions of the PWD&R and the late arrival of the experts and construction 
materials. For instance, locally made hoes and tin basins were used for earthworks, as locally 
made baskets were difficult to obtain.92 Some preliminary surveying had already started in 
1906, but it was not until late 1907 that the real surveying began. In practice, it was not 
necessary to undertake a great deal of surveying, as the engineers were able to make use of 
the report of previous surveys undertaken under Lugard. At the start of the surveys, only one 
surveyor was on site; but as the work progressed, more surveyors and engineers and auxiliary 
crew arrived on secondment from Canada, South Africa, Benguela, Chile, the War Office, 
and the Marine Workshop in London. A reconnaissance survey started from Zungeru to 
Moya valley with a small quantity of earthwork for a road at Baro.93 The building of Baro, 
also known as Gidi, some 130 miles below Jebba on the Niger River also began at this time. 
The village was moved downstream below 0.0 mile for sanitary reasons. This was the 
proposed outlet of Northern Nigeria to the outside world as proposed by Lugard, and it was 
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the starting point of the rail mileage in the Northern Provinces (i.e. below 00 on the plan, or 
Bar 0, corrupted to become Baro).94 
 
Besides the hot climate and sometimes rain in which the Europeans and the labourers 
worked, the indigenous labourers also felled trees and cleared forest to make way for the 
railway. Villages were broken up and dispersed. The earthworks passed through flat, rocky, 
and mountainous as well as swampy landscapes, all of which had to be reshaped.95 In cutting 
through the rocky landscape, explosives were used, as was the case in Tartabu. The rock 
flecks were used for ballasting. Rivers were bridged and swamps reclaimed. A forest which 
might have proved useful for a sleeper industry was discovered and expert lumbermen were 
brought in from Canada to develop the industry. The labourers were taught how to cut the 
sleepers, and a railway sawmill was planned at Baro.96 The timber sleepers were not used in 
the end, however, because they were of low quality.97 
Type camps also were built for the indigenous labourers and the European experts at 
five-mile intervals up to mile 120. The camps consisted of thatched huts with mud or 
thatched walls and proved invaluable as a refuge from sun and rain for the survey and 
construction parties.98 The camps not only served as sleeping places; they also served as a 
place of social interaction and trading points for the communities along the line. Prostitutes, 
gamblers, and criminals also took refuge in the camps. As Wale Oyemakinde pointed out, the 
camps were temporary and were abandoned to make new ones as construction work moved 
inland. The abandoned camps later provided accommodation to track maintenance gangs 
before quarters were built all over the system.99 
Construction followed closely on survey and earthwork. The real construction work 
commenced in 1908, from two opposite directions in Niger Province. South of Baro, the 
construction of the Lagos extension started from Ilorin, to cross Jebba and link up with the 
Baro–Kano railway near Minna. This study does not concern this section. From the opposite 
direction, which is the focus of this study, the work was officially inaugurated at Bedegi on 5 
January 1908, with the Emir of Bida, Mallam Muhammadu, laying the first sleeper linking 
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Baro with Badeggi at a colourful ceremony in the presence of the High Commissioner, the 
Resident, Emir of Zazzau Aliyu Dansidi, political officers, and railway officials. The laying 
of the first sleepers by Emir Muhammadu carried an important message, which was to 
reassure the labourers that what they were doing was right after all and for the benefit of all. 
A bridge was supposed to be built to connect Badegi with Bida but was postponed owing to 
the necessity of pushing the work further.100 
A fact not often mentioned in previous analyses is that immediately a section of the 
line was completed, it was declared an open line. The assumption previously was that the line 
was opened only when completed at Kano. This popular assumption is not correct and need 
to be corrected. As the evidence shows, a simple passenger freight service of 3d was charged 
for travelling by construction or work trains over each section of 15 miles. Although the open 
line was a strategy to familiarize people with trains, it also facilitated the transport of goods, 
construction materials, government stores, and commercial firms’ consignments.101 
The first gangs of labourers from Niger Province were organized under the 
Superintendent of Police. Most of them were of Nupe and Gwari origin.102 The claim that 
labourers from Southern Nigeria were not employed on the Northern Nigerian Railway, and 
that the northern administration preferred to delay the work rather than allowing southerners 
participate, is misleading.103 As the evidence indicates, Yoruba were employed on the 
railway, even if on a small scale. As Director of the PWD&R J. N. Eaglesome reported, the 
initial work “originally began with about 1,200 men comprising Yoruba, Hausa and Nupe”. 
There is no indication to suggest they were from within the province.104 The labourers 
worked long hours under strenuous conditions, from 6 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. with an hour’s rest, 
and then continued from 9.30 a.m. to 3 p.m.. Another gang worked from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. with 
an hour’s break, and then continued from 8 p.m. to 12 p.m.. The gangs had only one day off a 
week, and all this work was at the expense of farm work.105 
At the start of the work in January 1908, approximately 2,426 labourers were working 
on the line, rising to 3,820 in April. By November, about 5,146 labourers were already 
working on the line (see Table 2.1). The construction work proceeded slowly owing to the 
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lack of familiarity with construction work. The training of labour for track laying also proved 
difficult, with a slow rate of 1/5 mile a day, reaching mile 120 in the middle of the year.106 
The Bako River, one of the many rivers through which the line passed in the first 120 miles, 
was reached by the middle of the year and cleared of obstruction for at least 60 miles, which 
proved invaluable in the transport of construction materials by canoe. Owing to the 
prevalence of tsetse flies, animal transport was not used in transporting construction materials 
from the river. Most of the materials were carried by head. Even horses belonging to the 
European staff died of tsetse attacks. One of the areas where the construction party faced 
enormous challenges was the Bako and Bakogi valleys, owing to the nature of the terrain. 
The work had to be abandoned for some time, partly owing to the terrain and partly to a delay 
in the arrival of cement. Temporary and permanent bridges were constructed over the 
rivers.107 One of the steamers carrying construction materials even sank, which resulted in the 
loss of 785 tons of sleepers, foundation bridges, and cement.108 
It should be noted that in constructing the railway, many problems and challenges 
were encountered at the beginning. Many mistakes were also made; some were technical, 
while some were due to poor information about the environment and failure to recognize the 
local requirements of a situation. Most of the work was at first based on trial and error, as the 
engineers did not understand the terrain and its hazards; but as the work progressed, the 
knowledge of the terrain and of the local situation improved. After all, it was in making 
mistakes that good engineers and technicians were made—working out problems based on 
local requirements and conditions as they went along. 
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Figure 2.1 Setting out for earthworks at Patatifi 















Figure 2.2 Earthworks in progress at Patatifi Bluff 












Figure 2.3 Survey party No. 1, camp type 
















Figure 2.4 Railway construction in Nupe Province 
1. The Emir of Bida Muhammadu in white robes, standing at the laying of the first 
sleepers at Badeggi in January 1908. 
2. The Sarkin Paiko in white robes, turning the first sod at the start of the Gwari section 
in Nupe Province in 1909.  
3. Labourers at work at the Gwari section in Nupe Province in 1909.  
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Figure 2.5 Levelling of rocky landscape in 1908 




Figure 2.6 Reclaiming of swamp in 1908 













Figure 2.7 Temporary bridge over the Bakogi River 













2.8 Testing of the Emir Class engine on a steel bridge 












As the construction work entered Kuta Division—the last district on the rail line in 
Nupe Province—in 1909, it encountered major resistance from the Gwari people of Gussoro, 
owing to labour recruitment and the fact that the work undermined agricultural production. 
By this time, labour demand has reached its peak, with more labour required to complete the 
remaining length of the line in the province. Before the line entered Gwari country, the 
labours employed on the line were mixed, comprising Nupe, Gwari, Koro, Yoruba, and 
Hausa. As the line entered Gwari land, more and more Gwari labour was required to 
complete the remaining length of the line in the district. Unlike the Nupe, the Gwari had no 
well-organized political and coercive structure. They were independent village communities 
without an established political structure.109 It was to this village community that the British 
called for labour. The Gwari people deserted the construction site at the beginning of the 
rains and refused to return or pay their tributes for the previous year.110 The revolt in Gussoro 
was one of the popular uprisings against British colonialism, after the Satiru and Hadejia 
revolts of 1906.111 
Although the provincial administration gave the impression that the revolt was due to 
domestic intrigues over chieftaincy, it led to the killing of a European Political Officer, Mr. 
Venrenen, and 11 indigenous police. The revolt had its origin in what the labourers perceived 
as their forced conscription, extortion, and failure to release them ahead of the wet season, as 
well as in allegations that the recruiting officer slept with their wives while on site. Earlier in 
that year, their kin of Paiko and Fuka districts deserted the construction site at the beginning 
of the wet season and refused either to show up for work or pay their tributes. The Gwari 
people plotted to kill their chief, whom they perceived as a collaborator with the white men. 
Having got wind of the plot to attack him, the embattled chief ran to the Political Officer. The 
latter and his 11 indigenous police were ambushed and killed on their way to restore the 
embattled chief. In two massive retaliatory attacks, the whole village was destroyed, with 
heavy casualties, and the culprits were apprehended.112 Despite the uprising and its 
disruption, the work progressed rapidly and entered Zaria, the second province on the 
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railway, in March 1909. By this time, the Lagos extension had reached Gudu, mile 43 from 
Jebba.113 
However, as the construction party entered Zaria, more and more labour was required 
owing to the magnitude of the work in the province. Of the total 400 miles of rail line, 141 
miles, “the stiffest portion”, was in Zaria.114 As in Gussoro, the work was not popular in 
Zaria, due to the magnitude of labour required from the province. Besides the labour required 
for this particular section of the line, the province was to provide additional labour for 
building another, narrow-gauge line known as Bauchi Light Railway, from Zaria to the tin 
mines on the Jos Plateau, later in 1911. This was in addition to the labour required for the tin 
mines on the Jos Plateau itself. The European Political Officers, the Emir, and his chiefs were 
fully occupied with labour recruitment and supervision, as well as with supplies of food for 
the construction work.115 The Emir, Aliyu Dansidi (mentioned earlier for his poem), threw his 
whole weight behind the work, to the satisfaction of the Resident. His district and village 
heads also responded energetically, to the delight of the colonial state.116 Earlier in January, 
Governor Sir Percy Girouard had toured the villages on the line, where he was met by the 
Resident, the Emir, and his chiefs at Likoro in preparation for the work. The purpose of his 
tour was to see for himself the level of preparation and to impress on the Emir and his chiefs 
the importance the state attached to the project.117 
Labour was short at the start of the work. In Zaria, as in Nupe, labour recruitment 
rendered administrative and political work handicapped owing to shortage of staff. The 
railway work imposed a considerable burden on the Emir and his chiefs, a situation which 
provided opportunity for abuse, as they diverted some of the labour to their personal farms 
and trade.118 As Safiyanu Aminu and Shoyebi Abayomi asserted, villages were raided to 
procure labour for the construction work.119 Besides the organization of labour, which fell on 
shoulders of the Emir, he also carried out administrative work on behalf of the Resident, who 
was pre-occupied with the railway work. The work also resulted in an administrative 
reorganization, leading to the creation of the Western Division specifically to meet the 
requirements of the situation caused by railway work and the building of Kaduna (the 
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proposed administrative headquarters). The Southern Division and the Gwari Division, 
previously administered separately, were also merged for the railway work in August 1909.120 
The construction work was not popular in Zaria and resistance was both passive and 
active. At the start of the work, south of the province, desertion among the Gwari was 
between 300 to 800 labourers due to the Gussoro episode. As the Resident pointedout, an 
exaggerated account of the Gussoro uprising in Nupe Province had reached them. Those 
already mobilized on the construction site armed themselves and wanted to make trouble. 
Before the troops dispatched to quell the rebellion had arrived, the situation was tactfully 
prevented from escalating, and so construction continued.121 By March, about 300 men 
comprising free and unfree labour, were already working on the line. This rose to 3,191 at the 
end of the year, with 22½ miles of heavy earthworks recorded. North of Kaduna, construction 
work began at Zaria in July with 470 men, rising to 4,100 men by the end of the year (see 
Table 2.1 below). A motor road was also constructed from Rigachikum to Naraguta, the 
location of the tin mines in Jos. The total work for the whole nine months was 50 miles, 
involving a little over 17,268 labourers, as the table indicates.122 As the construction work 
moved away from Zaria City to Kano in 1910, more and more labourers were required north 
of Zaria (where some of the studied communities are located). The Emir further tightened his 
grip to ensure the required labourer quotas were met to complete the extent of the line in the 
province. Not only did he organize the supply, he also supervised the construction. John 
Raphael, a British journalist and editor of African World, who was on a tour of Nigeria at that 
time, writes that Dansidi was always in the habit of sitting on the embankment with his 
officials watching how the tracks were laid.123 As the record indicates, Likoro suffered 
severely from having to supply huge numbers of labourers for the construction work.124 
Stations were established at Likoro, Gimi, and Faiki.125 The construction work proceeded 
rapidly, with the earthworks reaching Kano border in May 1910.126 
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It needs be pointed out that the massive labour recruitment in Zaria created 
widespread tension and resistance. For instance, approximately 1,100 labourers deserted the 
construction site, while 639 families emigrated to Kano, Katsina, and Bauchi for fear of 
conscription. Those who stayed behind were either conscripted or handed over two-thirds of 
their income to their headmen as exactions.127 Construction work also undermined 
agricultural work. Although railway work exposed labourers to exploitation and exactions, it 
had the educative value of facilitating the spread of the colonial coin and bringing the pagan 
subjects of southern Zaria and the Hausa together for the first time. Previously, they had been 
hostile to and suspicious of one another.128 
As the construction work entered Kano, the last province on the line, in 1910, those 
communities along the rail line likewise supplied the labourers for the work. As with Zaria, 
the labour requirement in Kano was high, due to building of the rail line and the Challawa 
bridge (the longest on the system), as well as building of Kaduna, the new administrative 
headquarters. As the study by Mohammad Gwadabe indicates, many peasants and slaves 
were forced to work on the railway, which led to population dislocation.129 With the Emir and 
his chiefs ready to supply the labour, there were no complaints of a labour shortage as there 
had been in Zaria. The work initially started with 500 men, and increased to over 11,000 at 
the end of June. Before the end of the year, thousands of labourers were toiling on the line.130 
The speed in track laying was also phenomenal; it proceeded very fast, at a rate of 25 to 40 
miles a month, 12 miles a week, and 6½ miles a day. The earthworks finally entered Kano 
metropolis at mile 356, the great northern terminus, in June 1910.131 
 
The track itself, however, did not enter Kano until March 1911, owing to the washing 
away of the temporary bridge over the Challawa River. Kano Station was moved backward to 
mile 354, owing to the ample space required for trading and residential quarters.132 The whole 
work spanned a period of three years and eight months altogether and was completed earlier 
than anticipated. It was a great success, being the first such project to be built by any 
PWD&R in the country. The success was due to the combined efforts of European experts 
and the indigenous labourers. As Aliyu Dansidi himself rightly acknowledged in verses 27–
37 of his poem, the success was due to many people: the labourers, the labour recruiters who 
watched over them day and night to ensure they remained on site, and the emirs and their 
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chiefs, who ensured that labour poured onto the site, as well as the women and children who 
fed them. Dansidi thanked every one of them, including the European Political Officers for 




Table 2.1 Number of labourers recruited, January 1908–March 1911 
 
Month  Year Number 
January 1908 2,426 
February 1908 4,364 
March 1908 3,820 
April 1908 3,820 
May 1908 4,264 
June 1908 4,362 
October 1908 4,798 
November 1908 5,146 
December 1908 2,827 
January 1909 2,426 
February 1909 3,364 
March 1909 4,822 
April 1909 3,820 
May 1909 4,264 
June 1909 4,362 
Quarter ending 31 March 1910 14,879 
Quarter ending 30 June 1910 11,911 
Quarter ending 30 September 1910 3,727 
Quarter ending 31 December 1910 3,638 
Quarter ending 31 March 1911 8,804 
 
Source: These figures are collated from the Northern Nigerian Annual Reports for 1907–
1911. 
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Figure 2.9 Construction work near Kaduna in 1910 






Figure 2.10 Construction work near Kano 






It is important to mention that none of the stations in the studied communities south of 
Kano were established at this time; they were established after the line was completed. The 
only station south-west of Kano City at that time was Rafingora. This was closed down with 
the establishment of Madobi station in 1913.134 A fact often ignored in the literature is that 
the railway construction led to the establishment of Dangora (one of the studied 
communities), which became an important railway hub south-west of Kano. Oral account has 
it that Dangora was created out of the necessity to prevent theft of construction materials. 
According to this popular tradition, when the construction party arrived at the present 
location of the town, theft of construction materials was prevalent. In order to ensure safety 
of the materials, the colonial authority ordered the village headman of Kyarana (a hamlet 
three miles away) to move to Dangora so as to keep an eye on the materials. Since then, 
Dangora became the seat of a village headman, while Kyarana remained the seat of a ward. 
When the railway system was being expanded in the post-World War I period, Dangora was 
made a railway town. Prior to this, it was essentially an unimportant centre.135 
As mentioned earlier, the Baro–Kano railway had been conceived and built as a 
temporary line to be upgraded as traffic improved on the system. On the system as a whole, 
24 stations, both permanent and temporary, had been established, with a plan to establish 
more as traffic improved. Of the eight communities considered in this study (see Map 2.2), 
only two actually had stations at this time. The remaining ones were established during and 
after World War I (Table 2.2). The station structures were generally temporary, made of 
wood and iron pending the erection of permanent structures. On the whole, there were no 
passenger platforms and none of the stations was signalled, partly because of the low speed of 
the trains and the fact that night journeys were not anticipated at that time.136 This temporary 
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Baro 0 0 Open line 1912 
Katcha 14.50 14.50 “ 
Bakogi 26.50 12.00 “ 
Baddegi 42.50 14.00 “ 
Ebba 59.00 16.50 “ 
Katerigi 72.50 13.50 “ 
Lafiagi (proposed) 91.25 13.50 “ 
Shappa (temporary) 97.00 5.75 “ 
Minna 111.25 14.25 “ 
She 130.00 18.75 “ 
Guni 147.00 17.00 “ 
Kogi Serikin Pawa 169.00 22.00 “ 
Godani 185.50 16.50 “ 
Bakin kasua 197.00 11.50 “ 
Kaduna 215.00 18.00 “ 
Rigachikum 228.50 13.50 “ 
Birinin Yero 239.50 11.00 “ 
Dumbi 254.50 15.00 “ 
Zaria Cantonment 266.00 11.50 “ 
Likoro 275.00 9.00 Open line 1912 
Gimi Dabosa/ Gimi 287.00 12.00 “ 
Faiki/Paki 310.50 23.50 
“ 
(closed in 1918) 
Anchau/ Auchang 306.00 23.50 1913 
Rafingora 334.00 23.50 
1912 
(closed in 1913) 
Dangora n.a. n.a. Established 1918 
Yako n.a. n.a. Established in 1918 
Madobi/Maidobi 322.75 n.a. Established in 1913 
Kwankwaso 322.75 n.a. Established in 1918 
Challawa/Challowa 337.00 n.a. Established in 1914 
Kano 335.00 21.00 Open line 
 
Note: n.a.= not available 
Sources: NAK SNP7/2227/1912, 13; NAK SNP7/6/9/1913, Railway Station naming of…; 
Jaekel, Nigerian Railway, vol. 2, 102. 
 
Although the railway had entered Kano metropolis, it was not open to traffic. 
Contrary to the popular claim that the traffic train entered Kano in 1911, there was no such 
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train; the first train was a work or construction train. The line was not open to traffic until 
1912, owing to washouts and technical problems. The bridge over the River Niger had also 
not been completed, although the early trains were ferried across the river by a steam ferry 
named Fabius.137 This was a temporary arrangement, and the bridging of the north channel of 
the river was completed in 1910. The south channel, the most difficult part, although started 
in 1911 was completed only in 1916.138 It should be noted that the opening had been 
deliberately delayed until the amalgamation of the two railways (i.e. the Baro–Kano railway 
and the Lagos Government Railway) which had been slated for 1 January 1912. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, the amalgamation was predicated on the need to unify 
the debt incurred in building the railway. As with the railway, the essence of unifying the 
administration of the Southern and the Northern provinces was to rescue the North from 
annual grant-in-aid and treasury control. Unifying the two administrations would provide a 
pool of resources that would be used in administering the railway and the country, while also 
doing away with barriers that might hinder national integration. 
Now that the railway had been completed, it remained to be seen whether it would 
achieve the goal for which it was constructed. As the next chapter will show, initial 
encounters with the locomotive, as with the construction process, were marked by strong, 
mixed reactions owing to lack of familiarity. As familiarity with the locomotive increased, it 
was appropriated and domesticated in distinctive ways.  
 
                                                 
137 The Fabius had a length of 160 ft and a beam of 33 ft 6 in and accommodated between four and six coaches, 
depending on their length. Crossing the river involved lowering and raising at both ends, which took a little over 
an hour to complete, a novel experience by local standards. John R. Raphael writes that the carriages were run to 
the head of an inclined plane and a wire rope attached to each coach, the other ends encircling a winding drum. 
Another rope bound to the further end of the carriage drew it onto the slope of the plane, and the winding 
machine let it down. The plane carried the carriages to a trolley bridge fitted to the steam ferry, which took four 
carriages, so that the entire train was taken over in two journeys. At Jebba Island, the reverse process was 
followed, and, a freight engine being coupled up, the train proceeded over the north channel bridge and thus 
onwards. See NAK 299/S. 3 vol. 1, Railway Publication 1949-1956, 7; Tamuno, “Railway II”, 37; Raphael, 
Through Unknown Nigeria, 17; Bell, “Recent Progress”, 390. 
138 Jaekel, Nigerian Railway, vol. 2, 96; Tamuno, “Railway II”, 37. 
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Map 2.2 Map of Nigerian Railway in the 1960s 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Baro–Kano railway was a “troubled railway”, from its 
conception to its construction and completion. It was shown that the idea of the Northern 
Authority to build the railway provoked a prolonged rivalry and controversy among the other 
provincial administrators. As the chapter shows, the lack of a countrywide policy guideline, 
often assumed to be the source of the conflict, was merely a contributing factor rather than 
the cause. This is because railway development is always controversial, because it is a 
political as well as an economic matter, due to the initial sunk costs and the expected returns 
on investment, as well as the issue of control. The decisions to build a line, the choice of 
junction, terminal, and freight rates, as well as control are issues which bred controversy. 




As the chapter also indicates, the building of the line was influenced by an imperialist 
motive to exploit cotton. Right from its conception, planning, and construction, the line was 
conceived as an “economy line” to be built as cheaply as possible. The construction method 
itself was influenced by economic motives to save costs. Despite the challenges and 
difficulties, the construction work proceeded rapidly and was completed earlier than 
anticipated. The local authorities also ensured the required labour and food requirements 
were met. As the chapter also suggests, the construction work facilitated the spread of the 
colonial currency and undermined agricultural production. 
Contrary to the popular claim that flight from forced recruitment was the only reaction 
to the railway’s construction, the chapter demonstrates that mixed reactions of fear, 
apprehension, and awe marked local communities’ reactions to the work. This is because this 
was their first encounter with the domestication of Western technology. The construction 




CHAPTER 3: PERCEPTION, APPROPRIATION AND 
DOMESTICATION OF TRANSPORT INNOVATION 
 
For the first few months or so that the weekly trains were running to Kano, natives from the 
city and the surrounding villages displayed curiosity concerning the locomotive to the degree 
of assembling in a crowd on the track at the railhead [...]. 
John R. Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria. 
 
Wakar Jirgin kasa (Train Song) 
Jirgin kasa sarkin aiki 
The train, the indefatigable creature, 
Aikinshi yafi Jakkai dubbai  
It does more than a thousand donkeys do; 
Jirgi mai zuwa Kano daga Kurmi 
The train that goes to Kano from Lagos, 
Jirgi maje Ilori da Bidda 
The train that goes to Ilorin and Bida, 
Jirgin Ilori yaje Lakwaja 
The train goes to Lokoja from Ilorin, 
Jirgin Kaduna yazo Zazzau  
The train came to Zazzau (Zaria) from Kaduna. 
Jirgin dakon gyada dana kirgi 
The train carried groundnuts and hide and skins; 
Jirgi yazo Likoro ranar jibi 
The train comes to Likoro on market days. 
Jirgi dakata Likoro kai mana aiki 
Train, stop and carry passengers and load at Likoro. 
Jirgi mai kama da dakin sarki 
The train that looks like a king’s palace; 
Sarkin Likoro ya shiga Jirgi 
The chief of Likoro entered the train; 
Sarkin Kudan yace abin mamaki 
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The chief of Kudan says it was wonderful; 
Da jirgin sarakuna dana soja 
There are royal and military trains.  
(Collected from Hajiya Aishatu Dede-Likoro) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
With the completion and opening of the railway to traffic, expectations were high that it 
would transform the Northern Territories from their ‘backwardness’. Most importantly, it was 
envisaged that the railway would activate agricultural production and trade and open up the 
country to British trade and finance. However, the arrival of the first train that would usher in 
this development was marked by mixed reactions from the local communities, because they 
did not understood what the railway and its uses were. As soon as they familiarized 
themselves with it and understood its benefits, they quickly apprehended and integrated it 
into daily life. 
This chapter analyses how the railway was perceived, appropriated, and domesticated 
into daily life. The chapter argues that the initial encounter with the locomotive was marked 
by fear and awe, because people did not comprehend what it was all about; but as familiarity 
increased, they quickly apprehended and integrated it to transform their lives. Also, it is 
argued that the railway and its associated technologies were means of representing and 
signifying the symbolic meaning of British rule and civilization as technological 
achievements to Nigerians. 
 
3.2 Fears, wonders, marvels and the locomotive 
The completion of the railway and its associated effects have attracted a fair amount of 
attention in the literature. The general consensus is that the railway had enormous effects on 
the socio-economic and cultural landscapes of Northern Nigeria, especially for those living 
along the rail line. The railway shortened travel time and facilitated the movement of people, 
goods, food, and ideas, and it made British control very effective, both administratively and 
economically. However, despite the sustained attention in the literature to the railway’s 
effects, it is taken for granted that Nigerians apprehended the new transport system almost 
immediately. Such analyses also ignore how Nigerians’ initiative resulted in a new concept of 
travelling that shaped everyday life. This gap in the literature is partly due to the materials 
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available to writers at the time they wrote. Another reason, as Collin Divall and George 
Revill suggested, is that transport specialists rarely conceive of a railway as technology, 
despite its semiotic aspects.1 Using old and new sources, some of which have not been 
considered in previous analyses, I will demonstrate that northerners first encountered the 
railway technology with mixed reactions of fear and wonder, owing to their lack of 
familiarity with Western technology. 
When I asked old men what they remembered or heard about how people encountered 
the locomotives and trains, their response was that they were perceived with mixed reactions, 
because they did not understand what they were all about. A. O. Anjorin pointed out that “it 
took some time before [the northerners] began to make use of the new transport system after 
their completion […]. This according to him was due partly to the natural human suspicion 
against innovations, especially drastic ones.”2 Comparative studies elsewhere indicate that 
Africans encountered Western technologies such as motor cars, airplanes, electricity, cinema, 
and even telescopes with mixed reactions.3 Michael Adas asserted that no technology 
unleashed such terror and awe on Africans as the locomotives.4 Even in Europe and the 
United States of America, where the locomotive comes from, its arrival there was marked by 
a new type of fear and apprehension.5 
To understand why the new transport unleashed terror and awe on people, it is useful 
to think of the locomotive and train as the colonial technological sublime. As stated in the 
previous chapter, the colonial sublime is a mixed reaction the mind experiences when 
confronted by grand, man-made objects which it cannot comprehend. The colonial sublime 
works only when compared with other things.6 Brian Larkin argued that one of the goals for 
using infrastructural technologies under the colonial regime was to demonstrate power and 
instil total submission.7 In this regards, the built space of the locomotive and trains, the ability 
to move over tracks, and the speed and sound were some of the ways the sublime was 
                                                 
1 C. Divall and G. Revill, “Cultures of Transport”, 104. 
2 See Anjorin, “Cotton Industry”, 120. 
3 See for instance W. G. Nkwi, Kfaang and Technologies: Towards a Social History of Mobility in Kom, 
Cameroon, 1928-1998, (Leiden: ASC, 2011), 79; Adas, Machines as the Measure; J. Cary, Mr Johnson, (New 
York: New Directions, 1939); Larkin, Signal and Noise, 40-43. 
4 Adas, Machines as the Measure, 223. 
5 W. Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, the Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century, (The 
University of California Press, 1986/1977); Nye, American Technological Sublime, 54; Adas, Machines as the 
Measure, 223; Larkin, Signal and Noise, 40. 
6 See Larkin, Signal and Noise, 15-40. 
7 Ibid. 36.  
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produced as a spectacle of colonial rule- to instil feelings of total submission. As informants 
generally commented, the trains’ movement and speed shook their houses to their very 
foundations.8 The sound and speed were novel experiences which the mind was not 
accustomed to. Of course, reactions differed from individual to individual, depending on their 
understanding. As some informants pointed out, some people ran into the bush, and even 
animals scampered into the bush on the approach of the locomotive.9 The psychologist Lisa 
Fritscher pointed out that when the human body is terrified, it responds in different ways, one 
of which is “fight or flight”.10 The archival record also suggests that not everybody ran; some 
stayed but decided not to have anything to do with the locomotive. As one annual report 
indicates, even the “mighty and the powerful” were terrified of the locomotive. When invited 
to take a train ride by the Resident, during the opening of the Ilorin section of the railway in 
1908, the Emir declined the offer as he was terrified.11 Larkin argued that “the colonial 
sublime is about Europeans’ tactile symbolic efforts to make technology mean”.12 For many 
rural dwellers, the ambivalence toward the locomotive was both fear and awe. Evidence from 
elsewhere in Nigeria and Africa also reveals that tension, anxiety, apprehension, and in some 
cases tragedy, marked responses to the introduction of the locomotive.13 
While some reacted with a sense of fear and terror, others responded with a sense of 
wonder and awe. The fantastic tales of how northerners marvelled at the locomotives have 
been documented in travel accounts of Europeans. John R. Raphael, referred to in the 
                                                 
8 Interviews with Malam Hamza Zawachiki, Malam Ali Zubairu, and Malam Ibrahim Alhassan, Zawachiki, 19 
May 2012; and with Alhaji Mohammad Abubakar, Leiden, 15 August 2012. 
9 Interview with Malam Hamza Zawachiki, Malam Ali Zubairu, and Malam Ibrahim Alhassan, Zawachiki, 19 
May 2012; and with Alhaji Yakubu Likoro, Likoro, 11 July 2012.  
10 L. Fritscher, “The Psychology of Fear: Understanding the Dynamic of Fear Response”, 2011. About.Com 
Phobia, http://phobias.about.com/od/introductiontophobias/a/psychologyfear.htm [accessed on 15 March 2012]. 
11 Colonial Report-Annual, Northern Nigeria Report for 1908. Also see Tamuno, “Railway I”, 279-292, 292.  
12 Larkin, Signal and Noise, 42. 
13 For instance, Innocent Uzoechi reports that during the construction of the Eastern Railway, an Igbo chief 
protested against the line being constructed through his village for fear that it would take away the women. 
Since he could not stop the construction work, however, he promised to stop the train.13 Mark Uzomba 
Oyekwere provides a tragic account of what happened afterwards. On the day the locomotive was to pass 
through his village, the chief stood on the track warning the locomotive to stop. As the locomotive pushed 
forward, it horned and blared warnings to the chief to get off the track. Despite appeals from his subjects, the 
chief declined to step aside. The train did not stop, however; it ran over him, and his body was recovered from 
the track. The chief thought the driver would respect him because he was a chief. But the locomotive is no 
respecter of persons or status, for it has no destination other than the next station. The chief’s apprehension 
derived from the fear of the unknown which the locomotive was capable of generating. The locomotive, as the 
narrative suggests, would undermine men’s control over women and break down family ties. See Uzoechi, 
“Social and Political Impact”; M. U. Onyekwere, Igbo Idioms, (London, 2011), 256; also see K. P. Vickery, 
“Railways, Railway Culture, and Industrial Work Discipline in the Rhodesias”, in: Robert Ross, Marja Hinfelaar 
and Iva Pesa (eds), The Objects of Life in Central Africa: History of Consumption and Social Change 1840-
1980,” (London: Brill, 2013). 
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previous chapter, was in Nigeria in 1911 when the railway was still novel. He wrote that 
northerners reacted to the locomotive with awe and anxiety. Raphael’s account may be 
accepted as primary evidence, as it is an eye-witness account. The railway, as Raphael 
represented it, was the epitome of modernity, progress, and development. He writes: “[for] 
the first few months or so that the weekly train were running to Kano, natives from the city 
and the surrounding villages” on the railway displayed curiosity at the locomotive. They 
assembled themselves on the track in large numbers, “to gaze again and again at the engine”, 
examining it from every angle, “quite polite and giving no trouble to the officials […,] some 
lying on the ground to look [...] beneath the phenomenal thing”.14 This tale about Nigerians’ 
reactions to locomotives suggests, as Louise White pointed out, “popular ideas about the 
interaction between culture and technology, between bodies and machines”.15 
No one displayed as much curiosity about the locomotive as Aliyu Dansidi himself, 
the British-appointed Emir of Zaria, mentioned in the previous chapter for his role in the 
railway’s construction. Dansidi’s reaction was one of wonder and awe. Raphael writes that 
Dansidi was in the habit of enquiring what quantity of fuel wood the locomotive consumed 
and what quantity of water it drank. He regarded the locomotive as a living creature. The 
sound of the locomotive dazzled him, so much so that its whistle and shriek was kept to its 
loudest for his pleasure for several minutes.16 Comparative accounts elsewhere in Nigeria 
also reveal that wonder and awe were some of the reactions to the locomotive. As Toyin 
Falola writes of his own encounter with the steam engine: “I saw the train for the first time. 
Coaches upon coaches, moving slowly, […] I thought it looked like a snake. As it moved 
away, I marveled. Then [I went] to the rail lines, to touch them, to feel the heat.”17 For some, 
however, the locomotive was nothing but magic in the hand of the British. As one Colonial 
Officer, Major A. J. N. Tremearne, writes, the locomotives were the “great juju” in Northern 
Nigeria.18 In other words, it was the white man’s magic. Michael Adas writes that whenever 
Africans cannot comprehend something, they resort to superstitious notions.19 Contrary to the 
                                                 
14 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 301.  
15 L. White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumour and History in Colonial Africa, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000), 132.  
16 Ibid. 300. 
17 T. Falola, A Mouth Sweeter than Salt: An African Memoir, (USA: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 61.  
18 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria; A. J. N. Tremearne, The Tailed Head Hunter of Nigeria: An Account of 
an Official Seven Years Experiences in Northern Nigeria Pagan Belt and a Description of the Manners Habits 
and Customs of the Native Tribes, (London: Seelay Services and Co, 1912), 311. 
19 Adas, Machines as the Measure, 3. 
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well-established claim that appropriation of the train was sudden, the decision to appropriate 
or even touch the train for many was something planned over time.20 
The colonial administration was aware of the reactions to their locomotive. They 
were, as Michael Adas writes, delighted at the terror and awe their technology unleashed.21 
The railway and its associated technologies were, as Ian Keer argued, “part of the process of 
representing, and […] signifying what it was the railways were or hope to be.”22 The railway 
symbolized the coming of the industrial age and emblemized the material side of colonialism. 
It was the most effective means of extending the path of civilization. As a way of displaying 
their technological achievement and to familiarize northerners with the locomotive, the 
authority organized “rituals” in the form of grand opening ceremonies, where important 
personalities and some members of the public were treated to a train ride. Although people 
had grown used to construction or work trains, traffic trains were another matter.23 
The authority also invited as many people as possible to impress them with the 
transport system. The ceremonies had their own codified genres—military parades, 
decoration of stations, running of special trains, Durbar,24 firework displays, and speeches—
with which the colonial authority encouraged people to use the train.25 Under colonial rule, 
grand openings of infrastructure were visual spectacles and political rituals, where the 
aesthetics of colonialism and its technological achievements were displayed.26 The authority 
was also precise in recording numbers; they invited as many people as possible. At the 
opening of the arrival of the first passenger train to Kano in 1912, there were no fewer than 
2,734 passengers. The Emir and his chiefs, the Emir of Katsina, government officials, and 
                                                 
20 Falola, Sweeter than Salt; Vickery, “Railways, Railway Culture”, 26.  
21 Adas, Machines as the Measure, 223. 
22 I. J. Kerr, “Representation and Representations of the Railways of Colonial and Post-Colonial South Asia”, 
Modern Asian Studies, 37/2, 2003, 287-326, 291. 
23 NAK SNP7/2227/1912, 21. 
24 A durbar is a classical form of entertainment with a colourful procession on horseback, carried out by Emirs 
and their chiefs and horsemen to show off their eminence and the grandeur of their monarch. The procession is 
marked by a parade and stud in which the Emir’s chiefs pay homage to the Emir as a public display of loyalty. It 
is often mistakenly thought that durbar is a festival, but it is not. Durbar is a colonial creation, borrowed from 
India and integrated into the culture of the Muslim emirates of Northern Nigeria. The procession is also 
organized to honour a very important visitor or mark an important event, as was the case with the opening of the 
railway in Kano in 1912 and Lugard’s visit to Kano that same year. Durbar is also organized annually to mark 
Muslim festivals.  
25 “Notes on Railway Construction”, Journal of the Royal African Society, 12/47, (1913): 290-95, 291; Nadabo, 
Tarihin Garin Kaduna, 110-1. 
26 Larkin, Signal and Noise, 19; A. Apter, “On Imperial Spectacle: The Dialectics of Seeing in Colonial 
Nigeria”, Comparative Studies Society and History, 44/3, (2002): 564-96, 572-3 
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important members of the community, as well as students of the Nassarawa School were 
treated to a free ride to Challawa—a distance of about 12 miles—there and back. A few 
months earlier, the Emir of Zaria and his chiefs were treated to a similar ride at the opening 
ceremony of the rail line in Zaria.27 
The ceremonies symbolized the triumph of British imperialism and their technological 
achievements. To the colonial authority, the rides represented a public display that the emirs 
and their chiefs recognized the importance of technological advancement. Engineered into the 
locomotive was a sort of authority located in the technology as evidence of progress. The 
railway became the epitome of modernity and advancement. It represented, as Christiane 
Reichart-Burikukiye writes, “colonial values and imperial power, the vehicle that transferred 
those values and power”.28 Not only did the train ride offer the emirs and others aboard the 
train a new way of travel, it also created new perceptions, thoughts, and expectations. As 
Schivelbusch notes, train travel was like being shot through the landscape. It created 
conditions that ‘mechanized’ travellers’ perceptions, while also offering them a new view of 
the landscape from inside a train. They did not feel the landscape as they did on donkey and 
horseback.29 
I would also argue that the initial ride had its own novel experience, which was an 
admixture of anxiety, thrill, and sensation. Raphael documents the experience of the chiefs on 
the train ride: after the initial uneasiness, they were thrilled at being transported at what was 
then a speed of 20 miles an hour, which was novel by local standards. When the chiefs were 
asked whether the sensation of riding on a train was not better than travelling in the saddle, 
they replied: “Certainly not, as the horse did not spit hot sparks at a man on his back or 
behind him.”30 A Hausa train song, Wakar Jirgin Kasa, quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, which probably depicts the train ride in Zaria Emirate, illustrates the sheer wonder of 
the train. As the song indicates, the local chiefs marvelled at the ride: sarkin Kudan yace abin 
mamaki, “the chief of Kudan says the ride was wonderful.”31 Train travel was different and 
faster than travelling in the saddle. Travelling at a speed of 20 miles an hour was indeed a 
                                                 
27 “Notes on Railway Construction”; NAK 975/1912, Zaria Province Report, Annual, 1911; Tamuno, “Railway 
II”, 31-43, 34. 
28 C. Reichart-Burikukiye, “The Railway in Colonial East Africa: Colonial Iconography in Colonial and Post-
Colonial Africa”, in: Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell (eds), Landscape, Environment and Technology in 
Colonial and Post Africa, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 64, 69. 
29 Schivelbusch, Railway Journey, 53-5. 
30 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 302. 
31 Collected from Hajiya Aishatu Abdussalam (Dede), Likoro, 23 August 2012. 
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novel experience when compared with what had gone before. As the song indicates, the train 
was also less tiring compared with donkey and horse. Another Hausa railway poem, Wakar 
Reluwe, dated 12 February 1929, composed by a railway worker, Alhaji Bello Yahaya 
Gidadawa, also depicts the sheer wonders of the locomotive. As the song indicate, “there is 
wonder in the way the train moves”. “It combined both the train and the track, and works in a 
straight line, with the track responding to its rhythm.”32 
A pupil of the Nassarawa School on the train, an elderly man from Bornu (who had 
been persuaded with difficulty to board the train), was asked what he thought of it. After 
thanking the railway officials “for so much education given in so short a period,” he replied 
that he could only express himself better by writing a book. When reminded that some of 
them (the officials) might not live to read his book and so he should mention one thing that 
impressed him, he answered after a long silence: “the fact that the engine drank more water 
than a thousand elephants!”33 The old man’s reaction was an admixture of anxiety and 
wonder.34 The colonial authority ensured that they impressed the people with their new 
transport system. Most people found their first train rides quite uncomfortable. Besides the 
blasts from the train and the spit of hot sparks from the engine, the train movement was jerky. 
Raphael writes that the early trains were without cover and without seats, and passengers 
provided their own camp chairs.35 
However, the sublime is only temporary; and after the initial incomprehension, people 
soon discovered the railway’s benefits and quickly apprehended and integrated it into their 
daily lives. David Nye argued that a technology does not endorse human limitations; it shows 
a split between those who understand and those who do not. The weakness of technology is 
that as familiarity to it increases, it loses its novelty and is quickly appropriated and 
domesticated into daily life.36 Appropriation itself is a process, where users interact with the 
technology to transform their understanding of it. As Reichart-Burikukiye notes: 
                                                 
32 D. M. Mukoshy et al., Bargon Hikima; Diwanin Wakokin Alhaji (Dr.) Muhammadu Bello Gidadawa, 
(Sakkwato: Usmanu Dan Fodio University Press, 2006), 114-5. 
33 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 302-3. 
34 A comparative example from western Nigeria also indicates that wonder and awe were generally a reaction to 
train rides. Nigerian Noble Laureate Wole Soyinka, in his book Isara, provides an account of his father’s 
experience in the 1920s. Soyinka writes that, besides the speed and the contrapuntal sound of the train 
movement (“faka fiki faka fiki”) that dazzled him, his father marvelled at the steel and the fat wooden sleepers 
of the railway. Everything about it was so excessive, he continued to marvel and marvel: “This was THE 
WORLD. The railway denizens are different from the rest of humanity.” See W. Soyinka: A Voyage Around 
Essay, (USA: 1986), 12-21; also, L. A. Lindsay, Working with Gender: Wage Labour and Social Change in 
Southern Nigeria, (Portsmouth, 2003), 8. 
35 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 44-5.  
36 Nye, American Technological Sublime, 60 
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“consumption means integration into daily life experience”.37 After all, the success of any 
technology depends on its penetration and acceptability; hence, consumption justifies the act 
of producing the railway. 
 
3.3 From appropriation to domestication 
The inhabitants of the studied communities were not victims of change or passive receivers of 
transport advancement; they were involved in its development during construction, and now 
that it was completed they were also involved in its development by appropriating it. Lee, 
Smith-Jackson, and Kwon have argued that appropriation is the first stage in domesticating 
technology. This involves bringing the technology from the public realm into the private 
realm—to understand it better.38 The French sociologist Michel de Certeau pointed out that to 
appropriate a product or object is itself production and a mode of exercising power and 
strategies.39 In the case of Nigeria, it was also about developing initiatives which shaped the 
use of the railway. This need be emphasized, because the railway was not intended for 
Nigerians’ benefit; but somehow they appropriated it, while also contributing to its 
development. 
One of the many ways in which people appropriated the railway was by travelling to 
the city and the interior. The new transport connected them to the interior and beyond more 
cheaply and faster than was previously possible. As the Wakar Jirgin Kasa suggests, people 
travelled as far as Lagos. The railway allowed them to participate in the worldwide cultural 
interaction called globalization. The railway brought a radical reduction in travel time and 
space among and between communities and beyond. A journey from Zaria to Kano (about 90 
miles), which previously took between three to four days, was achieved in less than three 
hours by train at that time.40 In a similar manner, a journey from either of the communities to 
Lagos, which previously took three weeks on foot and by animal transport, was achieved in a 
little over three days, a time which would have sounded like a romantic tale in pre-colonial 
times.41 The train offered people the opportunity to travel at what was then a greater speed of 
                                                 
37 Reichart-Burikukiye, “Colonial Iconography”, 70.  
38 Y. S. Lee, T. L. Smith-Jackson and G. H. Kwon, Domestication of Technology Theory: Conceptual 
Framework of User Experience, (2009), 2. Available at: 
http://goodgestreet.com/CHI09/submissions/YS_Lee.pdf. [accessed on 12 July 2012]. 
39 Cited in ibid. 
40 A. Mani, Zuwan Turawa Najeria ta Arewa, (Zaria: NNPC, 1978). 
41 The Nigerian Pioneer, Friday, 31 December 1915, 9; Bell, “Recent Progress”, 390. 
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20 miles an hour, at first, and later at 45 miles an hour-without efforts of theirs.42 The 
communities also learned to adjust to living along the line, given the sound and sparks and 
the danger of accident. 
The railway increased the communities’ mobility and integrated them more into the 
national economy than was previously possible. It also made British control of the 
communities much easier. With a warrant ticket, the European District Officers (DOs) could 
inspect distant districts and villages more frequently than was previously possible.43 In those 
days, the DOs usually sent word of mouth to district and village heads of their pending visit 
through the station masters, but the records do not suggest the communities were regularly 
assessed.  
The train differed from the saddle by virtue of its mechanization of motive power. 
Compared with what went before, it combined the train, the route, and the station under one 
single machine ensemble called railway.44 The train transformed the experience of travelling, 
by making it a lot easier and safer, while it also made the possession of money a precondition 
for travelling. Travel was divided based on status and race. Nigerians travelled third class, 
while Europeans travelled first and second class. When the train initially began operation, 
there was no third-class service, evidence that it was not meant for Nigerians’ use.45 During 
the planning of the railway, only a once-a-week passenger train from Lagos to Kano was 
thought to be adequate. Within a short time after its inauguration, there was a high demand 
for rail service from Nigerians, necessitating the introduction of a third-class service in 1912. 
By 1914, the once-a-week train was found to be inadequate, necessitating the expansion of 
passenger services. Contrary to the claim that the fare discouraged the locals from using the 
train, the fare for third class was just one farthing from the start, while the second class was 7 
shillings and 7 pence, reduced to 7 shillings and 3 pence upon the commencement of a third-
class service. Raphael noted that the demand for third class exceeded the available spaces. 
The third class was to become the main income earner for passenger freight.46 As the 
Colonial Annual Report for 1912 indicates, the trains carried 84,819 passengers on all classes 
of travel in 1912, with 1,672 travelling first class, 421 second class, and 82,726 third class.47 
                                                 
42 Uzoechi, “Social and Political Impact”, 171.  
43 NAK ZarProf Railway Warrant Issue of Railway Transport by NB.A. Staff. 
44 Schivelbusch, Railway Journey, 29.  
45 Colonial Annual Report-Annual: Northern Nigeria, Report for 1912, 28. 
46 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 48-9.  
47 Colonial Annual Report for 1912, 28. 
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Until 1918, there was no night journey on the system.48 The trains were slow and 
characterized by frequent breakdowns, washouts, derailments, and accidents.49 From the end 
of World War I onwards, the trains were slow and broke down owing to technical problems 
(this was the beginning of the problems of the Nigerian Railway). R. O. Ekundare and J. R. 
Raphael wrote that the early trains were slow due to the single track and the fact that most of 
the engines and coaches were second-hand or cast-offs from British railways.50 
The train democratized travelling for the communities. As oral and archival sources 
show, the train made rural–urban and rural–rural movement possible. With two “local” or 
“unlimited” passenger trains daily both ways from Kano and Zaria, and once-, and later 
thrice-a-week “express” or “limited” trains from the south, villagers shifted locations very 
easily. The local trains stopped at all stations without exception, while the limited trains 
stopped only at the larger stations. The former ran between Kano and Zaria, while the latter 
went as far as Lagos and Port Harcourt in the South. On the days the passenger trains were 
departing, the stations were always filled with passengers waiting to board a train either to the 
city or one of the nearest villages, markets, or some distant location. Passengers boarded the 
daily train to Zaria or Kano and came back the same day, in the same manner as city dwellers 
visited non-city communities.51 The limited trains, on the other hand, stopped only at the 
important stations such as Madobi, Gimi, and Dangora, owing partly to the southbound 
passengers’ being mostly local traders and southerners from the locality. The local trains 
were very important to the communities’ development, because they stopped daily at all the 
stations without exception. However, centres such as Madobi, Gimi, and Dangora became 
popular and expanded, partly because of the southbound passenger traffic and the 
concentration of commercial firms there. 
As Table 3.1 on outbound passengers indicates, the communities were among the 
important passengers stations interm of generating revenue (note that the table is not 
exhaustive, as it does not cover the entire period covered in the study). As the table shows, 
Faiki, which though not part of the studied communities (it was closed at the opening of 
Dangora station), was the most important station before its closure. Unfortunately, the 
records do not indicate the motivation and destination of travellers or the traffic volumes for 
                                                 
48 F. Jaekel, The History of Nigerian Railway; Organisation, Structure and Related Matters, vol. 3, (Ibadan: 
Spectrum Books, 1997), 148. 
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50 R. O. Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960, (London: Methuen and Co, 1973), 141; 
Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 48.  
51 KSHCBAcc. No. 68, Kura Inspection Notes.  
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both trains. As the records show, Madobi, Gimi, Dangora, and Challawa were the important 
stations as far as passenger traffic was concerned. They were the most important stations not 
only between Kano and Zaria, but also between Kano and Baro (with the exception of Zaria 
and Kaduna). But Madobi was the most important station between Kano and Zaria, followed 
by Gimi and Dangora, partly due to the southbound passenger freight.  
 
 Table 3.1 Passenger traffic, 1916-1939 
Stations 1916 1917 1918 1919 1923 1939 
Inward Outward Outward Outward Outward Outward Outward 
No £ No £ No £ No £ No £ No £ No £ 
Likoro 593 19 687 43 986 94 1191 182 1678 230 591 133 5873 168 
G/Dabosa 2713 1 07 3372 105 3826 261 2987 386 5962 670 2337 359 22851 1101 
Anchau 597 21 1018 36 1298 70 1056 127 2183 203 888 120 8162 249 
Faiki 7708 559 4814 128 4440 442 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Dangora n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3116 557 5835 869 2018 493 16112 673 
Yako n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 516 97 16150 692 
Madobi 4470 291 4078 273 3978 343 2498 353 4786 575 1229 238 19149 865 
K/kwaso n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 198 25 5976 290 
Challawa 822 37 1688 293 2735 866 1619 787 2363 589 737 210 11045 356 
 
Note: n.a. = not available 
Source: These figures were collated from records of the Railway Department for the period 
covered in the table. 
 
The arrival of the passenger train was always the most important event that 
galvanized the communities along the rail line into action. In those days, the trains were 
usually greeted or cheered by songs (such as the Wakar Jirgin Kasa above) and mimicking, 
which are evidence of familiarity with the locomotive.52 It was common for people to stand 
by the track to welcome or bid the passengers farewell. These were railway enthusiasts, who 
                                                 
52 In those days, it was common for people to gather at the rail track on the arrival and departure of a train, to 
sing and mimic the sound the locomotive made. In 1931, the Resident of Kano Province, H. O. Lindsell, called 
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1930). Murray Last provides examples of such mimicry: when the train departed from Kaduna, it said 
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the bridge, both the engine and the bridge said gadar amana gadar amana (“truce bridge, truce bridge”). After it 
had crossed the bridge, it puffed and said loudly, babu amana, babu amana (“no truce, no truce”). This was 
probably the Kaduna–PortHarcout Express train. See M. Last, The History of the Nigerian Railway, by Francis 
Jaekel, Review of “The History of the Nigerian Railway, vol. 1, 2 and 3” (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1997), 
African Journal of International African Institute, 68/4, 1998, 606-7. 
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took pleasure in trains. “We were always happy” was one of the common responses to the 
fascination with trains.53 For as the Hausa poet, Alhaji Gidadawa (mentioned earlier), says in 
his Wakar Reluwe: “Praise be to God […] for including the Hausa among the users of 
train.”54 The passenger trains gave meaning to their lives. For many farmers, traders, and 
industrialists, the trains’ arrival was always an opportunity to make some quick sales of items 
they based their livelihoods on. It became, as Jamie Monson writes, “a resource around which 
[they] structured their material survival.”55 People from the communities and far away always 
brought their goods to sell at the stations. The station became a sort of market—the point of 
entry and exit for people, goods, food, and ideas. Informants commented that: “Whenever the 
train arrived, the stations were always busy like market days.” “You see people rushing to 
sell their goods.”56 
People also learned to adjust to passengers’ demands for their products, which in turn 
made them expand and optimize their markets. The common products on sale at the stations 
were agricultural products (largely food crops) and products of local crafts, as well as cooked 
food. Owing to ecological differences, the crops on sale differed between stations. For 
instance, tuber crops like yam and potatoes were common at Gimi, Likoro, and Auchan 
stations. An informant from Saulawa recalled that, as a child, he preferred to sell to 
passengers aboard the limited train because, according to him, he always sold above the 
normal price. “Whatever profit I made, I pocketed it.” The passenger train itself was, as one 
Yoruba woman pointed out, a mobile shop for itinerant traders on the train to sell as the train 
halted.57 When they sold their goods, they were paid in cash, which also facilitated the 
circulation of the colonial currency. However, vendors needed a permit to sell on platforms. 
It was difficult for the authorities to control illegal hawkers, as the stations were not fenced. 
Although the local police (yandoka) were always on hand to prevent illegal hawking, an 
informant commented that vendors without a permit always bribed their way to the 
platform.58 Due to the modernizing effects of trade and cash, some of the locals began to 
                                                 
53 Interview with Malam Badamasi na Ahmadu, Auchan, 6 April 2011. 
54 Ina gode Allahu mai yau da gobe 
Da yas sanya Hausa cikin Reluwe. 
See for examples, O. O. Kane, Non-Europhone Intellectuals, (Dakar: Codesria, 2012), 26. Also see Mukoshy et 
al., Bargon Hikima, 114.  
55 Monson, African’s Freedom Railway, 95. 
56 Interviews with Alhaji Bello Yakubu Daburau, Alhaji Ilyasu Lawan, Mal Rabo Nasidi, Malam Yahaya Dabo, 
Daburau, 13 March 2011. Interview with Malam Garba Adamu, Bature, Yako, 15 March 2011. 
57 Interview with Malama Bayarabiya (not his real name), a Yoruba and trader, Yako, 12 March 2011. 
58 Interview with Malam Yakubu Ismail, Kura, 14 April 2011. 
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move out of the walled towns to the rail line.59 They also had to adjust to living on the rail 
line, because of the noise and sparks from the engine and the danger of accident.60 
Entrepreneurs used the train to bolster their economic activities. With the train, they 
could do more business and expand their businesses more than was possible by caravans. 
Transporting goods by train was also safer, unlike the caravan. In order to attract traffic from 
the traders, special rates were introduced on some export crops and local commodities.61 
Having discovered the advantages and comfort of transporting their goods at a low rate, 
entrepreneurs reoriented their businesses to the railway, which eventually resulted in the 
phasing out of the traditional transport systems for long-distance trade. The annual report for 
1912 mentioned a decline in pack animals and carriers for sending goods.62 John Raphael 
wrote that: “[b]y [...] using the railway they could do much business in one day with less 
marching [than] they formerly did.”63 The kola traders were the first to re-orient their trade to 
the rail. A once-a-week kola train with three passenger vehicles was made available for their 
use.64 Unlike the old caravan system, the train carried bulky goods at cheaper rates and was 
very fast. As the Wakar Jirgin Kasa indicates, the train was not only less tiring, it also carried 
more than a thousand donkeys did. The popular Hausa praise of the locomotive, kadau mutun 
kadau kayansa, better explains the steam engine’s capacity to carry passengers and loads at 
the same time. In order to intensively use the system to capacity, feeder roads were built 
across the locality to connect remote areas to the railway, but care was taken to ensure they 
did not compete with the line.65 The feeder roads also created opportunity for donkey 
transporters, who quickly circumvented it by charging higher for their service, although 
short-distance traffic was all they could capture. 
Although traders travelled along with their goods on the passenger trains, there was a 
limit to their baggage allowance and what they could carry. When it exceeded the minimum 
weight, they had to pay higher; otherwise they could cargo or parcel it. And where large 
quantities were involved, they had to hire a wagon or join together to hire one. The train 
                                                 
59 Colonial Annual Report-Annual: Northern Nigeria, Report for 1910–1911, 5.  
60 NAK ZarProf 950/1911. 
61 Colonial Report-Annual, Nigeria Report for 1913, 26; Oyewuenyi, “Railway Development”, 91. 
62 Colonial Report-Annual, Northern Nigeria Report for 1912, 22. 
63 Raphael, Through Unknown Nigeria, 49.  
64 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 83, 106. 
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carried cargo that previously would have been very difficult to transport.66 As Jamie Monson 
notes, “the parcels were […] key components of the multi-spatial livelihoods […] fashioned 
by [rural dwellers].”67 On the days a goods or freight train arrived, it was always filled with 
goods belonging to commercial firms and local traders. European manufactured goods and 
agricultural products, especially food crops and fruits from the South, were some of the 
products brought by the trains. Kola was also one of the conspicuous commodities 
transported. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the communities housed numerous long-distance 
traders, many of whom reinvested proceeds from their businesses in kola and other important 
commodities that could be sold back at home. Over time, the communities became 
distribution points for kola and other consumable goods across the North. An informant, 
Alhaji Yakubu Likoro, pointed out that on the days the freight train arrived with kola, the 
station was always a beehive of activity with labourers offloading goods from the train. It was 
said that owing to the volume of kola one Alhaji Yakubu Likoro (since deceased) always 
imported, he requested the railway authority to extend the track to his house.68 Informants at 
Dangora also noted that on the day the kola train was due to arrive, kola traders from the 
town and neighbouring villages as far as Faiki and Rogo always came on donkeys to collect 
their consignments or buy from one of the importers.69 
The railway also fostered trade relations between traders and industrialists in the 
railway corridor with others elsewhere in the country. The railway facilitated much greater 
collaboration in their economic activities than was previously possible. With accessible 
transport, they sent goods to their business associates at some of the main stations or markets 
along the rail line, where there was always a market for such products. This contact also 
provided information on changes in price trends and demand. Informants pointed out that as a 
result of the collaboration, traders from Southern Nigeria, particularly the Yoruba and Igbo, 
always came to buy local staple foods, such as locust beans, shea nuts, pepper, and sugar 
cane, as well as livestock and products of the local industries, bringing with them products 
from the South. The trade in these products expanded and found ready markets across the 
country, owing to the low freight rate (see the tables in Appendix 1). As Remy Onyewuenyi 
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with Malam Adamu Zaki, Malam Chindo Mohammed, Malam Yusuf Inusa Dan Madaki, Malam Idi Inusa, 
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69 Interviews with Malam Garba Adamu Katsina (a.k.a. e don don-ta nuna), Malam Miko Barau, Malam Sule 
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noted, the low freight rate was introduced to make products from the North accessible to 
markets across the country.70 For instance, the popular Makarfi sugar cane and Gimi brown 
sugar (mazarkwaila) reached their widest markets as a result of the railway. In the 1930s and 
1950s, the sugar cane was exported as far as Lagos and Port Harcourt, while the brown sugar 
found ready markets in Kano, Zaria, and far away Sokoto, Maiduguri, and Nguru71 (see 
Chapter 4). Cow butter and ghee (man shanu) were transported to the United African 
Company (UAC) ghee factory at Zaria from Gimi.72 In a similar manner, the popular Bida 
soap (sabulun sallo) made inroads into the localities through the railway.73 Textiles from 
Madobi and Gimi were transported to Plateau and faraway Bornu and French Niger.74 As the 
tables in Appendix 1 illustrate, Gimi, Madobi, Dangora, and Challawa were the most 
important freight stations. Although the tables do not exhaustively cover the entire period 
covered in the study, it is clear the railway had enormous effects on internal trade as well as 
foodstuffs trade between the North and South.75 
It is important to note that prior to the construction of the railway, contact between the 
North and the South was quite limited. The railway not only made it possible; it facilitated 
the union of the two parts of the country. As Olasiji Oshin, F. Umiunu, and A. Onokerhoraye 
have argued, the railways facilitated inter-regional trade in non-export and domestic products 
between the North and the South. Each region exchanged its most characteristic products for 
those of other regions.76 Ann O’Hear’s study of Ilorin crafts indicates that the Ilorin black 
soup pots reached their widest markets across the country and beyond owing to the cheap 
transport facility.77 As Simon Heap also pointed out, European liquors from the South made 
                                                 
70 R. N. Onyewuenyi, “Railway Development and Growth of Export Agriculture in Nigeria During the 1900–
1950s”, (Master’s Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1981), 91.  
71 NAK ZarProf 3296 vol. Sugar Production 1943-54.  
72 NAK ZarProf 5280 Makarfi District.  
73 Ibid.  
74 KSHCB Acc. No. 68 Kura Inspection Note; NAK ZarProf 5280 Makarfi District Note Book 1943. Not only 
did the railway facilitate inter-regional trade, it also facilitated long-distance trade beyond Nigerian borders in 
French Niger. Informants note that Tuareg traders from Agadez in French Niger always brought cloth for dyeing 
at Kura. The Tuareg came by train by way of Gusau (connected by railway in the 1920s) and took the train to 
Zaria and thence to Kwankwaso, whence they trekked to Kura. After completing their business, they took the 
train back to Gusau the same way they had come and then rode on camel back to Agades (interviews with Alhaji 
Yakubu Daburau, Alhaji Ilyasu Lawan, and Malam Yahya Dabi, the village head of Daburau, Daburau-
Kwankwaso, 13 March 2011). 
75 Colonial Report-Annual, Northern Nigeria Report for 1911, 28. 
76 Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”, 115 and 119; F. G. I. Umiunu and A. G. Onokerhoraye, Transportation 
and the Nigerian Space Economy, Benin, University of Benin, 1995), 175-77; F. G. I. Umiunu, “The Role of 
Transportation in Nation Building; the case of the Nigerian Railways…”, Nigerian Magazine, (1981): 3-15. 




inroads into the North, despite the prohibition in Islam.78 The railway not only transported 
people and goods but also ideas, culture, and civilization from one region to another. It 
played an even greater role in the creation of Nigerian national identity and integration. As I 
have indicated elsewhere in Chapter 2, part of the logic for amalgamating the railways and 
administration of the two regions, in 1912 and 1914 respectively, was to break down barriers 
that might undermine national integration. 
The stations, with their relatively elaborate structures, became the communities’ 
gateway to the outside world and a central focus of village life. For many villagers, going to 
the station was synonymous with going to the city, and it was something they planned. The 
station became something to be appropriated as a marker of modernity. Going to the station 
or travelling by train became a sign of becoming modern, a marker of “eye opening” which 
distinguished the men from the boys. As informants generally noted, going to the station and 
travelling by train in those days were something to boast about. Those who had not been to 
the station or entered the train were considered backward. Falola writes that: “It was 
shameful for one to declare that he had been led to the station like a goat.”79 
For many rural dwellers, the stations were places for dissemination of news and 
information. Most of the stations had a newsstand and postal and limited telephone and 
telegram facilities. In those days, these facilities were markers of modernity. Villages without 
them were considered backward. According to Alhaji Usman Abdurrahim Madobi, “in those 
days, when banking was not popular, we sent and received money and mails through the post 
office. A village without a postal agency was as good as a person without a cell phone 
nowadays.”80 Their counterparts in Kwankwaso without a postal facility lamented the 
inconvenience of having to trek to send and receive mail from Madobi. Informants pointed 
that “when the postal facility in the town was closed down, they suffered having to go to 
Madobi to post and send money orders”.81 The station was also an avenue through which the 
locals learned of happenings in the country. Informants in Bagardi stated that “in those days, 
they always trekked the long distance to Likoro station to confirm about the sighting of the 
moon for the Ramadan fasting.”82 
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There was another way the people used the railway, in addition to using it to send and 
receive goods. The railway offered them employment and the experience of modernity in the 
form of wage labour. Although opposition to white man’s work was popular at the beginning, 
the need for cash to pay tax pushed many into railway work. Informants generally pointed out 
that they took railway jobs because of “the steady income and prestige associated with the 
job”. The majority of them worked as permanent way workers or labourers, or as porters and 
guards. The work provided them a steady income to become independent. Despite their low 
status in the railway hierarchy, they were harbingers of industrial culture and modernity in 
the localities. Many who are now retired can still be found in groups around the stations, 
reminiscing about the good old days. Many of them lament the present state of the railway 
and how they had been abandoned by the government. “No gratuity, no pension” was their 
common complaint. 
Although the colonial state undermined Islam in Northern Nigeria, its transport 
infrastructure unexpectedly facilitated and sustained the old contact between Muslims and the 
Arab world. The study by Alexander Thurston suggested that the railway revolutionized the 
way Hajj pilgrimage was undertaken, as it diverted the pilgrims from the trans-Saharan routes 
to the rail line, cutting down travel time and cost for those with the means. Thurston pointed 
out that pilgrims without the means to travel “follow[ed] the tracks which gave them direct 
route to the Red Sea”.83 In a similar manner, the railway facilitated the penetration of 
Christian missionaries into the communities. The missions all came by the railway, as it 
helped them spread the Gospel more easily and cheaply. Until the 1930s, not many Christian 
missionaries were physically established in the North.84 
Also, for the mobility and opportunities it engendered, the railway unexpectedly 
spread disease. The public nature of the stations where people mingled and the enclosed 
nature of the trains provided ideal conditions for the transmission of viruses and diseases. 
Recent studies indicate that when the worldwide influenza pandemic broke out in 1918, it 
spread to major centres along the rail lines with consequent heavy mortality rates. Influenza 
travelled to Nigeria by way of the Lagos coast and then through passengers on trains to the 
communities along the rail line. Attempts to curtail its spread by examining passengers at 
                                                 
83 A. Thurston, “Interactions Between Northern Nigeria and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century”, (MA 
Thesis, Georgetown University, 2009), 16, 18.  
84 E. A. Ayandele, Nigerian Historical Studies, (London: FrankCass, 1979), 159; E. A. Barnes, “Evangelism 
Where It is not Wanted: Colonial Administrators and Missionaries in Northern Nigeria During the First Third of 
the Twentieth Century” Journal of Religion in Africa, 25/4, (1995): 412-441; E. P. T. Crampton, Christianity in 
Northern Nigeria, (London: Cassell Ltd, 1975). 
 
 78 
stations and on trains and through quarantine failed. When it re-occurred in the 1950s, it 
again spread through the railways.85 
The physical appearance of the stations also undermined the cultural importance of 
the village gates (kofofi; sing. kofa). In pre-colonial times, gates occupied important positions 
in Hausa society, as no visitor could come into a community or village without the gate 
chief’s (sarkin kofa) knowledge and consent.86 When the stations appeared with their 
elaborate structures, they almost immediately undermined the gates and became the new 
gateway, where people, goods, and ideas entered and exited under the watchful eyes of the 
station masters. Not only did the stations undermine the village gates, they also undermined 
the local architectural forms. With their aesthetically striking designs, which ranged from the 
fanciful—squat rectangular buildings with arched loggings on four sides and a balustrade at 
the top—to the simple corrugated iron roofs reinforced with concrete, they were not only the 
most distinctive architectural sights in the locale; they were also disruptive of indigenous 
architecture. 
In addition, the structures spoke volumes about the importance of a station and a 
town. They were representations of imperial pride and modernity. As Ian J. Kerr noted, they 
“represent[ed] a set of attitudes, beliefs and relationships; an attitude of British superiority 
[…] measured by machines, beliefs in the progressive and civilizing powers of railways, 
relationships anchored in the fact of colonial rule to which compliance was fostered by grand 
building.”87 Whether built to represent imperialism or not, they were the most imposing 
structures in the locality, “ready for beholders’ interpretation and reinterpretation; they 
represented and could be made to re-present. They stood ready for appropriation.”88 
Finally, with their bustle and elegance, the stations also had their own individual aura. 
They were a haven for beggars and station loungers. They also had a dark underside and a 
criminal half-life, which co-existed with their public face. They were magnets for 
pickpockets, robbers, and prostitutes. This is not to suggest that criminality was colonial in 
origin—it is much more ancient than that—but the public nature of stations undoubtedly 
attracted criminals, while the trains provided them with platforms for their activities (as we 
shall see in Chapter 6). 
                                                 
85 Ayoola, “Price of Modernity”; M. Wada, “A History of Modern Health System in Kano”, (PhD Thesis, 
Bayero University, Kano, 2013), 62-83; KSHCB SNP/12/1924, Kano Province Annual Report File 635. 
86 B. M. Barkindo, “The Gates of Kano City; A Historical Survey”, in: Bawuro M. Barkindo (ed.) Studies in the 
History of Kano, (Ibadan; Heinemann Books, 1983), 1-30, 12-14. 
87 Kerr, “Representation and Representations”, 292. 





As this chapter demonstrates, the railway had enormous effects on the studied communities. 
The communities encountered and reacted to the locomotive and trains with mixed reactions. 
Contrary to the established view that the trains were appropriated almost immediately, the 
chapter demonstrates that appropriation was not as sudden as was previously assumed, 
because the ambivalence toward the rail line manifested in a mixture of fear and awe. This 
was the case because many did not understand initially what the rail line was all about, much 
less its benefits; but as they grew to understand it, they quickly appropriated it in distinctive 
ways and used it to transform their lives. Part of this process involved the colonial state, 
which had to educate people how to use the system and what its advantages were. 
As the chapter also indicates, the communities were not passive recipients of transport 
advancements: they had been involved in its development during construction, and when it 
was completed they actively contributed to its development in their capacity as passengers 
and producers of food and cash crops. 
The chapter also shows that the railway and its other structures were means of 
representing and showing off British technological achievements, superiority, power, and 























Figure 3.1 A First Class passenger sleeping car 
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Figure 3.2 Railway buildings across the study areas 
Sources: Personal collections 
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSPORT ADVANCE, 
MARKETING AND REACTIONS OF LOCAL 
PRODUCERS 
 
It is interesting to note that at that time the purpose of the railway was to evacuate the cotton 
and to carry building materials and trade goods in the opposite direction. There was then no 
thought of groundnuts, which is now the biggest export crop from Nigeria. 
  Nigerian Railway Jubilee 1901–1951 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is a shared opinion among scholars that the large-scale agricultural expansion which took 
place in West Africa during the last century was achieved by bringing underutilized factors of 
production into optimum use and that labour was too scarce for there to be any market for 
labour. According to this theory, the construction of the railway infrastructure was the vent 
that activated agricultural production, and this agricultural expansion was accomplished 
without reduction in domestic food sufficiency. This is the ‘vent for surplus’ theory, 
popularized by the Burmese development economist Hla Myint.1 Scholars who applied the 
same theory to analyse Northern Nigeria’s agricultural exports have recounted the same old 
story, although with slight modifications. They asserted that large-scale agricultural 
expansion was constrained by land and labour. While some of the assumptions of the vent for 
surplus theory are correct, not all are applicable to the studied areas. Although cotton was a 
complete failure in Kano, it was a marked success in Zaria and most especially in northern 
Zaria, where some of the studied communities are located. Throughout this chapter, I shall be 
testing these popular patterns of general agriculture in Northern Nigeria’s history in the 
studied communities. The chapter examines the role of the railway in the development and 
expansion of cash crops production and trade in the communities. It also looks at how food 
production was maintained in the face of such cash cropping. 
 
                                                 
1 Hla Myint, “The Classical Theory of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries”, Economic 
Journal, 68, (1958): 317-337. 
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4.2 Development of the cotton export trade 
The railway was completed in 1911 but was not open to traffic immediately owing to the 
wash-out of tracks and bridges around Challawa. Having entered Kano, the train had to wait 
until the amalgamation of the two railways, which had been fixed for the following year. 
While the opening of the line was being awaited, both the colonial authority and the BCGA 
focused on propaganda to step up cotton production against the coming season.2 The BCGA 
among other things sent out agricultural experts to farmers living along the rail line to explain 
to them what they stood to gain by growing cotton for export, in addition to distributing seeds 
to them. The close-settled zone between Kano and Zaria, to which the studied communities 
were integral, evinced much attention from the BCGA and the colonial authority. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, the zone was the main cotton and textile belt in the Sokoto Caliphate 
in the nineteenth century, and hence the BCGA’s interest in this area. They also opened a 
ginnery at Maigana in Zaria in anticipation of a bountiful harvest.3 The colonial authority also 
engaged in similar propaganda, by way of encouraging farmers to grow cotton for export and 
of establishing experimental farms.4 In 1911, provincial administrations suggested to farmers 
the improved methods of cultivation that should be adopted. Expectations were high that 
farmers would grow cotton when they realized there was a ready market for it.5 Also, in what 
appeared as a fine display of indirect rule, the emirs and their headmen were instructed to 
influence farmers to grow the crop. Such a directive coming from the local authority was 
likely to influence farmers into growing the desired crop. For instance, in Katsina, the Emir 
instructed four of his district headmen to ensure every adult male in their districts devoted at 
least one acre of their land to cotton.6 This official propaganda continued well into the 
                                                 
2 For elaborate discussion on this, see among others: A. O. Anjorin, “European Attempts to Develop Cotton 
Cultivation in West Africa, 1850-1910”, ODU, 3/1 (July, 1966): 3-15, and also “Cotton Industry”; Hogendorn, 
“Cotton Campaign”; J. S. Hogendorn, “The Origin of Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria”, in: Carl Eicher 
and Carl Liedholm (eds), Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy (East Lansing: Michigan 
University Press, 1970), 31-51; Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 16-35; M. Candotti, “Cotton Growing and 
Textile Production in Northern Nigeria from Caliphate to Protectorate c. 1804-1914: A Preliminary 
Examination”, being a paper presented at the African Economic History Workshop-London School of 
Economics-May 2009, 1-15; Okediji, “Economic History”, chapter 4, 139-179; Bristwistle, “Cotton Growing”, 
106-7; S. Onyewu, “Deceived by African Cotton: The British Cotton Growing Association and the Demise of 
the Lancashire Textile Industry”, African Economic History, 28, (2002): 92; E. de C. Duggan “The Cotton 
Growing Industry of Nigeria”, Journal of the Royal African Society, 21/83, (1922): 199-207. 
3 Colonial Annual Report for 1910–1911, 8 
4 Ibid. 
5 Colonial Annual Report for 1911, 28 
6 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 25-28; Candotti, “Cotton Growing¨ 7-8; Anjorin, “Cotton Industry”, 122-3; 
Okediji, “Economic History”, 149-50. 
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farming season, with anticipation that cotton would pile up by the time the line was officially 
opened to traffic. 
Farmers’ response to this state-directed cotton promotion was quite the opposite of 
what the authorities had anticipated. The propaganda made little or no impact. Although they 
had everything required to expand production, on their own initiative they did what they 
thought would most benefit their own objectives. I argue that the transition to cash crop 
expansion was gradual rather than spontaneous, contrary to what has been previously 
assumed. 
Food security is at the heart of every farmer’s thinking; they could not afford to 
import food, for to do so would be too expensive and uneconomical. The farmers were like 
businessmen, who take into account prices and market trends. When the cash return on a crop 
was attractive, they increased their acreage; but when prices fell, they decreased their 
acreage. 
Land was definitely not an issue, contrary to the vent for surplus model’s contention 
that land was scarce. In fact, land was available in abundance, but it was difficult to exploit 
intensively in some cases owing to soil type and the prevalence of trypanosomiasis.7  
On the eve of the export trade, farmers grew food crops and groundnuts on their own 
initiative. During E. H. B. Laing’s tour of Sarkin Yaki district in 1912, he observed that large 
amounts of land were devoted to food crops, mainly guinea corn and pepper. He observed  
that “[c]otton and ground-nuts are not mostly cultivated, as farmers devoted their energies on 
food crops”, while some combined it with cash crops.8 Of course, cotton was grown; but, as 
earlier indicated, it was used in the indigenous textile crafts. 
The claim by the vent for surplus proponents that labour was scarce during the 
transition to cash crop production is misleading, as a recent study indicated that labour was 
scarce only during the wet season.9 At the start of the cash crop production, the labour 
shortage was remedied by recourse to a combination of family, slave, and forced labour. 
Although production was largely household-based, the aristocracy and merchant classes 
relied on slave labour. Contrary to the claim by Hogendorn that slave labour did not 
                                                 
7 G. Austin, “Resources, Techniques and Strategies South of the Sahara: Revising the Factor Endowments 
Perspectives on African Economic Development, 1500-2000”, Economic History Review, 61/3, (2008): 587-
624, 7-9; NAK ZarProf 2900 Sleeping Sickness Existence in Christian village of Gimi 1920-1923; NAK 
ZarProf  C.7/1919 Church Missionary Society of Zaria-Audu of Gimi Question of Inheritance of 1919. 
8 NAK SNP 10/268P/1913, Zaria Province Annual, Sarkin Yaki District Assessment Report by E. H. B. Laing 
1912. 
9 Austin, “Resources, Techniques and Strategies”, 12. 
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contribute to cash crop expansion, slave labour did expand production.10 As indicated in 
Chapter 1, when the British abolished slavery they criminalized wholesale desertion of 
slaves, as they feared it would ruin the estate owners with whom they had forged alliances. 
British colonialism actually promoted slavery by enhancing slave owners’ ability to use slave 
labour; therefore, slavery and slave dealings continued clandestinely until the 1930s. Since 
slaves could not access land even if they had left their masters, many continued to live with 
their masters, while many others were forced to remain.11 Migrant or hired labour, which was 
so central in the cocoa expansion in south-western Nigeria, was not popular in the case of 
groundnuts until the 1930s. 
As the new evidence indicates, besides the slave labour, the Emir of Zaria, Aliyu 
Dansidi, and his district heads also relied on forced labour. Large amounts of labour intended 
for railway work were diverted to their own private plantations without paying for it.12 This 
was at a time the railway work was at its peak, and the Emir and his chiefs were given a free 
hand to recruit labour.13 Bashir Salau and Safiyanu Aminu argued that large amounts of the 
labour so used on farms of the aristocrats were recruited through communal work (gayya). 
The communal work, according to their different interpretations, was supposed to be 
voluntary, but in practice during much of the colonial period it involved force. And it was 
only those in positions of authority that sanctioned such labour.14 Hence, the transition to 
cash crop production was achieved by a combination of family, slave, and forced labour. 
By the time the railway was officially opened in 1912, its economic consequences 
diverged dramatically from the official expectations. The colonial authority found that in 
spite of the efforts they had invested in cotton promotion, not much was realized; instead, 
farmers appropriated the railway to grow groundnuts, a crop which did not feature during the 
planning of the railway. It is generally agreed that cotton was a complete failure in Kano and 
that it was quickly embraced in Zaria Province. Jan Hogendorn and Florence Okediji’s claim 
that the crop was quickly grown for export in northern Zaria, where some of the studied 
                                                 
10 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 103. 
11 See J. Hogendorn, “The Economics of Slave Use on Two ‘Plantations’ in the Zaria Emirate of Sokoto 
Caliphate”, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 10/3, (1977): 369-83, 382; Lovejoy and 
Hogendorn, Slow Death, 145-8, 221; C. N. Ubah, “Suppression of the Slave Trade in the Nigerian Emirates”, 
Journal of African History, 32, (1991): 447-470; Watts, Silent Violence: Food Famine and Peasantry in 
Northern Nigeria, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Lovejoy, “Plantations”, 353-4; NAK 
ZarProf 5280 Makarfi District Note Book 1943.  
12 NAK SNP7/950/1911, Zaria Province Annual Report for 1910 
13 SNP/10/105P/1921, Zaria Province Annual Report for 15 months, ended 31st March 1921. 
14 M. B. Salau, “The Role of Slave Labour in Groundnut Production in Early Colonial Kano”, Journal of 
African History, 51, (2010): 147-65; Aminu, “The Colonial State”, 127-131. 
 
 86 
communities are situated, is misleading.15 Okediji misrepresented the real situation of cotton 
export from the area. This can be understood given the nature of sources available to them at 
the time, which did not give the real picture at the district and village levels. The new 
evidence indicates that although cotton was grown, it was not offered for export. The amount 
so realized from the area was too low, although it became popular and increased over time. 
As the record indicates, cotton purchases in the Kano area were the lowest. When the BCGA 
representative visited Madobi during his tour of the Kano areas in 1913, he was disappointed 
to find that groundnuts were grown instead of cotton.16 As the Nigerian Railway annual 
report indicates, the raw cotton was consumed by the indigenous textile industry.17 The 
BCGA lamented that its free distribution of seed could not guarantee it a preferential 
advantage over the Hausa traders, who secured most of the raw cotton. The BCGA wanted 
the government to influence farmers to sell the raw cotton to it.18 Their purchase from the 
areas up to 1914 was quite disappointing. The crop did not feature prominently on rail-borne 
export lists from the communities. As the evidence suggests, the bulk of the cotton so 
produced was exported to Kano for use in the local textile industry. 
One reason farmers refused to sell to the BCGA was that cotton from their areas, as 
elsewhere in Hausaland, was meant for the local textile crafts and not for export. Another 
reason was the low price the BCGA offered for the produce. It is quite likely that farmers 
would have sold to the BCGA had the price been higher than that offered by the Hausa 
traders.19 In addition, cotton impoverishes the soil, which makes it unsustainable over a long 
period, whereas groundnuts add nitrogen to the soil.20 
A further factor was that the economic specialization, which dated back to the 
nineteenth century, between Kano and Zaria also worked against BCGA’s demand. Zaria had 
always specialized in growing cotton, while Kano specialized in making cloth. Most of the 
cotton from Zaria has always been transported to Kano, “where the purchasing power of local 
weavers was much greater”.21 Beside traders from Kano who purchased the cotton fibre, 
there were also many at centres such as Meyere, Kudan, and their environs who purchased 
                                                 
15 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 110, 112; Okediji, “Economic History”, 151. 
16 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 112; NAK KanProf 95/1914, Annual Report 1914. 
17 Public Record Office (hereafter referred to as PRO), PRO 657/7, Nigerian Railway and Udi Coal Mines, 
Administrative Report for the Year Ending 31st March 1918, 64. 
18 NAK KanProf 270/1913, Annual Report for Quarter Ending 1913.  
19 Dupigny, Gazetteer of Zaria, 31; NAK KanProf 270/1913. 
20 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 41; Okediji, “Economic History”. 
21 Candotti, “Cotton Growing”, 5; Anjorin, “Cotton Industry”, 122-3. 
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cotton and transported it to Kano.22 Hence, when the cotton trade started, these traders used 
their capital to purchase most of the crop—at a rate a little higher than what the BCGA 
offered—and transport it to Kano at a low cost by railway.  
The outbreak of the war in 1914 affected the cotton trade, but it favoured the 
indigenous textile crafts. During the war, imports of goods were seriously restricted owing to 
the wartime restrictions. This condition of scarcity stimulated a corresponding demand for 
products from the local looms. The raw cotton was diverted to the craft, which was a positive 
development. From the start of World War I onward, the BCGA was determined to dislocate 
the local textile mill through the importation of cheap European textiles into the local markets 
and the revival of the cotton propaganda. The idea was to flood the local markets with cheap 
cotton goods with a view to reducing local demand for raw cotton. The BCGA also 
distributed an exotic variety of seed called the Allen Middling American Exotic, which they 
distributed to farmers free of charge, and they offered to buy the fibre at 1¾d per 1b.23 From 
the colonial perspective, the local variety was of low quality compared with the Middling 
American variety, which was of a higher yield. 
As if the authority anticipated that the local variety would be grown to the exclusion 
of the exotic, it prohibited the growing of other varieties in the districts where the exotic was 
grown. The colonial authority also prohibited touting or sales of cotton outside the 
established markets, with the aim of improving the quality.24 By the end of the war, the 
American variety had replaced the local variety, but it did not destroy the local textile craft, 
as most of the fibre was still directed to local crafts.25 
By the end of the war, the old cotton promotion policy was revived, this time around 
with more vigour, as the government was determined to see the American variety extended to 
the studied communities. The emirs and their headmen were actively enlisted to influence 
their subjects to grow the crop, and the seeds were distributed through them. The extension of 
this variety was gradual; and as the scheme was widely taken up in one district, it was 
extended to another. Buying stations were established at the main centres, and cotton 
examiners (mallams) were posted to such centres by the Agricultural Department.  
                                                 
22 NAK MLG 22289 Makarfi District Reassessment Report. 
23 Dupigny, Gazetteer of Zaria, 37. 
24 Ibid. 38-9. 
25 PRO 657/7, 100, appendix IV. 
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Although the Nigerian annual report indicated that the American variety had replaced 
the local variety by 1916, evidence from the studied areas suggests otherwise.26 From 1919 
through 1921, large amounts of the American variety were distributed to farmers across the 
studied communities. In 1919, all the districts in Zaria Emirate were brought under the 
Middling American variety, with 1,200 bags distributed at Makarfi, 1,050 bags at Ikara, 842 
at Auchan, and 600 bags at Kudan. As the evidence indicates, in all the districts where the 
seeds were distributed it was the farmers themselves who requested the seeds.27 Gimi, 
Dabosa, and Auchan were selected as buying stations and rail heads for the American seeds. 
Kudan, though not a rail head, was also made a buying station.  
Despite the free seed distribution, the quantity realized was much lower than the 
authority anticipated. During the 1919 buying season, only 35 tons were realized by the Niger 
Company at Gimi. As usual, the Kano traders purchased most of the crop; the local variety 
was sold at 3d per pound28 as against 2¾d per pound for the American cotton. Again, the 
annual report suggests that the American variety had replaced the local variety, but the 
evidence suggests otherwise, as the local variety was still popular. All this goes to confirm 
that cotton export was not as popular in this part of Zaria as previously assumed, although it 
became popular over time. In Madobi, south-west of Kano, the result was the same as only a 
little over a ton was realized in that year.29 30 As records indicate, large amounts of the cotton 
produced, including the American variety, were consumed internally by the local textile 
crafts.31 
By 1921, the American variety has been extended to the Kano area, with Kura, 
Karaye, Tudun Wada, and Gwarzo joining the American seed cotton areas. Dangora and 
Madobi were made buying and seed distribution centres as well as rail heads for cotton from 
those districts.32 Similarly, cotton examiners were also posted there to inspect and grade the 
crop to ensure that quality was maintained. At first,  there was a misunderstanding, as the 
cotton examiners thought farmers had to sell to the BCGA. This was remedied by explaining 
                                                 
26 Colonial Report-Annual, Nigeria Report for 1930, 2. 
27 NAK SNP10/273P/1919, Zaria Province Report no. 74 for half year ending, 30th June 1919. 
28 In this case, pound represents a British pound weight and is abbreviated as lb. (2.2 lbs is approximately equal 
to 1 kg). This is not to be confused with the British currency pound. 
29 PRO 657/7, 100, appendix IV. 
30 A ton is a unit for measuring weight in Britain and the colonies. A ton contains 2,240 pounds. 
31 NAK SNP/273P/1919, Zaria Province Report no. 74 for half year ending, 30th June 1919; KSHCB SNP17/2, 
Kano Province Annual Report 1929. 
32 KSHCB 123, Kano Province Annual Report for 1921.  
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to farmers that it was up to them to decide to whom they wanted to sell.33 As Table 4.1 
indicates, the quantity realized from some of the areas in 1923 was not impressive. The table 




Table 4.1 Ginned cotton freight in tons, 1923 
Gimi Anchau Madobi 
220 tons 7 tons 27 tons 
 
Source: PRO 657/7, Nigerian Railway and Udi Mines Administrative report for the year 
ending March 1923. 
 
A number of developments took place at the end of the war which need highlighting 
here. As can be seen from the discussion so far, the railway opened new markets in distant 
locations and also areas far removed from the line; but there was a limitation, as the railway 
could not intensively tap the new sources. This was circumvented by donkey transporters, 
who exploited the situation to their advantage by charging higher rates for their services, even 
though short-distance traffic was all they could capture. During his tour of markets in Zaria 
Province in 1918, the District Officer II, Mr. Porch, observed that prices in remote areas were 
lower than those along the line. He suggested linking such areas to the railways. The colonial 
authority also stimulated production in such far distant areas through road development 
projects.34 Right from the start, the colonial authority envisaged an integrated road network 
that would feed the railway with traffic. A couple of cart roads in areas far removed from the 
line were improved to feed the railway with traffic, but efforts were made to ensure they did 
not compete with the railway itself. By the 1918/19 season, the railway also operated a motor 
service which connected centres like Kudan, Giwa, and Tsibiri with the ginnery in Zaria.35 
The cotton-producing areas south-west of Kano were improved and linked with the BCGA 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 SNP10/273/1919, Zaria Province Report no. 74 for Half Year Ending 30th June 1919. 




station at Challawa. The roads were mere feeders to the railway and were capable of carrying 
a three-ton lorry to evacuate the crop.36 
It is also to be noted that despite the efforts taken to ensure the quality of the Middling 
American seeds, they were adulterated. Adulteration was prevalent among the firms, which 
resulted in the introduction of cotton grading. This was carried out by the cotton examiners, 
who issued certificates to farmers, indicating the grade. Cotton unaccompanied by a 
certificate was not accepted for ginning.37 The old system whereby farmers sold directly to 
the BCGA was also abolished, and the BCGA received it from the firms who bought directly 
from farmers or acted as middlemen.  
Another important development was the establishment of a new ginnery at Challawa 
in 1924. The inadequacy of the one at Zaria necessitated the establishment of a new one to 
take care of cotton from the Kano area. The Kano ginnery itself was closed down and its 
equipment was sent to Gusau, because the conditions in Kano were against cotton export, as 
the local loom continued to compete with British demand.38 By this time also, European 
textiles had increasingly made inroads into the rural space.  
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, cotton trade suffered from the fluctuating 
influence of the global economy. Cotton export was affected by factors such as price falls, 
droughts, food shortages, and locust and hopper invasions (which occurred intermittently 
during the crisis). Although prices were lower generally, exports did not decline, as farmers 
had to sell three times what they had been selling in the pre-Depression era to raise cash for 
tax. In most of the communities, farmers cut down or stopped cotton production altogether, 
while many focused on food and groundnuts. Although the groundnut price was also lower at 
the time, unlike cotton it could still finance tax payments, be eaten as food, or be processed 
into oil which could also fetch cash. 
                                                 
36 NAK ZarProf 431 Vol. IV, Cotton Market: Erection, gazetting, opening and closing of 1947-51; NAK 
ZarProf 510, Cotton Market: Control of Cotton Examiner 1946–1956; NAK/MKT/55, Gazetted Cotton Buying 
Stations. 
37 Okediji, “Economic History”, 159-60. 






Figure 4. 1 Transport of cotton by bullock in Funtua in the 1930s 















Evidence indicates a general marked reduction in acreage under cotton. For instance, 
of the 24 representative farms assessed in Ikara District during the 1933–1934 tax seasons, 
only four were under cotton cultivation; the rest were under food and groundnuts.39 In Paki 
District also, groundnut expansion had taken over land previously under cotton.40 The 
exception was Kura, where the record suggests a large acreage under cotton.41 In order to 
stimulate exports during this time, a special rate was introduced for ginned cotton booked 
from Zaria and Challawa to Baro.42 
Although the British undermined the indigenous textile crafts through import of cheap 
textile goods and prohibition on sales of cotton outside the official market, the industry 
benefited from the economic slump, as import was restricted. Evidence indicates that local 
industries such as weaving (turkudi), dyeing, beating, and tailoring (dinkin turkudi) flourished 
during the Great Depression. Farmers continued to weave in the dry season, and their low 
costs offered them a competitive advantage over the imported cloth. The record also suggests 
an increase in the indigenous cloth trade with the Beriberi (in Bornu and Jos) and the Tuaregs 
in what is now the Niger Republic.43 
By the end of the economic crisis, cotton trade recovered and serious trade resumed at 
the buying stations. By this time, Kudan had emerged as a popular cotton market, serving not 
only farmers from the environs but also from Kano Emirate. Cotton had become popular over 
time, as evidenced from the data on cotton freight (Table 4.2). As the table shows, cotton 
purchases from Kudan were higher than those from the rail head at Gimi. The record itself is 
problematic; for instance, data on cotton purchase does not tally with the quantity freighted. 
Similarly, some of the purchase by the firms and middlemen which ought to be reflected on 
the list appears separately, and one is left wondering whether it had been added already or 
not. For instance, 120 tons purchased by the Niger Company in 1937 and 6 tons in 1938, and 
another 30 tons by a Hausa merchant—Mallam Kampa from Makarfi—in 1937–1938 are 
mentioned only in passing.44 Two important observations also arise from the records. First, 
there is the large quantity of cotton seeds that were offloaded annually at Gimi, Madobi, and 
                                                 
39 KSHCB 438C Kano Province Annual Report for 1930; Colonial Report-Annual, Nigeria for 1930, 14; NAK 
ZarProf 1712, Ikara Assessment of Representative of Village Area 1933-4. 
40 NAK ZarProf 395, Paki District Affairs 1930. 
41 R. N. Onyewuenyi, “Railway Development”, 104, 109; KSHCB Acc. No. 68 Kura Inspection Notes vol. 1. 
42 Colonial Report-Annual, Nigerian Reportfor 1930, 45. 
43 NAK ZarProf 1712; NAK ZarProf 395; NAK ZarProf 5280; KSHCB Acc. No. 68; NAK ZarProf 1706, 
Makarfi District Assessment of Representative Village Area; NAK Prof MLG 22289, Makarfi District 
Reassessment Report; KSHCB MLG 16490/1932 Kumbotso District Kano Emirate Reassessment. 
44 NAK ZarProf 5280. 
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Dangora for distribution to farmers across the localities, evidence of cotton’s increasing 
popularity. For instance, 367.5 tons of cotton seeds were offloaded at Gimi Station in the 
1935/6 season, 346 tons in the 1936/7 season, and 117 tons in the 1937/8 season. Second, 
European textiles such as grey baft, shirting, and cotton hanks had increasingly made inroads 
across the communities. As the records highlight, the products were expensive but were 





Table 4.2 Cotton purchases and exports in tons, 1932-1938 
Year Gimi Kudan 
Cotton seed freight from Gimi Station 
(lbs Grade I Cotton) 
1932-33 538 n.a. n.a. 
1934 564 n.a. n.a. 
1935 1,451 n.a. 1935–36: 367½ tons 
1936 480 538 1936–37: 346 tons 
1937 280 505 1937–38: 117 tons 
1938 73 284 n.a. 
 
Note: n.a.=not available 
Source: NAK ZarProf, 5280 Makarfi District Note Book 1943. 
 
When the Second World War broke out, the cotton trade suffered again owing to the 
wartime policy. During the war, the colonial authority stepped up production to prosecute the 
war, and the colony was expected to bail Britain out, but official attention favoured 
groundnuts and not cotton. For instance, the propaganda for maximum groundnut production 
was increased in Ikara District in 1944.46 In the Kano area, all the cotton markets were closed 
down from 1940 to 1943 because of the propaganda.47 Even the annual cotton seed 
distribution was suspended to avoid competition with groundnuts. The implications for cotton 
farmers were enormous; its selling price was lower, while food prices and taxes were higher. 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 NAK ZarProf 3930 Zaria Province Annual Report for 1945. 
47 NAK KanProf 6991/S.5. 
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At the same time, export of cotton was higher, as in order to raise cash for tax, farmers 
produced three times what they had produced in the pre-war period.48 
One important development of the wartime policies in the areas under study, as in 
most places, was the reorganization of the cotton trade. The marketing and export of the crop 
previously handled by the firms was taken over by a new statutory monopoly board, known 
as the Cotton Marketing Board. The reason was that prior to the war, increase in prices were 
not being passed on to farmers. For instance, when prices were high, local prices did not rise 
proportionately; and, when prices were low, the effects of low prices were passed on to the 
farmers. The board was established to stabilize prices, protect farmers from exploitation, and 
use profits accrued from cotton export for research and developmental purposes. As Peter 
Bauer pointed out, however, the marketing board weakened rather than strengthened farmers’ 
position. Their statutory power over the intermediaries in the trade, as Bauer noted, 
destabilized rather than stabilized prices.49 Under the new arrangement, the board purchased 
cotton through the Licenced Buying Agents (LBAs). At first, the LBAs were predominantly 
the European firms who controlled the trade in the pre-war era. This was reversed in the 
1950s to include Nigerian entrepreneurs, most especially politicians with links to the 
government. The board gave them bank guarantees and capital to become LBAs. The crop 
was purchased at the same gazette cotton stations which had existed before the war. 
From its numerous interventions in the studied communities, the board stimulated 
production through the establishment of markets where the crop was purchased at a set price. 
The prices were always announced at the beginning of the season, so farmers knew 
beforehand how much their product would be worth. The board also intervened in road 
development to connect distant producing centres with the rail line. The roads were built and 
maintained by the board through a special allocation to the native authorities.50 Although the 
roads were motorable in the dry season only, they played an important role in stimulating 
production and in bringing distant farmers closer to the markets. In the 1950s, when road 
development became high on the government’s agenda, they were linked with the old Kano–
                                                 
48 Ibid.; KSHCB Acc. No. 68; NAK ZarProf PLT/4, Makarfi District Affairs; NAK KanProf 5467, Railway 
Employee Complaints of Short Food Supply; NAK KanProf 6033, Provision of Passes on the Railway; NAK 
KanProf 6395 Kano Provincial Annual Report for 1946. 
49 P. T. Bauer, West African Trade: A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and Monopoly in a Changing Economy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 263-280. 
50 NAK ZarProf 431 Vol. IV, Cotton Market: Erection, gazetting, opening and closing of 1947-51. 
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Zaria road which the railway followed and which had been converted to an all-season road.51 
The road did not follow the same route followed by the railway; instead it followed a new 
route previously isolated from the rail line. These roads generally became important in the 
1970s, when road transport become popular.  
It would be interesting to know what the effects of the roads were; unfortunately, this 
is not possible due to lack of data. As the evidence indicates, cotton purchases from the 
communities were lower than the previous years. For instance, only a little over 187½ tons 
were realized at Gimi, 448 tons at Kudan, and 1 ton at Challawa in 1951, and 2 tons at 
Dangora in 1953/4.52  
It also appears that the export trade had reached its limits, as production dropped. The 
records suggest this was as a result of low yields. In the 1950s, an attempt to improve crop 
yields through the application of fertilizers was introduced. At first, farmers resented the idea; 
but following the official propaganda, they gradually embraced the practice.53 
By the 1970s, cotton export fluctuated owing to the Sahelian famine and the shift in 
government priority in regard to the agricultural sector. Increased wealth from oil exports 
shifted government attention from agriculture to the productive sector. The existence of 
modern textile mills in the North from the 1950s also meant that much of the raw cotton 
previously exported was consumed internally. Firms continued to buy the crop and resell to 
the industry. By the end of 1970s, the local loom and its subsidiaries such as weaving, 
dyeing, and tailoring were in continuing decline. 
From the discussion so far, it is clear that the anticipation that the railway would 
activate cotton export failed owing to the low prices and the fact that the crop was not meant 
for export. The Hausa traders competed with the firms for the raw cotton by offering higher 
prices than the firms offered. The Hausa traders continued to dominate the trade until their 
hold over the trade was undermined in the 1920s. As was shown above, cotton export from 
the areas was not as significant as writers have previously speculated. Until the 1920s, cotton 
did not feature prominently on the list of rail-borne exports from the communities. The 
colonial government also tried to improve the quality of the crop by introducing an improved 
variety. Although the improved variety was intended for export, much of it was consumed by 
the indigenous textile industry. As noted above, the railway opened new frontiers, but it could 
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not intensively exploit them. This was circumvented by donkey transporters who exploited 
the situation to their advantage by charging higher rates. The colonial authority also 
stimulated production in such areas by building access roads to connect farmers in far 
removed areas to the rail line. By the 1950s, much of the cotton previously exported was 
internally consumed by the emerging textile mills. 
 
4.3 Development of the groundnut export trade 
It is clear from the above that cotton export was not the marked success proponents of the 
railway had anticipated. Instead, groundnuts, which had never featured during the planning of 
the railway, became an important export crop. The crop had been grown since pre-colonial 
times, but it did not become an important cash crop until the completion of the line. Some 
officials had indeed speculated that it might likely form part of the rail-borne traffic when the 
line was completed. For instance, the Agricultural Commercial Officer of Southern Nigeria, 
C. A. Bristwistle, speculated that groundnuts would take a second position to cotton as an 
export crop.54 But despite these speculations, it did not attract the attention of the colonial 
authority.  
It is not entirely clear why the British did not accord groundnuts the special attention 
their counterparts did in Senegal.55 Part of the reason groundnuts did not attract attention was 
that cotton promotion distracted attention from other crops. The absence of groundnut-
processing mills in Britain at that time also discouraged official interest. Until the World War 
I period, when groundnut-crushing and margarine plants were established in Britain, Nigerian 
groundnuts were processed in the Netherlands, Germany, and France, with Germany and 
France being the main markets for the nuts. Another reason for lack of interest was that 
European commercial firms, especially the Niger Company, were not interested in 
groundnuts because they considered the crop inferior both in yield and price compared with 
cotton.56 
This general anticipation that cotton would form the main traffic for the railway was 
proved wrong, and there was a general shift to groundnut production. Farmers, on their own 
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initiative, appropriated the railway to grow groundnuts, using the combination of family, 
slave, and forced labour. As indicated earlier, production was largely conducted by 
households, but the aristocrat and merchant classes relied on slave and forced labour. Migrant 
labour was not so popular until very much later.  
The price returns on groundnuts were more attractive than cotton. Unlike cotton, 
groundnut is a food crop and has always been planted alongside food crops. Groundnuts 
could be eaten as food or cake (kulli kulli) or processed as oil which could be sold in the 
event of a price fall.57 Hence, farmers grew groundnuts and food crops instead of cotton, the 
officially favoured crop.58 The conditions in the studied communities were also well suited to 
groundnut expansion. Rainfall was adequately distributed, and land was fertile and in 
abundance, though difficult to exploit in some places.59 
As Hogendorn and Okediji argued, “a new demand” from Europe for fats and oils 
stimulated a corresponding demand for Nigeria’s groundnuts. Although the vent for surplus 
theory ignored the role of African entrepreneurship in cash crop expansion, studies by 
Hogendorn and Okediji indicated that groundnut exports began at the initiative of Hausa 
traders. As a result of this new demand and the cash returns on the crop, Hausa merchants 
responded energetically by ensuring that large amounts of the crop were grown for export.60 
As Paul Lovejoy and Jan Hogendorn asserted, the Hausa merchants themselves had been 
involved in the old caravan kola nut trade to Ashanti for many years. As the railway was 
nearing completion, the caravan trade was dying, and many of the traders reoriented their 
trade southward. Some of them reoriented their entrepreneurial skills, networks, and capital 
to the new groundnut trade. At the start of the trade, many of them were contacted by the 
European firms to help them reach out to farmers.61 The firms relied on these traders to buy 
the nuts, partly because of their knowledge of the local trade and their well-established 
networks in the kola trade, contacts which were suited to the new export trade. Using their 
client networks, propaganda, finance, and incentive goods, the merchants sent their agents to 
communities along the rail line to inform rural dwellers of the profits they stood to gain by 
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growing the nuts. They also enlisted the services of traditional authorities, most especially 
village headmen, to persuade people to sell the nuts to them.62 
By the time the line was opened to traffic during the harvest of 1912, large amounts of 
groundnuts from the studied communities and their environs were made available for export. 
Compared with the low price of cotton, the £5 per ton offered for groundnuts was attractive 
enough to encourage farmers to sell their nuts, even though prices were always lower in the 
countryside. At the start of the trade, groundnut buying was handled by the agents of the 
Hausa merchants and the firms. The firms were not physically established in the areas until 
1924, but they stationed their middlemen at the more important centres like Madobi, where 
they purchased the nuts directly through their Yoruba middlemen.63 The combined activities 
of the firms and the middlemen  stimulated production, as farmers from the communities and 
environs brought the nuts for sale using personal and hired private and hired animal transport.  
The railway stimulated production by opening up new distant markets, and caravans 
of donkeys and bulls and in some cases camels were employed in conveying the nuts to 
railway stations.64 Though figures are not available on groundnut exports before 1916, the 
impression from records suggests the tonnage was relatively high. Studies by Hogendorn and 
Okediji demonstrated that the groundnut exports in 1912 generally exceeded the capacity of 
the railway, requiring the firms to temporarily discontinue buying. The increased price in 
1913 saw farmers selling again, which resulted in an accumulation of groundnuts at the 
stations, causing embarrassment to the railway authority.65 
It should be pointed out that during the planning of the railway, a once-a-week train 
was thought to be adequate for developing the region at the time of the opening of the line; 
but in less than five months after the start of the trade, this was found to be inadequate, 
necessitating an expansion in rolling stock. The much talked about ‘groundnut pyramid’,66 
often assumed to be a result of surplus production, was in fact a result of transport 
difficulties. Had the railway lived up to expectations, there would have been no need for the 
nuts to pile up at stations.67 In any case, the nuts accumulated and continued to accumulate 
until the 1950s, though not in a such a way that it embarrassed the authorities. 
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Figure 4.2 Camel transporting groundnuts to a buying station in the 1930s 

















Although men’s role in the development of the groundnut trade has been recognized, 
women’s role also was important and should not be overlooked. While women generally did 
not participate in farm work, they did take part in harvesting of certain crops, such as cotton 
and groundnuts, as well as food crops. A large amount of women’s labour was employed in 
shelling the nuts, as they had to be shelled before they were exported. Due to transport costs, 
it was important to shell the nuts to reduce the weight. The shelled nuts also attracted better 
prices than unshelled ones. Shelling could be done by hand or with a mortar and pestle. The 
task, although it looked simple, required some degree of patience and skill to ensure the nuts 
themselves were not crushed. This task was ideally adaptable to women’s labour and the 
practice of purdah (kulle), as it could be done within the comfort of the home. Hogendorn has 
argued that shelling nuts promoted the practice of purdah and offered women a steady 
income.68 Two women could produce one ton of shelled nuts in less than 27 hours, at a fee 
which ranged from 8s to 10s.69 
By the planting season of 1913/14, there was again a general shift to groundnut 
production. Farmers who had not grown the nuts the previous year decided to do so in the 
new season. As usual, the Hausa merchants were offering gifts to encourage them to grow the 
crop.70 And, as expected, farmers increased their acreage using a combination of family, 
slave, and forced labour. A bumper harvest was anticipated that year; this hope was severely 
dampened, however, by a famine, a drop in rainfall, and, more importantly, by the rumour 
that groundnuts would attract a special tax and that increased production would force down 
prices. The result was that farmers uprooted their groundnuts, and there was a consequent 
shortage of food, as they had neglected food production. Kano area was the hardest hit. An 
appeal by the Emir that more food be grown was ignored. As Michael Watts pointed out in 
the case of Kano, the area was not sufficient in foodstuffs even in the nineteenth century. 
Increased cash cropping had deflected attention from food production, and the bad harvest 
that year resulted in the necessity of food imports to feed the population.71 Foodstuffs were 
sold at famine prices, and mortality was high in the Kano area. The railway played an 
important role in the distribution of relief supplies, as the rates for grain freight were 
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lowered.72 Lovejoy and Hogendorn pointed out that the famine also had a significant effect 
on slavery, as some slave owners let their slaves go free because they could not afford to feed 
them.73 
The outbreak of the war in 1914 further jeopardized the groundnut trade, as prices 
were falling. Farmers refused to sell because of the price fall, and large quantities of the nuts 
were consumed internally or used for making oil. The groundnut trade suffered closure for 
months owing to the war.74 The German and Austrian firms that had been the main buyers of 
Nigerian nuts had been ejected from the country with the onset of the war. The cessation of 
trade with the Germans strongly affected the trade in nuts, as the Germans were the main 
buyers and carriers as well as processors of the Nigerian nuts. The shortage of steamers 
during the war led to congestion of stocks of the nuts at the Iddo terminus.75 Prices were low 
and the prices of imported goods went beyond the reach of the common people. Attempts to 
attract traffic through rate reductions on the transport of groundnuts, palm kernels, and shea 
nuts did little to improve the situation.76 The railway itself faced a severe coal shortage and 
irregular services.77 
After about 15 months of trade cessation, the groundnut trade picked up again in late 
1915, with prices rising between £4.10s and £6. The price rose again slightly in 1916, 
reaching a peak of £40 in the early 1920s, which resulted in increased exports, as Table 4.3 
indicates. Although prices were lower in the countryside, they were still better than the cotton 
price. Groundnut export became steady owing to a new demand from Britain. By this time, 
Britain had started margarine production; hitherto, margarine was processed at Hamburg, as 
Britain had neither nut-crushing nor margarine plants. By the end of the war in 1918, the 
industry had become well established in Britain, resulting in demand for margarine, which in 
turn stimulated a new demand for Nigerian groundnuts.78 The groundnut trade was generally 
remarkable in 1918, but the tonnage from the studied communities suggests otherwise. The 
annual report itself is problematic, as the purchased figures do not tally with the exported 
tonnage. As Table 4.3 reveals, groundnut exports were generally steady, with a slump in 
1923. In 1924, the trade exceeded the most sanguine expectations owing to the price rise, 
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which remained high through to the end of the 1920s.79 The increased cash from the 
groundnut trade also stimulated the textile trade, as farmers spent their money on imported 
cloth, which as the record suggests was purchased at a higher price.80 Table 4.3 also indicates 
that groundnuts were exported from Faiki despite the closure of its station in 1918.  
As one of the annual reports indicates, shipment of nuts was constrained by the 
insufficient capacity of the railway, owing to shortage of locomotives and rolling stock. The 
railway was stretched and in need of an overhaul.81 As usual, animals continued to be used in 
transporting the nuts from remote areas to the stations. The colonial authority also stimulated 
production by building roads to connect farmers in outlying areas with the rail line. As earlier 
indicated, the colonial authority had envisaged a coordinated transport system, whereby the 
roads fed the railway with traffic, but at the same time an effort was made to ensure the roads 
did not compete with the railway.82 
 
Table 4.3 Groundnut exports in tons, 1916–1924 
Year GimiDabosa Anchau Faiki Dangora Madobi Challawa 
1916 160  39 420 n.a. 1326 31 
1918 126 9 675 626 1236 n.a. 
1919 531 n.a. 1500 1508 1626 1 
1923 12 3 336 5 1217 14 
1924 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3000 n.a. 
 
Note: n.a. = not available 
Sources: PRO 657/7, Nigerian Railway Administrative Report for the year 1916; PRO 657/7, 
Nigerian Railway Administrative Report for the year 1918; PRO 657/4, Nigerian Railway 
Administrative Report for the year 1919; NAK 273P/1919; PRO 657/7, Nigerian Railway 
and Udi Coal Mines Administrative Report for the year ending 31 March 1923; AHAK 
3/3/16. 
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Two important developments that took place in the groundnut trade industry at the 
end of the war, with implications for the studied communities, need highlighting here: first, 
the change in the composition of the buying firms; and second, the physical penetration of 
these firms into the studied communities. Prior to the war, the firms were not physically 
established in the studied areas. The post-war period saw the emergence of Lebanese and 
Syrian migrants who challenged the prominent role previously played by European firms and 
Hausa merchants. Some of these migrants had worked as middlemen for the European firms 
prior to the war. Their awareness of the demand for Nigerian groundnuts from Britain and the 
profits to be made motivated them to join the trade. Unlike the Europeans, who restricted 
their activities to the townships, the Syrians and Lebanese operated both in the townships and 
the countryside and so could determine their buying capacity. They operated in much the 
same way as the Hausa traders; but unlike the Hausa traders, they were willing to take risks 
by offering higher prices than the European firms. In addition, they had financial backing and 
were better organized than the Hausa traders. They also employed some of the Hausa as 
middlemen or agents.83 The emergence of these newcomers coincided with a period of 
increased penetration of commercial trading firms into the countryside. The firms were 
motivated by a desire to tap into the groundnut trade directly at the source. The colonial state 
also established official trading centres at some of the areas where land was leased to the 
firms in 1924. For instance, in the Kano area in that year, approximately 129 certificates of 
temporary and permanent occupancy were granted to trading firms in the countryside, which 
had increased to 172 in 1930.84 
When the trading centres were opened in 1924, the firms established buying stations 
at the more important centres. As Table 4.4 indicates, the firms concentrated in Madobi, 
Gimi, and Dangora, a factor which accelerated their expansion and popularity. The table 
shows that Madobi was the only centre with a concentration of European, Lebanese, and 
Syrian firms, with the latter two being the pioneers.85 Some of them had been purchasing 
groundnuts from the communities through the agency of the Hausa and Yoruba middlemen 
even before the trading outlets were officially established.86 
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As the firms became physically established, they employed a number of Hausa, 
Yoruba, and Igbo as well as migrant and immigrant traders as middlemen to purchase the 
groundnuts for them. A number of firms even extended their buying stations to far-removed 
centres such as Ikara, Makarfi, Rogo, and Bebeji. By the 1940s, Madobi had become the 
centre with the highest concentration of trading firms, including indigenous Nigerian firms, 
making it the most popular railway town between Kano and Zaria (although the number of 
firms decreased over time).87 As the table also indicates, a centre like Likoro was entirely 
without the presence of commercial firms, a factor which accounted for its decline in 
importance. Centres like Challawa and Kwankwaso which at one time had trading firms, but 
the firms closed down because business was not good there. For instance, since the 
establishment of trading outlets at Challawa, only the BCGA established there, even though 
no certificate of occupancy was granted. The famous Hausa merchant Alhassan Dantata also 
had his middlemen permanently stationed there, in addition to establishing buying stations at 
the other centres. The only firm which established at Kwankwaso closed down in 1933.88 The 
physical presence of the firms and the activity of the middlemen stimulated production and 
also gave farmers more access to the markets. 
 
Table 4.4 List of trading firms, 1924–1940s 











A/Dantata  Mc Ivers Mc Ivers  W. B. Mc 
Ivers 
GBO 
  GBO GBO  UAC A/Dantata 
  John Holt John Holt  GBO  
  A/Dantata A/Dantata  John Holt  
     CFAO  
     A/Dantata  
     M. A. 
Bugren 
 
     L. A.  
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     Manaise 
Brothers 
 




     S. Raccah  
 
 
    Miller 
Brothers 
 
     Musa Tahir  
     S. J. 
Maxwell 
 




Sources: NAK ZarProf 5280; NAK ZarProf MKT/4 vol. 1; Yusuf, Impact of the Railway, 























United African Company Stores, Dangora     Alhassan Dantata Stores, Auchan 
 
    
United African Company Stores, Auchan       Alhassan Dantata Stores,  Madobi 
     
John Holt Stores, Madobi         United African Company Stores, Madobi 
 
Figure 4.3 Remains of commercial firm stores across the study areas 










However, when the Great Depression set in in the 1930s, the groundnut trade 
suffered. Although the Great Depression caused prices to fall at abnormal rates, groundnut 
exports rose—not because the price was attractive, but because farmers needed to raise cash 
to pay taxes and to maintain the lifestyle they had become accustomed to in the pre-
Depression era. As A. G. Hopkins asserted, the farmers’ strategy involved adjustments to the 
supply of produce.89 Moses Ochonu pointed out that farmers sold their crop at a rate lower 
than its value, leaving them with no reserves for the difficult months preceding the harvest 
period.90 As the evidence indicates, prices and taxes were high, while living conditions 
deteriorated. The situation was also compounded by locust and hopper attacks which 
destroyed food crops. In villages where crops other than groundnuts had been grown, there 
was a complete or partial extension of groundnuts to the exclusion of those crops because, 
despite the low price, groundnuts could still finance tax payments. It was also an easier crop 
to grow without imperilling food production. For instance, during the tax assessment in Paki 
District in 1931, the assessment officer observed, among other things, that large proportions 
of the lands were under groundnut and food cultivation. Prior to the economic crash, 
groundnuts, cotton, and sugar cane were “plentiful”. As the price fell, food, groundnuts, and 
sugar cane stole land previously used for cotton and tobacco cultivation.91 Also, during an 
assessment of crop yields at Ma’alikanchi in Ikara District in 1933, it was observed that 
groundnuts and food crops were mainly grown, as most of the crops were ruined owing to the 
early cessation of rain.92 
Farmers’ conditions deteriorated, and to be able to maintain an average lifestyle they 
had to produce three times what they had produced in the pre-Depression era. As Table 4.5 
indicates, groundnut exports were high despite the price fall. As a result of this deteriorating 
condition, rural dwellers migrated in search of better livelihoods. Cases of inter-district, 
forced migration (tashi) were widely reported in the district records. The receiving points of 
the migrants were the railway towns and the tin mines, where the migrants sold their labour 
in return for cash. Migrant labourers (yan kwadago) were listed on the tax lists, which 
suggests that migrant labour was not only popular but was employed in cash crop 
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production.93 Cases of embezzlements of tax funds by village and district heads were also 
common during the period.94 
 
Table 4.5 Groundnut exports in tons, 1930–1938 
Year Madobi Yako Dangora GimiDabosa 
1930 3,048 723 845 n.a. 
1931 3,325 947 914 n.a. 
1932/33 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,542 
1933/4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,053 
1935-6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,512 
1936-7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,846 
1937-8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,239 
 
Note: n.a.= not available 
Sources: KSHCB Kano Province Annual Report for 1930; NAK ZarProf 5280, Makarfi 
District Note Book 1943, Zaria Province Annual Report, 1939–40. 
 
The commercial trading firms also circumvented the groundnut trade by exporting 
adulterated groundnuts. Most of the nuts tendered for export during the period were 
adulterated with stones and sand and included beans. Adulteration was a strategy to overcome 
the economic crunch. The prevalence of the practice, despite appeals by the authorities, led to 
enforcement of the Groundnut Inspection Regulations No. 37 in 1936. This policy aimed to 
ensure that the produce exported was of good quality. As the evidence indicates, the 
regulation was not effective in the studied communities, most especially at Gimi. The 
quantity involved was not significant; however, it shows the prevalence of the practice. For 
instance, approximately 15 bags of adulterated groundnuts and cotton were seized in the 
1937–1938 season.95 In 1938, a storekeeper of John Holt and an agent of GBO were caught 
with adulterated bags of the nuts at Gimi. Similarly, several bags of adulterated groundnuts 
were seized in 1939. Another 158 bags of adulterated groundnuts were seized at the premises 
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of Alhassan Dantata at Ikara, while another 14 were seized at the premises of Messrs W. B. 
MacIver (UAC) at Rogo and Gimi in the same 1939 year.96 
With the outbreak of World War II, the economy plummeted further. The 
unfavourable terms of trade and the price decline had effects on farmers. Groundnut prices 
fell with the onset of the war, picked up in 1944, and fell again in 1946.97 Despite the price 
fall, groundnut exports were high because farmers needed cash to pay taxes. Food prices and 
taxes were high, while imported goods were scarce. Official propaganda to step up 
production was revived during the war. For instance, farmers in Ikara District were instructed 
to cultivate one acre of groundnuts in 1944. A minimum quota of two bags was also set per 
taxpayer.98 The firms also influenced production by paying in excess of the minimum price. 
Since the firms bought only on quota, they competed among themselves to meet their quotas. 
Competition was most common at centres like Madobi where the firms concentrated. As the 
records show, farmers there got a better deal as the Lebanese, the Syrian, the UAC, and the 
Dantata firms paid in excess of the minimum price.99 As usual, the railway motor service and 
donkey transporters continued to stimulate production by transporting the nuts from remote 
areas to the stations.100 The donkey transporters in particular charged higher rates for their 
services. During the groundnut buying season at Ikara and Anchau in 1943–1944, the firms 
complained of the difficulty of hiring donkeys, owing to the charges.101 
One development of the inter-war period was the reorganization of the groundnut 
trade. The marketing and export of groundnuts previously handled by the firms was handled 
by the Groundnut Marketing Board. As with the cotton board, it was established to stabilize 
prices, protect farmers from exploitation, and invest in research and development projects. 
The board also gave Nigerians bank guarantees and capital to become LBAs.102 At first the 
LBAs were predominantly the European firms who had controlled the trade in the pre-war 
era. This was modified to accommodate Nigerian entrepreneurs. As the names in Table 4.6 
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indicate, a number of locals and migrants from the localities were appointed LBAs in the 
1940s and 1950s.103 
The board also influenced production through the establishment of additional buying 
stations, fixing and announcing prices at the beginning of the farming season so that farmers 
knew beforehand what the prices would be.104 The Native Authority also established smaller 
buying stations, known as buying or scale points, but without trading firms, though the LBAs 
had scale points there. The buying points served as bulking points in the groundnut trade. 
They were established 12 to 15 miles away from the buying station so as to protect the 
former. In the late 1940s, buying points were established at locations such as Makarfi, 
Kwankwaso, Daburau, and Kura. These buying points became important with the increased 
importance of road transport in the 1960s and 1970s. The board also invested in road 
development, to connect distant groundnut areas with the rail line and also to feed the railway 
with traffic. As with the roads financed by the cotton board, these roads were built and 
maintained through a special fund allocation to the Native Authority. Unlike the cotton 
board’s efforts, the effect was widely felt because groundnuts were widely grown. As 
indicated elsewhere, the roads were linked with the Kano–Zaria road, which was converted to 
an all-season road in the 1950s.105 The new all-season road did not follow the same route 
followed by the old Kano–Zaria road; instead, it followed a route  previously isolated from 
the railway. 
However, the railway had its own problems. Its active involvement in the war effort 
subjected it to enormous strains and the need for repairs. Rolling stock and indents ordered 
during the war did not arrive until the end of the war. The railway workshops were also 
unable to manufacture the required spare parts locally, thereby causing technical dislocation 
to the system and resulting in accumulation of groundnuts around the stations. The timber 
sleepers manufactured at the railway’s workshop at Zaria also was discontinued, as the timber 
was found to be of low quality.106 The weekly wagon allotment to groundnut shippers during 
the war did little to clear the huge groundnut pyramids around the stations. Industrial action 
embarked upon by railway workers in 1945 also aggravated the condition of the railway, by 
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holding up repairs when locomotives could have been taken out for service.107 As the war 
came to an end, the situation deteriorated further and the nuts continued to accumulate, as the 
railway could not discharge its obligations. Groundnuts were crammed into passenger trains, 
and passengers were transported like goods.108 Until the introduction of diesel electric 
locomotives on the Zaria–Kano route in 1954, the nuts continued to accumulate.109 
 
Table 4.6 List of Licenced Buying Agents at scale points, 1947–1955 
Licence Number Licencee Firm Buying Point 
001001 Yakubu P. Z. Kudan 
001002 P. H. Sawyer P. Z. Ikara 
001003 Bawandozen P. Z. Ikara 
001004 Mallam Koshe P. Z. Kaya 
001006 Sule Isa Makale Ikara 
001007 Abdu Mailafiya Isa Makale Ikara 
001008 Alhaji Ibrahim 
Makarfi 
G. B. Ollivant Ikara 
001009 Mr. E. C. Opufou John Holt Ikara 
n.a. Mr. S. A. Umoru n.a. Anchau 
n.a. Mallam Umoru n.a. Ikara 
n.a. Mr. T. E. Opufou n.a. n.a. 
n.a. Tanimu P. Z. Kaya 
 
Note: n.a. = not available 
Source: NAK ZarProf MKT vol. I, Groundnut Buying Stations and Points 
 
The groundnut trade picked up at the end of the war owing to demands from Britain, 
which stimulated a corresponding demand for Nigerian groundnuts. Prices were high and 
continued to rise through the 1960s, with a corresponding increased export tonnage. The 
groundnut exports reached their peak in the 1960s and began to decline in the 1970s. 
Although the figures are not detailed for the most part, Table 4.7 on groundnut exports 
indicates that exports from the areas remained steady through 1962, with fluctuations every 
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now and then.110 It is also clear from the record that the groundnut export had reached its 
limit, as it was interrupted by the Sahelian drought of the early 1970s. The increased wealth 
from oil exports also shifted government attention from agriculture to the productive sector. 
The emergence of crushing mills, which had become well established in the 1970s, also 
meant the disappearance of groundnut from the export list (the nuts were used in the local 
mills).111 The railway also had its own problems, as it was in a decline condition and its role 
was challenged by the increased importance of road transport. The roads made new centres 
on the road more popular. The completion of the Kano-Zaria road in the 1960s had 
repercussions on the studied communities, as the road diverted traffic from the rail line and 
opened up new areas previously isolated from the railway.112 
Before concluding the section, it is necessary to state that increased cash returns from 
groundnut trade put more cash at farmers’ disposal, which influenced their upward social 
mobility. Not all farmers prospered, but many invested their money in their children’s 
education, social networks, and building of elaborate houses with more permanent materials. 
The more prosperous ones invested in landed properties, especially the soro type, a 
rectangular mud house with a flat or round roof.113 Many also re-roofed their houses with 
corrugated iron sheeting, the symbol of modernity and prosperity at that time. A survey of 
Soba, Jere, Ikara, and Kudan districts by L. C. Giles in the 1930s revealed that farmers and 
traders invested their money in sewing machines, which they hired out to tailors.114 
 
Table 4.7 Groundnut exports in tons, 1945–1961/2 
Year Anchau Challawa Dangora Gimi Madobi Yako 
1945 493 24 1,810 1,665 5,041 4,354 
1946 765 n.a. 2,220 2,872 4,627 4,657 
1947 1,673 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1948 573 580 1,652 1,790 2,533 3,115 
1949 1,073 n.a. n.a. 3,151 n.a. n.a. 
1950/1 402 98 1,240 1,456 1,310 1,149 
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1951/52 n.a. 632 2,839 n.a. 10,154 1,889 
1952/3 n.a. 738 3,097 n.a. 4,112 2,473 
1953/4 n.a. 986 2,500 n.a. 12,712 1,966 
1954-5 n.a. 561 2,545 n.a. 2,878 2,100 
1955-6 n.a. n.a. 3,116 n.a. n.a. 2,963 
1961-2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,418 n.a. 
 
Note: n.a. = not available 
Sources: These figures were compiled from annual reports and the groundnut marketing 
board records for the period covered in the table. 
 
From the discussion so far, it is evident that the railway was instrumental to the 
development of the groundnut export trade and that farmers on their own initiative decided to 
grow groundnuts instead of cotton, the officially favoured crop. The railway influenced 
groundnut production and trade and also offered farmers better cash returns for their products 
by guaranteeing them access to the market. As is obvious from the above discussion, the 
trade started at the initiative of the indigenous traders, who invested their funds, energies, and 
networks. Unlike cotton, the groundnut trade was popular due to the price and opportunities it 
offered many people. The railway also opened up access to new sources of groundnuts, but it 
could not exploit them intensively. This was circumvented by animal transporters. Sustained 
government investment in access roads also stimulated production, while assuring farmers of 
better prices. The groundnut trade reached its peak in the 1960s and began to decline in the 
1960s. 
 
4.4 Hides and skins production and trade 
Hides and skins were another commodity that became important with the completion of the 
railway. The history of the trade in this commodity is a long one, dating back to pre-colonial 
times. The popular Moroccan leather, often assumed to have been produced in Morocco, was 
originally Kano-made. It was called Moroccan leather because it was exported to Europe via 
Morocco. The trade in this commodity at the time was constrained by weight and distance. 
Also, not all animals slaughtered were flayed and their skins turned into leather; instead, most 
were turned into food. At that time, leather was a mere by-product of the more lucrative meat 
trade. However, the establishment of British rule and the construction of the railway removed 
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the constraints on the hides and skins trade and provided the vent for moving the commodity 
over a long distance, while also stimulating production. The conditions in the studied 
communities supported breeding of livestock, despite the trypanosomiasis endemic in some 
of the areas.115 
The establishment of British rule and the construction of the railway offered the 
European trading firms an opportunity to capture most of the raw hides previously used 
locally. As with other trades, the hides and skins trade developed at the initiative of Hausa 
traders, who ensured the commodity was produced for export. And, as with groundnuts, the 
commodity did not feature on the government’s priority list during the planning of the 
railway. European firms were not interested in developing the trade, as they thought it was 
inferior to cotton in terms of cash returns.116 The Hausa traders’ awareness of overseas 
demand for the commodity stimulated its production. Many of them had been involved in the 
trade since pre-colonial times but lost out to the European firms owing to lack of capital. 
Their services were indispensable, however, to the firms who relied on them for supplies of 
the commodity. As A. G. Adebayo pointed out, the trade in hides and skins thrived on cash 
advances. The practice had the advantage of ensuring the flow of the commodity; however, it 
also had the tendency to make butchers indebted to the firms.117 Using their own networks 
and cash or incentive goods provided by the firms, the Hausa traders visited the village 
markets to purchase raw hides and skins from professional butchers. This is important, 
because the way and manner in which the hides and skins had been flayed and treated 
previously, in the traditional way, left marks and blisters on the products, which reduced the 
quality and value. The colonial authority assisted the trade by improving the quality and 
value of the product.118 
As with groundnuts, the hides and skins did not feature prominently as rail-borne 
traffic until the World War I period. The wartime demand affected the trade positively, as 
prices were high throughout the period. Goat skin (the most sought after) prices rose from 8d 
in 1914 to 20d in 1916 and declined in the 1920s. Prices varied considerably from town to 
                                                 
115 For discussion on the tsetse and trypanosomiasis problem in Northern Nigeria, see for instance T. A. Nash, 
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town and tended, as usual, to be much lower in areas far removed from the line. Most of the 
firms suspended buying in 1919, owing to shipping difficulties.119 
Competition among the European firms stimulated production. In the 1920s, prices 
fell as a result of the post-war economic slump and the glut in export trade. The prices did not 
recover until the 1940s.120 As with the trade in cash crops, animal transporters played 
important roles in feeding the railway with traffic. Donkeys were employed in transporting 
the products from remote areas to the stations, which indirectly stimulated production. 
Although data are not available for the whole period covered in this study, Table 4.8 indicates 
that the quantities of hides and skins exported rose steadily. The peak of the trade was 1919, 
with the highest quantity originating from Faiki, a very important commercial centre (despite 
closure of its station), followed by Gimi and Dangora.  
 
Table 4.8 Hides and skins exports in tons, 1916–1923 
Station 1916 1917 1918 1919 1923 
 
 tons cwt* tons cwt tons cwt tons cwt tons cwt 
Likoro n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 
Gimi 1 2 1 3 19 6 36 8 1 n.a. 
Anchau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. 8 3 17 n.a. 10 
Faiki 1 7 10 19 n.a. n.a. 9,945 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Dangora n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 10 19 11 14 9 
Madobi 2 2 1 11 n.a. 18 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 
Challawa n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 19 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Note: n.a. = not available 
Sources: PRO 657/4; PRO 6577; NAK SNP 10/273P/1919. 
* See footnote121 
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120 Adebayo, “Production and Export”, 281-6. 
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An important development occurred in the hides and skins industry at the end of the 
war, as the government began to intervene actively in the production process with the aim of 
improving its quality and attracting price increases. This intervention led to the introduction 
of an improvement scheme. The scheme had its origin in the wartime complaints from the 
buying companies in Britain that hides and skins from Nigeria were poorly flayed and tanned 
and were adulterated. A large proportion of the hides exported during the war, especially 
those showing flay marks, were from animals that had died of disease and whose carcass had 
been allowed to set before flaying. Many of the European firms were implicated in the 
misconduct. The government was concerned about the situation and wanted to see it 
improved. The improvement scheme was first introduced in Kano Province in 1928 after 
several years of campaigning. At a meeting held in Kano to decide the practical methods of 
achieving the scheme’s objectives, the representatives of the Hides and Skins Sub-Committee 
of the Kano Chambers of Commerce opposed the idea of inspecting the commodity at the 
point of railing. Concerning the poor flaying techniques and disease, they proposed that 
butchers should be taught proper methods of flaying and drying and educated in detecting 
disease lesions. It was also suggested that some means of inspection be put in place to ensure 
that improper flaying was easily detected.122 
The scheme started in Kano City with the training of butchers on the proper methods 
of flaying and drying. The following year, the butchers taught others in the province and 
elsewhere. Also, hides flayed under this scheme were marked with letters indicating their 
point of origin, with an inscription which indicated whether it was properly flayed or not. 
Provincial administrations from other provinces also sent their officials to Kano to learn the 
improved methods.123 To ensure compliance with the scheme, an ordinance which prohibited 
the old style of flaying and drying was enforced, with penalties stipulated for offenders. The 
ordinance was first implemented in the Kano area, with most of the studied communities 
falling into line in 1933. Similarly, special markets and drying sheds for flaying and drying of 
hides and skins were established at Madobi, Gimi, Yako, Likoro, Kura, Makarfi, Kudan, and 
Hunkuyi in 1934. The scheme prohibited the removal of hides and skins from such markets 
until they were properly dried. It also empowered veterinary and inspection officials to 
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inspect the hides and skins at any premises where the buying and packing of the commodity 
was done.124 
However, the hides and skins trade was unstable in the 1930s, as prices declined. At 
the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s, goatskin prices dropped from 23d in January 
to 14d in December. The price decline involved a substantial drain on producers’ incomes. 
Despite the price fall, exports were stable as the product was forced on buyers, irrespective of 
demand and the price fall. Unlike groundnuts, skins and hides could not be kept or hoarded 
until a price rise. Even if they decided to tan and hoard these products, the price might not be 
worth the effort; hence, selling at the prevailing rate was better than nothing at all. As usual, 
donkeys continued to be used in transporting the product to the stations from areas far 
removed from the line. Detailed figures on export from all the studied communities are not 
available, except for Gimi (Table 4.9). The table includes figures from the buying centres in 
Ikara and Makarfi.125 
Adulteration of the hides and skins was also prevalent during the 1930s, which 
resulted in prosecution of offenders. Adulteration was a standard strategy to overcome the 
economic crunch of the time. As A. G. Adebayo pointed out, when prices were low, 
producers paid little attention to the improved method of flaying and drying.126 Most of the 
defective skins rejected were diverted to the indigenous leather industry.127 The hides and 
skins improvement scheme was frustrated by the combined activities of the middlemen and 
butchers and the African veterinary officers and the firms. The old habits of removing the 
skins from the shed before drying continued despite the prohibitions. Whenever a middleman 
was apprehended for flouting the order, the European firms often frustrated court proceedings 
by offering to pay the fines to get him off the hook. This practice continued well into the 
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Source: NAK ZarProf 5280. 
 
In the 1940s, the leather industry received a boost owing to the wartime import 
restrictions and scarcity. Although the colonial authority intervened in stimulating production 
for the war effort, prices were lower to absorb the surplus. As the record generally indicates, 
demand was high while supply was low owing to the price decline. Most of the commodity 
was diverted to the indigenous leather industry because the wartime restrictions stimulated 
demand for a local substitute for imported skins.129 As the war came to an end in 1945, hides 
and skins exports did not improve, and it remained poor through to the 1960s as prices 
declined.130 
Although the wartime measures did not lead to increased exports, they resulted in the 
introduction of point-of-export inspection of the commodity in 1941/2. Produce inspectors 
were posted to stations, with mandates to inspect railway premises and premises where 
production and tanning of hides and skins were carried out. They were also mandated to 
inspect vehicles and animals used in transporting hides and skins and to keep their eyes and 
ears open for signs of animal diseases.131 The old methods, whereby the veterinary malams 
instructed butchers on the proper method of flaying and drying, were revisited. The malams 
also helped in repairing drying sheds.132 Adebayo pointed out that in spite of the measures 
and stringent penalties against offenders, contravention of the hides and skins ordinances was 
rampant, as the butchers certified all sorts of hides and skins as good. The malams were also 
alleged to be taking bribes from butchers. The laws targeted only Africans and overlooked 
Europeans that encouraged the abuse.133 
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the colonial authority focused on stimulating production 
through monthly inspection of hides and skins markets, building of slaughter slabs and drying 
sheds, and repairs of existing facilities in the countryside. Centres like Madobi became the 
headquarters for inspecting hides and skins in southern Kano.134 It should be noted that 
although the quality of the products improved owing to periodic inspections, the prices 
fluctuated. The emergence of the modern tanning industry in the 1960s also meant that a 
large proportion of the commodity was tanned locally. The first tanning industry in the North 
was established in 1949, but it did not become well established until the 1960s.135 The 
increased importance of road transport with the decline of the railway in the 1970s meant that 
large proportions of the commodity were transported to the factory by road. 
From the above, it is clear that the railway had marked effects on the hides and skins 
trade. The trade in the communities was pre-colonial in origin, but development was 
constrained by weight and distance, owing to transport difficulties. The railway removed the 
constraints on the trade and provided a vent for moving the commodity. The combination of 
demand, better prices, and access to transport released for export much of the leather 
previously consumed locally. The export of the commodity in appreciable quantities began 
during World War I, declined in the 1930s, picked up again during World War II, and then 
declined again after the war. The colonial authority assisted the industry to grow by 
improving the quality of the commodity, with the aim of attracting higher prices. As indicated 
above, an attempt to improve the quality of the hides was frustrated by the combined 
activities of the Europeans and their middlemen and government officials appointed to 
inspect the commodity. Despite the campaign to stimulate production in the 1950s and 1960s, 
hides and skins exports dropped, while the quality improved. By the 1960s, more of the hides 
and skins were processed internally in the emerging tanning industry. 
 
4.5 Development of sugar cane production and trade 
Sugar cane is another cash crop which became important with the completion of the railway. 
As with the cash crops already discussed, it had been grown for decades before the advent of 
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British rule.136 Its cultivation on a large scale, however, was partly a result of cheap transport 
and better prices. The railway removed some of the geographical constraints and allowed the 
cane to be transported over a long distance. Compared with other crops, sugar cane is a dry 
season crop cultivated when agricultural work is generally slack. It was grown mainly for 
internal consumption, essentially for chewing and for making brown sugar (mazarkwaila). 
This was the case because sugar cane was not exported like the other commodities. It was 
processed the same day it was harvested, as it cannot be preserved or eaten months after 
harvest. As with groundnuts and hides and skins, the colonial authority was not interested in 
developing the industry, but it did support its growth. As with the cotton trade, Kano was the 
main market for the cane and brown sugar trade. 
Sugar cane is a grass plant which belongs to the genus saccharum. The crop thrives 
on a variety of soils and in particular environmental conditions. It is grown in light and heavy 
clay soils, but thrives most in loamy clay or river floodplains (fadama). As the evidence 
indicates, rich fadama are not evenly spread, and the Emir of Zaria, Aliyu Dansidi, is 
recorded as having forcibly appropriated a large area of farmland for sugar cane production in 
Likoro.137 Temperature also plays a role in the growth, ripening, and sucrose accumulation of 
sugar cane. The plant thrives most under a low night temperature of 7–10°C and a low day 
temperature of 18–22°C. The cane naturally ripens after 8–10 months, depending on the 
variety, altitude, and climate. 
Sugar cane requires a plentiful amount of rainfall or water, both of which were readily 
available across the studied areas, most especially in Makarfi District, which was and is the 
main sugar cane centre between Kano and Zaria.138 In this district, just as in Ikara, sugar cane 
was next in importance to groundnuts owing to its high cash returns. Its immense popularity 
was such that it often hindered extensive cotton production.139 Compared with the other 
areas, Makarfi has the most fertile swamp land and is most suited to commercial sugar cane 
production. An average sugar cane farm in the district measured about 0.125 acres, with a 
yield capacity of 30,000 lbs per annum. In view of its immense sugar cane production, it was 
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popularly praised (kirari) as Makarfi garin karkafa, garin kara ba dawa (“Makarfi the town 
of strong people, the town with sugar cane, but no sorghum”), indicating its importance. 
As with cotton, sugar cane production is highly labour-intensive, but its dry season 
nature influenced its popularity among farmers. The crop did not feature on the government 
priority list during the planning of the railway; but when the line was completed, demand for 
sugar cane for chewing and for brown sugar production dramatically increased. Increased 
production was achieved largely by household and wage labour, although the aristocrat and 
merchant classes relied on slave and forced labour. As a matter of policy, the colonial 
authority made efforts to improve the yields of the crop by introducing improved varieties, as 
the indigenous variety was of low quality and yield. Between 1914 and 1915, no fewer than 
five different varieties were introduced. For instance, in 1914, the West Indies varieties B. 
208, Ba. 376, B. 3,922, B. 6,308, and Ba 6,032 were distributed to farmers. These varieties 
were popular at the time on account of their size and yields, but fell out of favour as they 
were said to be too hard to chew. Another variety from Barbados was introduced in 1915.140 
As mentioned earlier, the crop was grown mainly for chewing and for making brown 
sugar. As with the other crops, the Hausa middlemen purchased the cane directly from 
farmers. They had no problem convincing farmers to cultivate the cane, as the cash return 
was attractive. Unlike the other cash crops, there was no standard market for sugar cane, and 
it was sold at the local markets such as Fillata and Nassarawa. The bulk, however, was 
consumed in Kano, where demand for chewing sugar was high. During the annual cane 
buying season, middlemen from Kano always came to purchase the cane and transported it to 
Kano by train. In places such as Dan Bami and Gwibi, there were sugar cane middlemen who 
purchased the cane as it stood on the farm, suggesting the trade was lucrative.141 Although 
detailed data on sugar cane output and rail tonnage are not available, the records indicate that 
three wagons of sugar cane were shipped to Kano daily from Gimi station in the 1920s, 
1930s, and 1940s.142 This was in addition to the ones consumed locally and those transported 
to Kano by donkey by way of its border towns of Fillata and Rogo. As with the groundnut 
trade, donkeys also played an important role in transporting the cane from farms to markets 
and stations, from where it was shipped in bulk. It should be noted that besides the bulk of the 
product sold for chewing, quite a substantial amount was also used for making brown sugar. 
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The 1920s was good for the sugar cane trade generally, as the cash return was high and the 
decline in other crop prices saw farmers shifting to its cultivation.143 
The sugar cane trade also led to the development of the brown sugar industry. This 
industry developed almost at the same time as the sugar cane trade. The cane was crushed 
and processed into brown sugar or jaggery (mazarkwaila) in a simple mill or machine (injin 
mazarkwaila) powered by horse. The mills were established near sugar cane sources and 
markets. The technology itself was originally introduced by the Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) for its Hausa Christian converts in Gimi. Although the archival records date the 
development to 1916, R. K. Udo suggests it started in 1914, which suggests that the industry 
profited from a scarcity of white sugar during and immediately after the war. The industry 
started on a small scale among the Hausa Christian community and became popular over 
time, as farmers purchased the machines to make sugar for sale.144 By the 1920s, the industry 
had become well established and spread to Ikara, Soba, and elsewhere, but Makarfi and Ikara 
districts were the main sugar centres. In the 1920s, a crushing machine was sold for £10 and 
for £8 in the 1930s.145 
The 1930s was bad for the sugar cane trade, owing to price and income decline. The 
general drop in income affected people’s purchasing power, and they reduced consumption of 
the crop—after all, it was a luxury. Farmers reacted by growing food and groundnuts instead 
of sugar cane. Although many discontinued growing sugar cane, those in Makarfi and Gazara 
continued because it paid to do so in light of the demand.146 In 1938, when sugar fetched 
higher prices, farmers in Makarfi and Gazara did not bother to grow food crops.147 By this 
time, the markets for chewing cane and brown sugar had expanded considerably, partly 
because of expansion in rail services and demand. Sugar cane from Gimi was transported to 
Hadejia and Nguru in the north-east and as far as Lagos and Port Harcourt in Southern 
Nigeria by railway.148 
What was a disappointment to sugar cane farmers turned out to be a blessing in 
disguise to brown sugar makers, as the sugar cane was diverted to the brown sugar industry. 
Sugar cane cannot be withheld or stored until a price rise, so the cane was processed into 
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brown sugar. Kano continued to be the main market for sugar, as it was for sugar cane. The 
industry also attracted new entrants, as both farmers and non-farmers invested in the trade, 
thereby contributing to its expansion. The awareness of the cash returns on sugar attracted 
many people into the trade. In the 1930s, there were no fewer than 45 sugar mills in Makarfi 
District alone. As the records indicate, sugar mills had spread to places such as Richifa and 
Kargi in Soba District and Wusasa. The Niger Company also made profits on importing the 
machines for sale.  
Three important developments occurred in the sugar industry which are worth 
mentioning here. First, many people (both farmers and non-farmers) entered the brown sugar 
trade. As noted above, awareness of the cash returns on the trade attracted them. Second, 
there was the emergence of what may be termed sugar industrialists, with more than one mill. 
For instance, the Wusasa family in Zaria established mills at centres such as Nassarawa (in 
Makarfi District) and Kargi and Richifa (both in Soba District). The popular produce trader in 
Makarfi, Alhaji Ibrahim Makarfi, had two mills. Malam Abdu of Ikara had two, which 
increased to nine in the 1940s. Third, there was the emergence of larger mills (though few in 
number) powered by horses, different from the simple technology in use at the start of the 
trade. In this type of mill, the sugar crushing was done by three heavy rollers drawn by a 
horse. The juice from the cane was trapped and collected in a receptacle which was let into 
the ground, with the machine standing on the ground and held in position by long pegs or 
spikes. When the juice had been collected, it was boiled until a solid mass of brown sugar 
was formed. Powering the machine by horse enabled the sugar makers to crush cane as 
simply as possible while saving time.149 
In the 1940s, sugar cane production and trade witnessed an enormous boom, owing to 
the wartime scarcity. The scarcity of white sugar stimulated a demand for brown sugar. Sugar 
makers responded to the situation by charging higher prices for their product. The wartime 
exigency required brown sugar makers to assist Britain in the war effort by supplying sugar 
to the army. For instance, sugar makers in Makarfi and elsewhere in Zaria Province were 
compelled to supply 20 tons of sugar fortnightly to the army. Since the price offered by the 
army was lower, sugar makers flouted the order by selling to Kano traders, who offered better 
prices. For instance, of the 20 tons of sugar requisitioned from Makarfi District for the first 
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week of February 1944, only 12 tons were supplied. Even the district and village headmen 
flouted the order. The threat of prosecution against defaulters did not deter them.150 
The colonial state assisted the industry to grow sugar during wartime. Early in 1941, 
the Zaria Native Authority advanced loans to sugar cane farmers and sugar makers with the 
aim to expand production.151 The authority also imported crushing machines and distributed 
them to farmers and non-farmers on loan. Large numbers of the machines ordered during the 
war were delayed, owing to the wartime restrictions. By 1942, brown sugar began to be 
produced in southern Kano, as some crushing mills operated there.152 Owing to increased 
demand for the product, sugar makers were also given practical lessons on how to make 
crystal sugar at the Centrifuge Centre in Gimi. While the war lasted, the sugar cane and 
brown sugar industry expanded and reached its widest markets. Although figures are not 
available on sugar cane and sugar sales and tonnage, the Agricultural Officer of Zaria 
Province recorded in 1946 that the annual sugar cane transported to Kano stood at 1,000 tons 
per annum.153 The sugar industry also supplied over 300 tons of sugar to the army in 1943–
1944, in addition to the quantities sold to Kano.154 As usual, Kano and Nguru continued to 
absorb the products. In 1946, brown sugar was sold at between 4d and 4½d per pound and in 
1949 at between 4d and 6d per pound.155 Brown sugar was also exported as far as the French 
Territory.156 As the records suggest, most of the crushing machines that were distributed after 
the war were provided with the intention of undermining Makarfi’s control over the sugar 
trade. 
As the war came to an end, brown sugar was still in great demand, as scarcity of white 
sugar and high prices continued to stimulate production. In 1946, the Resident of Zaria 
Province reported that the increased demand for brown sugar imposed upon the industry a 
demand which could not be met at the lower prices offered by the army. The market for 
brown sugar in Nigeria meanwhile had continued to expand. As the Resident commented, 
“sugar is now found in all towns and village markets as far as Maiduguri and Sokoto, and it is 
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unlikely that any can be purchased unless the full local market price is paid”.157 Between 1 
November and 1 August in the 1947/8 season, approximately 5,000 tons of sugar cane were 
exported from Zaria Province, with 1,925 tons exported to Kano from Gimi, while 1,139 tons 
of brown sugar was exported to Kano.158 In a survey of sugar cane farms in Makarfi District 
in 1948, it was observed that some 5,000 acres of land had been put under sugar cane 
production. The increased prices of between 4d and 6d per pound stimulated production, and 
farmers in the district did not bother to grow food crops because the sugar cane price was so 
high.159 Expansion in sugar cane production continued to be ploughed into the brown sugar 
industry. By 1948, there were 54 sugar crushers in Makarfi District, each capable of 
producing about 1,350 tons of brown sugar. The number of crushers had increased to 90 in 
1949.160 
 It appears that the sugar industry reached its peak in the late 1940s, with diminishing 
returns on both sugar cane and brown sugar production. Although demand for sugar cane was 
still high, the limiting factor was farm fertility, with yield per acre being extremely low. In 
1948, it was reported that about 60% farmers’ manure in Makarfi District was used on sugar 
cane farms. Fertilizers were unknown to farmers until the 1950s, and even then it took time 
before they began to make use of them. The sugar cane was also plagued by diseases, which 
reached a disturbing level in the 1950s with fungus and red rot diseases ruining the crops.161 
As with sugar cane, demand for brown sugar was high, but the limiting factor was the 
shortage of fuel wood for boiling jaggery, which led to a decline in production. Colonial 
policies against wood felling also contributed to the shortage. During the Emir of Zaria’s visit 
to Gimi and Makarfi in the late 1940s, the complaint he heard from sugar makers was that 
fuel wood was scarce.162 
By the 1950s, the sugar industry was in a critical situation, as many of the mills were 
bankrupt. For instance, of the more than 238 crushers operating in Zaria Province, only 190 
were operating in January–February 1953.163 As the evidence from Makarfi and Soba District 
indicates, many of the crushers were in debt to the government and could hardly repay their 
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loans to the Agricultural Department. The brown sugar industry carried on in that manner up 
to the period of Nigeria’s independence.164 The emergence of modern sugar mills in the 
country in the 1960s competed with the brown sugar industry. Although a plan to establish a 
modern mill in Makarfi was mooted as early as the 1940s, it was dropped as it was thought 
that the time had not matured for such a development. The thinking in official circles at the 
time was that the industry might not be able to compete with jaggery makers for sugar 
cane.165 Z. A. Bonat has pointed out that the plan was thwarted by the combined efforts of the 
UAC and John Holt firms because they profited from importing sugar cane crushers.166 
As the discussion above suggests, the railway was instrumental in the development of 
the sugar cane and brown sugar trade. The development of the trade was a result of the cheap 
transport provided by the railway, as well as higher demand and better prices. Unlike the 
other crops, sugar cane was not exported from the colony; it was consumed internally in the 
form of chewing cane and for making brown sugar. As is obvious from the discussion, the 
sugar cane and brown sugar trade developed almost at the same time, and the demand for 
sugar cane boosted the brown sugar industry. Although the brown sugar technology was 
introduced by outsiders, people quickly appropriated it to transform their lives. Both the 
sugar cane and brown sugar trade started on a small scale, expanded in the 1920s, and 
reached their peak in the 1940s, beginning to decline in the 1950s. By the 1970s, refined 
sugar was competing with brown sugar. 
 
4.6 Food production 
This section highlights how subsistence production was sustained and provisioned in the face 
of increased cash crops production. Contrary to the vent for surplus arguments that cash crops 
export was achieved without a decline in food production, I attempt to show that cash crops 
export reduced subsistence food production. And contrary to the claim that the communities 
between Kano and Zaria were self-sufficient in foodstuffs to the extent of feeding the urban 
population, I also attempt to show that most of the communities, especially those bordering 
Kano, were not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. The situation was so bad that whenever famine 
and drought struck the communities became vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition. Although 
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they tried to produce enough to sustain their household requirements, this was never 
sufficient and they had to rely on traders. The tendency across the studied communities, 
including those deficient in foodstuffs, was to sell their surplus reserves because of the price. 
I argue that British colonialism entailed many disruptions in the prevailing relations of 
production in the countryside. The colonial economy was founded on cash crops production. 
The colonial authority introduced taxes and forced cultivation of cash crops, and it allowed 
European firms to extract the crop. Since the colonial authority abolished slavery, land 
accumulation, and plantation agriculture, production was largely household-based. Although 
the aristocrat and merchant classes relied on slave labour, production was generally based on 
family labour. Production under conditions of household and limited wage labour reduced 
subsistence production. The existence of fulltime crafts across the studied communities also 
negatively affected household sufficiency in food. The monetization of the economy made 
rural producers vulnerable to price fluctuations, unequal terms of trade, and weather 
fluctuations, and yet the colonial authority did not have an effective relief system. 
From 1913 onward, the studied communities’ sufficiency in foodstuffs was 
constrained by cash cropping and weather fluctuations. Increased cash returns from cash crop 
exports and the need for cash to pay taxes drew rural dwellers into cash cropping, which 
resulted in contraction of the acreage under food cultivation. Although farmers tried to 
produce sufficient food for domestic requirements, it was not sufficient. The first food crisis 
following the start of the export trade occurred within the context of a cooking oil shortage. 
The high price of groundnuts above other crops in 1913 saw farmers selling their stocks, 
including the reserves meant for cooking and lighting. The shortage was quickly resolved by 
resort to shea butter. By the 1913/14 season, food was running short. The rainfall in that year 
was extremely low, and too much land had been devoted to groundnuts. The result was 
famine conditions. By the middle of 1914, the food shortage was acute, with prices being at 
famine levels, and the domestic reserves were not sufficient. Between May and June 1914, 
corn was sold at 5d per pound as against 2d a pound in the previous years. There was a 
general condition of hunger, and the government response was ineffective, as the relief 
materials ordered arrived late. Domestic food requirements were serviced by the Hausa, 
Yoruba, and Igbo food traders as well as the European firms, but the consignment arrived 
late. The existence of non-food producing southern migrants across the localities also meant 
that they contributed to the food crisis. The groundnut-exporting belt—unlike the cocoa zone 
of south-western Nigeria—did not have food-producing migrants. Their food requirements 
were partly serviced by the southern food traders, who also shipped foodstuffs from the 
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communities (see Appendix 1). In Kano Emirate, the mortality rate was high as a result of 
this food crisis.167 
The food shortage continued well into wartime, as the wartime staple food requisition 
sapped domestic food reserves.168 Food prices were high, and rural dwellers had to provision 
for food from traders. Attempts to establish district grain reserves during the war were 
abandoned. Notwithstanding the impression from the records that food was plentiful, the 
evidence indicates that cereal prices were higher and the demand was higher than supply. 
Farmers sold their food reserves because of the high price. When the corn harvests failed in 
1917 and 1918 owing to drought and “superabundance” of rain, farmers had to buy foodstuffs 
at an inflated price.169 
When the war ended, food requisition was abolished, but prices were still high. 
Farmers were encouraged to increase food acreage, but the high price of groundnuts 
influenced them to grow the nuts at the expense of food crops. They continued to produce for 
domestic requirements, but it was not enough, as production was household-based.170 As the 
record indicates, the foodstuffs trade in Gimi, Makarfi, and Anchau was controlled by the 
Niger Company. Early in 1919, the company purchased 28 tons of corn in Gimi at ½d per 1b. 
By the time the price rose to ¾d per pound in the middle of the year, it discontinued buying. 
As the record also indicates, the Hausa and Yoruba traders were buying foodstuffs and 
transporting them to the tin mines on the Jos Plateau, using animal transport because 
transportation by railway was too costly, there being no through connection. It does not 
appear that producers got value for their produce, as they were underpaid. In order to prevent 
producers from exploitation, a by-law was enforced to prohibit buying produce outside the 
official market.171 
The tension in domestic food sufficiency assumed disturbing proportions in the 1930s, 
owing to income decline, food price hikes, and locust and hopper invasions which destroyed 
farm crops. A mudu (bowl) of corn was sold for between 2d and 4d in 1931, as against 1d in 
1930/31. The implication is that farmers stepped up production to raise cash for taxes. They 
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sold not only their cash crops but foodstuffs as well, a situation which made them vulnerable 
to hunger, forcing many to migrate.172 The renewed demand for foodstuffs for the tin mines 
during the Great Depression era complicated the domestic food insufficiency.173 Food prices 
were generally high. L. C. Giles, in his survey of Soba, Jere, Kudan, and Ikara districts in the 
late 1930s, revealed that a sack of grain was sold for between 8d and 3s.174  
The outbreak of the war in the 1940s further attenuated domestic food sufficiency, as 
the wartime measures required the colony to assist Britain in the war effort. The application 
of wartime policy marked a huge withdrawal of labour, food, and cash crops from the 
countryside for the army and the tin mines. The wartime food requisition placed enormous 
pressure especially on rural producers, further reducing domestic sufficiency. For instance, in 
1943 the colonial authority requisitioned 3,330 tons of corn from Zaria Province. This was in 
addition to a fortnightly 50 tons of brown sugar, Irish potatoes, and onions requisitions from 
Makarfi District, where some of the studied communities fall. The locust and hopper 
invasions and famine that occurred during the war also upset food prices. Sales and 
movement of foodstuffs across provincial boundaries were also prohibited. As if the authority 
envisaged a price hike, it enforced a price control at the onset of the war, prohibiting private 
sales of corn and limiting the number of bags an individual could keep.175 
Faced by food scarcity, the southern railway workers at Challawa, Kwankwaso, 
Madobi, Yako, and Dangora complained of hunger.176 These workers left written letters 
which enable us to locate their voices. Chima Korieh pointed out that complaint letters are 
tools for understanding interactions within colonial settings.177 As the letters indicate, staple 
foods like gari (a local staple food made from cassava), yam, palm oil, fish, and agidi (made 
from corn starch), as well as imported white sugar and tea were scarce across the areas. 
Unlike their counterparts in the urban centres, the workers in these areas did not benefit from 
the wartime permits required to purchase or import their own food.178 Although the railway 
authority had permits to import gari  for its staff, those in the countryside were not covered by 
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the permit. The food scarcity offered opportunities to food traders who circumvented the 
situation by selling at wartime rates.179 After the war ended, the grain requisition and ban on 
food movement was abandoned in 1947, but food prices still remained high.180 Increased 
demand for Nigerian cash crops in the post-war era continued to compete with domestic 
requirements for food. When famine reappeared in the late 1940s, the colonial authority 
renewed its determination to establish grain reserves, but this intention was not implemented 
until the late 1950s.181 
The outbreak of the Civil War in the 1960s further upset domestic food sufficiency, as 
the inter-regional trade in foodstuffs was affected by transport difficulties. The Sahelian 
famine and the government’s neglect of agriculture in the 1970s complicated the situation. 
Increased wealth from oil exports in the post-independence era shifted government attention 
from agriculture to the productive sector. By the end of the 1970s, the food situation in the 
country had worsened to such a point that the government was importing food to feed the 
population. For instance, in 1970–1978, food imports into the country increased by 700%, 
while real food output declined by 1.5% per annum.182 The transformation of the urban 
centres by industrial activities also drew many rural dwellers into wage labour in the cities, 
with serious consequences for agriculture.183 
As highlighted above, domestic self-sufficiency in staple foodstuffs was constrained 
by cash crop production and ecological factors. This challenges the vent surplus claim that 
cash crops export was achieved without a decline in food. Although farmers tried to produce 
as much as possible, this was not always enough because the basis of production was 
household- and not plantation-based. Production under a condition of household labour and 
limited wage labour reduced food production, as the producers tended to reduce food 
production to avail of every price rise, an action which made them vulnerable to hunger and 
famine. Also, the colonial authority did not have a strong relief mechanism, although it 
intervened in food supplies during the two world wars. Contrary to the claim that the 
communities were self-sufficient in food, it has been shown that they relied mostly on food 
traders who circumvented the situation to their own advantage. As the discussion suggests, 
the existence of non-food producing southern migrants across the communities also meant 
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enormous contraction in the local food sufficiency. As these migrants did not farm, their food 
requirements were serviced by southern food traders, who also extracted foodstuffs from the 
communities for sale in the South.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
As the foregoing analyses indicated, the railway was built with the aim of carrying cotton, 
but, surprisingly, it activated other crops not contemplated during the planning and 
construction process. The arrival of the railway stimulated production and assured farmers of 
better prices for their produce. Of the many types of produce exported from the localities, 
groundnuts were the most popular in term of earning cash and employment generation. 
Contrary to the well-established claim that cotton was exported from some of the 
communities immediately upon the completion of the rail line, the chapter demonstrated that 
exports of cotton from the communities were not as significant as previously assumed, owing 
to the low price and the fact that the crop had always been grown for use in the indigenous 
textile industry. While it did become popular as time went by, the crop did not feature on rail-
borne traffic lists until the 1920s, and it was not as significant as groundnuts. Increased 
production was achieved largely by a combination of household, forced, and slave labour. 
The railway also stimulated production in distant areas but could not intensively 
exploit these areas, as it was circumvented by animal transporters who exploited the situation 
to their own advantage. The colonial authority also stimulated production in such areas by 
continuously building roads to feed the railway with traffic. This was so because a railway 
without roads is useless. When the marketing boards were established in the 1940s, they also 
invested in road development, with the aim of stimulating production. The roads became 
more important in the 1970s, when road transport became popular. As the analyses have 
revealed, right from the advent of the export trade the railway could not cope with the volume 
of traffic, which resulted in accumulation of groundnuts at rail stations. Until the introduction 
of diesel electric locomotive on the Kano–Zaria route in the 1950s, the nuts continued to 
accumulate. As the chapter also suggests, the much talked about groundnut pyramid, 
previously assumed to be a result of surplus production, was in fact a result of transport 
difficulties. 
The chapter also shows that intensive cash cropping reduced domestic self-sufficiency 
in food. Contrary to the vent for surplus claim that increased production was achieved 
without reduction in food production, we have seen that cash cropping did indeed lower food 
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production to such an extent that, on occasion, there were famines. Colonial policies such as 
taxes and forced production of cash crops also reduced food production, which made 
producers vulnerable to price falls and weather fluctuations. The claim that the communities 
were sufficient in foodstuffs to the extent of feeding the urban populations is also misleading, 
as most of the communities were not sufficient in foodstuffs, much less capable of feeding 
the urban populace. This was because production was household- and not plantation-based. 
Although the aristocrat and the merchant classes relied on slave and forced labour, production 
was otherwise generally household-based. Farmers always tried to produce enough to satisfy 
domestic requirements, but this was not always sufficient. The government also did not have 
an effective relief mechanism, which made producers vulnerable to famine and drought and 
exposed them to the mercy of grain traders who used the situation to their advantage. 
As the chapter also indicates, the export trade reached its peak in the 1940s, 1950s 
and 1960s depending on the crop, and it went on to decline into the 1970s. The diversification 
of the economy following an oil-based wealth in the 1970s shifted priority from produce to 
oil export. The emergence of modern industries in the post-independence era also meant that 
most of the produce exported previously was processed internally in the emerging industries. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW 
SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND THE 
INTERMINGLING OF CULTURES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In addition to the cash crop trade it activated, the completion of the railway opened many 
other opportunities, both for employment and for commercial ventures, which attracted 
migrants to the studied communities. The completion of the line meant that labour was 
required to fill the various positions in the railway and commercial firms, labour which was 
not available in the communities themselves. These employment and commercial 
opportunities attracted people from diverse ethnic backgrounds, which in turn led to the 
establishment of new settlements and the intermingling of Nigerian cultures in the studied 
communities. 
This chapter analyses the influence of the railway on the migration of populations and 
the emergence of new settlement patterns as melting pots of cultures in the studied 
communities. The chapter argues that the bourgeoning socio-economic opportunities which 
marked the advent of the railway were the force that attracted migrant populations. 
 
5.2 Labour migration 
The previous chapter discussed how the railway activated cash crop exports, commercial 
opportunities, and the spread of the colonial currency. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
during this period of increased globalization and mobility, the railway offered migrants from 
diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds—most notably from Southern Nigeria, neighbouring 
countries, and Asia—opportunities to travel to the studied communities and participate in a 
worldwide cultural interaction. The bourgeoning opportunities in the railway and the 
commercial firms were the forces that attracted these migrants, who took advantage of the 
cheap and fast transport to seek better fortunes for themselves. The existence of railway 
stations and commercial firms meant that skilled and unskilled labourers were required to fill 
the several positions across the communities. A good Western education and technical 
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expertise were required to be able to qualify for employment both in the railway and in the 
commercial trading firms.  
There was a real scarcity of labour in the studied communities during the first and 
second decades of British rule in the North.1 As the General Manager of Nigeria Railway 
pointed out, the men from the North lacked the expertise and qualifications to enter even the 
lowest positions.2 Unlike their southern counterparts, the railway and the colonial authority in 
the North faced a real labour shortage, owing partly to the late contact with missionaries and 
Western education. The lackadaisical attitude of the British when they arrived also did not 
help matters, for instead of taking sole responsibility for educational affairs, they handed it to 
the Native Authority. The first elementary school in the North was not established until 
1909.3 In 1914, only 502 pupils were enrolled in school, out of the region’s 9 million 
population.4 Unlike Southern Nigeria, where the missions complemented government efforts 
in education, missionary activity was restricted in the North.5 Until the 1930s, they were not 
permitted to operate there, and hence the labour scarcity. It was against the background of 
this labour scarcity and the employment and commercial opportunities that the studied 
communities and others along the rail line became “magnet” which attracted new 
populations. Prior to this, they were almost exclusively mono-ethnic settlements, largely 
Hausa/Fulani. The advent of the railway was a turning point in the population influx and in 
determining a changed ethnic composition.6 The newcomers came with “cultural capital”, a 
set of skills, education, and technical knowledge which qualified them for employment in 
their new homes. Some of them were products of mission schools in the South. 
Three patterns of population influx can be observed. The first generations of migrants 
were those who came to work with the railway. These pioneers were predominantly Yoruba 
from south-west Nigeria and immigrant workers from Niger, Chad, Dahomey, and the Gold 
Coast, most of whom had some Western education or technical skills. The second generation 
came in the 1920s, the post-war boom era, following the physical establishment of 
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commercial firms in the communities. This group was mixed, comprising Yoruba, Ibo, 
Hausa, Beriberi, and other sub-groups within the North, as well as immigrant traders such as 
Syrians, Lebanese and, later, Asians. These were mostly commercial migrants and artisans 
who came in response to the post-World War I boom. The completion of the Eastern Railway 
from Port Harcourt to Kaduna in 1927 and of the Benue Bridge in the 1930s increasingly 
facilitated movements of Igbo, Tiv, and Idoma migrants to the studied areas and elsewhere 
along the rail line. Kaduna (the capital of the Northern Provinces from 1917) became a major 
railway junction and the largest passenger exchange point where migrants from the west and 
east of Nigeria entered various centres in the North. The economic dislocation of the 1930s, 
the burden of taxation, and the intensification of the activity of the commercial firms, as well 
as the scarcity of cultivable land, pushed many southerners to the North, including to the 
studied communities.7 These population movements had significant consequences on the 
ethnic composition and inter-group relations in the communities. 
For many migrants, this was their first sojourn outside their home towns. They were 
characteristically young men seeking new frontiers in the emerging colonial economy. As 
Reuben Udo pointed out, labour migration is always selective in terms of age and sex.8 
Although women also engaged in migration, their proportion was insignificant because of the 
cultural practice of confining women to the home, because of employers’ preferences for 
male labour, and also because of the Christian notion of women as the weaker sex.9 
Informants pointed out that most migrants heard about opportunities in the studied areas 
through relatives and friends who had preceded them and had written back. These constitute 
what Jaoquin Arango called migration networks. These networks are interpersonal ties or 
relations that connect migrants with relatives and friends or fellow countrymen at home.10 
Migration networks reduce the cost and uncertainty of migration, by providing prospective 
                                                 
7 See for instance R. K. Udo, “Food Deficits Area of Nigeria”, Geographical Review, 61/3, (1971): 415-430, 
417-8; Bako, Sabon Gari, 36; U. Hannerz, “Town and Country in Southern Zaria: A View from Kafanchan”, in: 
A. Southall (ed.), Small Urban Centers in Rural Development in Africa, (Madison: African Studies Program, 
1979), 226-240; Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”, 111-2; Magbeafulu, Migration and the Economy, 26-7, 
29-37. 
8 R. K. Udo, “Internal Migrations and Development”, in: J. S. OgunToyinbo, O. O. Areola and M. Filani, A 
Geography of Nigerian Development, (Nigeria: Heinemann, Books, 1978), 124-137, 124. 
9 B. Rogers, The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies, (London: Routledge, 1980), 
30-40.  




migrants with support and assistance by way of information, financial assistance, and 
accommodation, and as well as linking them to employers.11 
For instance, an informant, Theophillus Adeyinka Shittu, a Yoruba man from Offa, 
commented that his father, Samuel Shittu, came to Gimi in the 1940s on the advice of a 
younger brother who himself had been living in Zaria City. Prior to this, the father had lived 
at Beji, a small railway town in Nupe Province.12 Another informant, Innocent Opufou, an 
Ijaw man, related how his father, Wellman Warri Opufou, came to Gimi in 1939. He came to 
know about Gimi through his elder brother, T. E. Opufou, who was working with the London 
and Kano Company at Dutsin Wai (another railway town south of Zaria) in 1938. This elder 
brother relocated to Gimi in 1939, having secured employment with John Holt, after which he 
invited his two younger brothers, Wellman Warri Opufou and E. C. Opufou. The two 
younger brothers later secured employment in the groundnut industry through him. The 
former worked with the UAC, while the latter became an LBA in the 1940s.13 As Arango 
asserted, migration networks can serve as social capital insofar as they “permit access to 
other goods of economic significance such as employment or higher wages”.14 Within two 
decades of the opening of the rail line, the migrant population had grown steadily both 
through migration and natural increase. As the evidence indicates, the Yoruba were dominant 
at Madobi, Dangora, Yako, and Auchan, while the Ibo or those from the old Eastern Nigeria 
were dominant at Gimi, Kwankwaso, and Challawa.15 
This population influx with its attendant problems was accompanied by measures 
from the colonial state to control the migrants politically, economically, and medically 
through the establishment of segregated settlements under different terminologies. Based on 
the 1914 Cantonment Proclamation, the settlement was conceived exclusively for housing 
“natives” and “non-native Africans” working for the government and for commercial firms. 
In practice, the policy in the studied communities, as elsewhere, led to the establishment of 
separate settlements for migrants, most notably for southerners, “non-native Africans”, and 
Asians, as well as for northerners that were not indigenous to the communities, in areas 
known as tasha (from the word for station or railway settlement), sabon gari (new towns or 
stranger quarters), and tudun wada (exclusively for northerners that were not indigenous to 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 9. 
12 E-mail communications with Dr. Theophillus Adeyinka Shittu, 5 and 10 January 2013. 
13 E-mail communication with Mr. Innocent Opufou, 11 July 2013; NAK ZarProf MKT vol. I, Groundnut 
Buying Stations and Points. 
14 Arango, “Explaining Migration”, 291. 
15 Wiseman, “Structural and Ideological”, 2; KSHCB no. 68, Inspection Notes vol. 1. 
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the communities). Previously, it had been assumed that the segregated settlements in the 
North were established to protect Islam and Hausa people from the influence of southern 
Christians.16 Studies by Ahmed Bako indicate that the settlements were established for 
political, economic, and medical needs—and not for protecting Islam or Muslims as was 
previously assumed. According to Bako, the settlements were settled both by Christians and 
Muslims and included Hausa, and they were not settled exclusively by Christians and 
southerners.17 However, whether established to protect Islam and Muslims or not, it is 
common knowledge that the colonial segregation policy was a divide-and-rule strategy to 
prevent Nigerians from forming a common front against colonialism. 
This development resulted in the emergence of two complex settlements on the rail 
line. On the one hand, there was a settlement for southerners, “non-native” Africans, and 
Asians and another settlement for northerners that were not indigenous to the host 
communities. It needs be pointed that, apart from Madobi, all the other communities had only 
one settlement for migrants (e.g. unguwar Likoro tasha, Gimi tasha). These settlements were 
the nucleus and commercial nerve centres of the indigenous communities, and the export 
economy revolved around them. For instance, the stations, commercial trading firms, and 
even markets were situated around these settlements. The indigenous settlements, on the 
other hand, were situated within the walled towns and inhabited exclusively by the host 
communities. The migrant settlements were administered generally by political designate 
ward heads (masu unguwani; sing. mai unguwa), appointed from among the migrants and 
answerable to the indigenous village heads through their representatives (wakilan tasha).18 
However, owing to the concentration of population in some of the settlements, those 
with particularly high economic prospects were upgraded to sabon gari. As the records 
generally indicate, the migrant settlements in Madobi, Dangora, and Yako were the 
recognized sabon gari. Madobi Sabon Gari, which was the first and the largest settlement, 
was from the start established as an independent village unit in 1935 with own village head, a 
development which resulted in a reduction in the indigenous authority’s influence. A Yoruba 
                                                 
16 G. Olusanya, “The Sabon-Gari System in Northern States of Nigeria”, Nigerian Magazine, 94, (1967): 214-
248; Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”; R. Olaniyi, Diaspora is Not Like Home: A Social and Economic 
History of Yoruba in Kano, 1912–1999, (Europa: Lincom), 61. 
17 A. Bako, “Colonial Rule and Residential Segregation: The Sabon Gari Settlements Reconsidered”, in: A. M. 
Yakubu, I. M. Jumare and A. G. Saeed, Northern Nigeria: A Century of Transformation, 1903-2003, (Kaduna: 
Arewa House, 2005), 469-477; Bako, Sabon Gari, 1-9.  
18 Interviews with Malam Ali Tela (ward head of Gimi Tasha), Gimi Tasha, 7 March 2011; Alhaji Mohammadu 
Abubakar Goga (scribe to the village head of Auchan), Auchan, 8 March 2011; and Malam Haruna Audu (ward 
head of Tasha Likoro), Likoro Tasha, 24 March 2011. 
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man, AbdulRahimi Ogunlade, was appointed its village head. Also, a tudun wada was 
established near the sabon gari settlement the same year. The tudun wada did not become 
important until the 1950s, when the whole area (including the sabon gari) was renamed 
Tudun Wada, following Ogunlade’s death.19 It is surprising that, despite its importance, Gimi 
Tasha was not upgraded to a sabon gari. Those at Yako and Dangora, which were not as 
important as the one at Gimi, were upgraded to sabon gari in the 1950s, though they were not 
as important as Madobi Sabon Gari.20 Conversely, centres like Likoro, Kwankwaso, and 
Challawa had no significant numbers of migrants besides the railway workers there, owing to 
the low economic opportunities available in these centres. As indicated in the last chapter, the 
commercial firms did not establish at Likoro, and the only firms that established at 
Kwankwaso and Challawa closed down owing to the poor economic prospects.21 
The uneven socio-economic opportunities contributed to the expansion of some of the 
communities and the decline of others. For instance, centres like Madobi, Gimi, Yako, and 
even Dangora (an entirely colonial creation) expanded and developed into peri-urban-like 
centres along the rail line. In pre-colonial times, their strategic locations on trade routes and 
their defensive character enhanced Madobi and Gimi’s position. Their location on the rail line 
and the activities of the commercial firms and population further accelerated their expansion 
and popularity. Even Dangora, an entirely colonial creation, transformed into an important 
centre almost overnight. However, centres like Likoro and Kwankwaso, which had 
previously both been important, declined in importance owing to the low economic 
opportunities or absence of commercial firms.   
It would be interesting to have detailed comparative data on the migrant populations 
and the indigenous settlements, but unfortunately such data are not available. Tables 5.1 and 
5.2 are the only data we have so far on the migrants in Madobi, Yako, and Dangora. The data 
itself is misleading and so should be used with caution. It records taxable male adults, 
exclusive of women, children, the old, and Asian immigrants. The tables also do not provide 
explanations for the fluctuation in population. The tax lists for the main towns, which could 
have assisted in this study, were not used because they are not properly arranged. A detailed 
study of the lists will be required to arrive at a valid conclusion. Despite their shortcomings, 
these lists cannot be ignored, as they are the only available primary evidence on the migrant 
population. 
                                                 
19 Umaru, “Tudun Wada Madobi”; Yusuf, “New Approaches”, 219; Yusuf, Impact of the Railway. 
20 KSHCB KanProf 1/11/13, History of Kiru. 





Table 5.1 Migrant population in Madobi Sabon Gari, 1939–1949 
Town 1939 1942–43 1943 1943–44 1948–49 
Madobi Sabon Gari 208 138 142 142 114 
 
Source: KSHCB Acc. no. 68, Kura Inspection Notes vol. 1. 
 




Source: KSHCB KanProf 1/11/13, History of Kiru. 
 
 
5.2 Socio-economic basis of diaspora community 
Railway work 
The railway was the main industry in which the migrants were employed, being the main 
employer of labour during the colonial and post-colonial period. Many of the migrants 
worked as permanent way workers or labourers (leburori or yanbita), while some worked in 
the stations as clerks, signal men, and station masters. These were drawn from the first group 
of migrants in the communities. Many of them came from different parts of the country and 
from neighbouring countries. The Yoruba and Ibo were the earliest indigenous groups to join 
the railway because of their early exposure to Western education and wage employment. The 
Hausa and other northern groups joined afterwards.22 Linda Lindsay and Wale Oyemakinde 
pointed out that Nigerians joined the railway because of the attraction of a steady income and 
the prestige associated with the work.23 Lindsay noted that steady income helped these 
                                                 
22 A. G. Oilfield, “The Native Railway Workers in Nigeria”, Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute, 9/3, (1936): 379-402; Oyemakinde, “Railway Construction”; Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”. 
23 L. Lindsay, “Money, Marriage and Masculinity on the Colonial Nigerian Railway”, in: L. A. Lindsay and S. 
F. Mescher (eds), Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa, (Portsmouth, NH, 2003), 138-55; L. A. Lindsay, 
Working with Gender: Wage Labour and Social Change in South-Western Nigeria, (Heinemann: 2003). 
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workers to maintain harmonious relations with, and made them more attractive to, their 
wives.24 
As a rule, all railway workers (station masters and clerks and signal men) lived in the 
railway quarters situated along the rail line. These were the educated few, often products of 
mission schools in the South. The labourers constituted the bulk of the railway workforce in 
the communities, as elsewhere. They were mostly uneducated but possessed certain technical 
skills which qualified them to be employed in the railway. This group was responsible for 
maintaining and repairing the line. They worked in gangs under a head ganger, each gang 
inspecting a certain mileage of the line daily. The labourers lived in camps, or beater camps 
as the Nigerian Railway called them, which were spread along the line, the largest of which 
was around Likoro and Dangora. Many of them also lived in the migrant quarters and the 
indigenous settlements.25 As far as safety and maintenance was concerned, it was this army of 
labourers who looked after the line. Their career was characterized by mobility here and there 
along the rail line. As many of the labourers interviewed generally pointed out, many of them 
had worked in almost all the communities considered in this study. 
Their presence had profound consequences on the social and economic landscapes of 
the communities. On the one hand, their presence helped in the circulation of the colonial 
currency, as they were the main wage earners in the countryside. Railway workers were, as 
Wale Oyemakinde pointed out, “harbingers of the currency revolution” at a time when the 
colonial coin was still novel in Nigeria.26 They attracted markets and populations around 
themselves. The villagers made the railway camps, quarters, and stations their markets. They 
sold on credit and expected payment on days when the railway workers received their salaries 
or wages. In this way, part of the wage income entered the local economy.27 Similarly, 
service industries such as eateries, bottled beer, and locally brewed alcohol (burukutu and 
pito) centres, credit services, brothels, and entertainers developed to cater for these workers. 
On another level, they constituted an enlightened group, who were anxious to give their 
children a better education. They were always up to date on social and political happenings in 
                                                 
24 L. Lindsay, “Money, Marriage and Masculinity”, 144.  
25 Interview with Alhaji Ahamdu Dan Barno, Kwankwaso, 5 March 2005. 
26 W. Oyemakinde, “The Railway Workers and Modernization in Colonial Nigeria”, Journal of Historical 
Society of Nigeria, 10/1, (1979): 113-124, 115-6; Oyemakinde, “Railway Construction”, 317-323. 
27 Oyemakinde,  “Railway Construction”, 318 
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the country.28 As informants noted, the locals got their information about happenings in the 
country through the railway labourers.29 
However, the presence of the railway workers, coupled with the expanding cash 
economy and the influx of foreign ideas, had the consequence of breaking down or 
undermining the traditional social control over dependent women and girls. For instance, 
women and young girls who frequented railway camps and stations to trade often asserted 
their independence and even deserted homes, owing to contact with the railway labourers 
who enticed them into sexual relations. Informants commented that women and young girls 
usually ran away from home to the camps. An informant, Alhaji Ahmadu Dan Barno, a 
retired railway labourer, pointed out that “whenever a woman or girl got missing or ran away 
from home, the railway camp was always the first place to look for her.”30 The attraction to 
railway workers was understandable; they had a steady income, which made them attractive 
lovers. The railway workers stimulated local trade, as their camps and quarters became a sort 
of market to local women.31 Women who attached themselves to them not only stood a 
chance of getting a permanent space to sell from, they also had a steady allowance or even 
capital to expand their business.  
In a society undergoing major transformations through the introduction of cash, 
sexual relations with railway labourers were a way of negotiating social and economic ties. 
As studies by Judith Byfield and N. A. Fadipe revealed, the advent of the railway increased 
the rate of divorce and prostitution in Yorubaland. Married women and young girls in the 
course of contact with railway workers defied their husbands, parents, and public opinion, 
and ran away from home to become mistresses to railway workers.32 As Byfield pointed out, 
the railway camps provided new relationships and economic opportunities, as well as 
sanctuary from the traditional authority, in the form of an alternative legal space under the 
railway’s jurisdiction.33 As one early annual report also indicates, married women along the 
                                                 
28 Oyemakinde, “Railway Workers”, 116-7. 
29 Interviews with Malams Yusuf Inusa Dan Madaki, Hussaini Abdu, Adamu Zaki, Chindo Mohammed, and Idi 
Inusa, Yakum Dan Baure, 10 April 2011. 
30 Interview with Alhaji Ahmadu Dan Barno, Kwankwaso, 5 March 2005. 
31 Oyemakinde, “Railway Construction”, 323 
32 J. Byfield, “Women, Marriage, Divorce and the Emerging Colonial State in Abeokuta (Nigeria) 1892-1904” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 30/1, (1996): 32-51; N. A. Fadipe, The Sociology of Yoruba, (Ibadan: 
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rail line asserted their independence by refusing to bear children, aborting their pregnancies 
without their husband’s knowledge.34 
The Nigerian Railway was one government industry in which southerners, especially 
the Igbo, were dominant. They constituted the bulk of the engine drivers, technicians, and 
engineers. In the 1960s, many southern railway workers, most especially the Ibo, fled from 
the communities during the Civil War. Their departure during the crisis disrupted rail services 
between the North and South, and the system came to a virtual standstill.35 Although there 
were no attacks in the studied communities, many of the southern migrants fled owing to fear 
and rumours of impending attacks. At the end of the war, many of them returned, by which 
time the railway was in a decline. 
 
Groundnut trade 
Many of the migrants were employed in the groundnut trade industry as clerks and 
middlemen or sub-agents to the commercial firms. A number of the Yoruba and Ibo worked 
as clerks. Many of them, including the Hausa and the Asian traders, and particularly the 
Syrians and Arabs, acted as middlemen to the firms or sub-agents to the main middlemen 
who advanced them credit to purchase produce. Credit advances were a prominent feature of 
the produce trade.36 The migrants were attracted into the produce trade by their awareness of 
the possible cash returns. Their ambition was to save money to send their children to school. 
Some of these migrants were also independent traders, who used their personal capital to 
purchase produce. 
The migrants controlled the produce trade in the communities through kinship 
networks. They enjoyed what amounted to a monopoly. For instance, J. A. Wiseman pointed 
out that the Ibo dominated the produce trade in Gimi.37 The Yoruba, on the other hand, 
controlled the produce trade in Madobi, Yako, and Dangora. As early as 1924, a senior 
colonial official in Kano Province, H. H. Middleton, reported that the bulk of the groundnuts 
purchased by the firms in Madobi that year were possibly via Yoruba traders. Many of them 
had been living in the area before the firms began to operate there.38 A number of them 
                                                 
34 SNP/10 Zaria Province Report (Annual) 1914. 
35 For details, see M. E. Zukerman, “Nigerian Crisis: Economic Impact on the North”, The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 8/1, (1970): 37-54. 
36 Adebayo, “Production and Export, 286; Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut. 
37 Wiseman, “Structural and Ideological”, 2.  
38 AHAK 3/3/16, Report on the Groundnut Trade in Kano Province by H. H. Middleton, 6, 16. 
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started out as clerks in the trading firms. Having acquired the expertise and saved enough, 
they resigned to start trading themselves, and some even established their own firms.39 Their 
activities generated employment for fellow migrants and the indigenous population. 
Prominent produce middlemen among the migrants in Gimi were T. E. Opufou, E. C. 
Opufou, P. H. Sawyer, and Umoru. They became LBAs in the 1940s and 1950s.40 In Madobi, 
Michael Nwankwo was the most prominent produce trader in the 1950s and 1960s; he 
established his own trading firm, Michael Nwankwo Ltd, in 1947.41 AbdulRauf Fashola was 
another prominent middleman at Dangora in the 1940s and 1950s.42 
In the 1920s, the dominant position of the southern produce traders in Madobi and 
Yako was challenged by new arrivals, most notably Syrian and Arab traders who also were 
attracted by the post-war trade boom and their awareness of the profits to be made.43 As M. 
A. Bugren, the foremost Arab trader, interviewed by J. S. Hogendorn in Kano in the 1960s, 
pointed out, he came to Kano because of the money in the groundnut trade.44 Many of these 
traders also started as intermediaries to the European firms before saving money to establish 
their own firms. As indicated in the previous chapter, when the trading outlet in Madobi was 
established, the Arabs and Lebanese were the first group to establish their firms there. 
Although they were not many compared with the indigenous middlemen, as Table 5.3 
indicates, they constituted a distinct commercial group, and they had stronger capital than 
their indigenous counterparts combined. Toyin Falola asserted that the indigenous traders 
were jealous of the Asian and European traders because of their strong capital and control 
over the markets and their ability to use their networks and branches to divide the markets.45 
Their presence did not result in complete withdrawal of the indigenous middlemen, however, 
as a number of the latter acted as agents for these outsiders.46 
The newcomers were shrewd businessmen who did not accept bad business. As the 
records indicate, they were fond of snatching their rivals’ agents. When their agents defaulted 
or decided not to trade with them, they had them arrested and refused to appear in court; they 
                                                 
39 Interview with Malama Laraba Wellman, Gimi Dabosa, 25 May 2011. 
40 NAK ZarProf MKT vol. 1, Groundnut Buying Stations and Points. 
41 Yusuf, Impact of the Railway, 129, 148. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Okediji, “Economic History”, 141, 199. 
44 Hogendorn, Nigerian Groundnut, 141. 
45 T. Falola, “Money and Informal Credit Institutions in Colonial Western Nigeria”, in: J. I. Guyer, Money 
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even seized their donkeys. Prominent Syrian and Arab groundnut traders in Madobi and Yako 
in the 1940s were Saleh Bugren (mai gashin baki), Sadiq Tahir, Habib Deik, and Jamil. As 
Table 5.3 also indicates, there were also some European residents at some of the centres, even 
though they were not many.47 
As the archival records indicate, the social life of the migrants was generally 
characterized by upward social mobility, to the extent that some of their names appeared on 
the wealthy individuals’ tax list. In the 1950s and 1960s, some of them earned as much as 
£1,700 or as little as £150 annually.48 For instance, in the 1950s, Michael Nwankwo was 
listed as the richest person not only in Madobi but in Kura District as a whole. Also, Abdul 
Rauf Fashola was reported as the richest person in Kiru District.49 As the oral and archival 
sources suggest, the Yoruba and Ibo migrants invested profits from the produce trade in their 
children’s education and in other trade such as livestock trade, retailing, and real estate (e.g. 
hotels50 and housing to cater for the migrant populations).51 
 







Children Town Total 
1941 Syrian 3 Traders 2 2 Madobi 7 
“ “ 2 “ n.a. n.a Yako 2 
1942 British 1 Railway staff n.a. n.a. Dangora 1 
“ Syrian 2 Traders n.a. n.a. Yako 2 
“ “ 2 “ 2 5 Madobi 9 
1943 Syrian & Arab 2 “ 2 8 “ 12 
“ German 1 Trader 1 2 Madobi 4 
“ British 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. Yako 1 
1944 “ 3 Traders 3 n.a Madobi 3 
1945 “ 3 “ 3 10 “ 16 
1946 Arab 1 “ 1 4 “ 6 
“ Syrian 1 Trader 1 3 Madobi 5 
1948 Arab 1 “ 1 4 Yako 6 
                                                 
47 KSHCB Acc. no. 68. 
48 KSHCB KanProf 1/11/11 History of Kiru District, KHCB KanProf 1/11/13 History of Kura District.  
49 KSHCB KanProf1/11/13 History of Kura District. 
50 For example, there was a Provident Hotel at Gimi and an Alheri Hotel at Auchan.  
51 NAK ZarProf 2015, St. James Anglican School at Gimi Dabosa; NAK KanProf 4171, Elementary School at 
Madobi; NAK KanProf 6476, Methodist Church Mission Application for Church Site at Dangora; NAK 
KanProf 6575, Applications to Open School at Yako by Methodist Church Mission. 
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1 “ 1 3 Madobi 5 
 
Note: n.a. = not available 
Source: KSHCB BMD/36, Statistics of non-indigenous population. 
 
Livestock trade 
Besides the produce trade which attracted the migrants, a number of them, particularly the 
Yoruba and Hausa, were also in the livestock trade. Those of them involved in the produce 
trade also participated in the livestock trade when the opportunity cost in the trade was low or 
during festival periods. Florence Okediji pointed out that most of the Hausa middlemen who 
drove the produce trade were also involved in the livestock trade. Just as they reinvested 
profits from kola nuts into the groundnut trade, so also did they reinvest in livestock trade.52 
As with the produce trade, it was oriented southward. The livestock trade between the North 
and South dated back to the pre-colonial period, but the trade at that time was constrained by 
transport difficulties and general insecurity.53 The establishment of British rule and the 
completion of the railway gave a new impetus. Expansion in the trade was a result of the 
steady demand for meat from Southern Nigeria, owing to the increased wealth from cash crop 
exports and the new transport system. The bulk of the meat consumed in the South was 
imported from the North. 
Livestock traders purchased their stocks, particularly rams and goats as well as fowl, 
from the communities and their environs and then transported them to the South. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, livestock freight featured prominently in rail-borne traffic from the 
localities studied (see Appendix 1: Table 3.7). The peak of the trade was during the festival 
periods, especially the Eid al adha (the Greater Eid or festival of sacrifice) and Christmas 
time, when demand for animals was high. In the 1960s, the livestock trade between the North 
and South was disrupted by the Civil War, and then again by the drought of the 1970s, the 
latter causing heavy mortality among cattle herds.54 From the 1970s onwards, the livestock 
trade was transported by road owing to the decline in importance of the railway. 
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Textile and cosmetic trade 
While men dominated the produce and livestock trades, women’s involvement in trading was 
also important and should not be overlooked. Despite the critical role women played in 
informal trade, they were seen as a group requiring integration into the mainstream 
economy.55 Many Yoruba women migrants engaged in the textile and cosmetic trade. Though 
men also engaged in this trade, the majority were women. The trade was called osomalo, an 
Ijesha word, coming from the saying: “Oso ni ma a lo ki mo fi agba omi, or Oso ni ma lo 
gba’ owo mi loni o” (“I shall remain standing here, squatting or stooping, until I am paid”).56 
The term originated in the fact that the trade itself was based on a credit or hire purchase 
system. The women always called on customers to buy from them on credit and pay at a later 
date. Toyin Falola pointed out that the trade was similar to the trust system introduced by the 
European traders in the coastal trade with Nigerians during the nineteenth century.57 Many of 
the women traders were either wives of railway workers or produce traders, and some were 
independent traders themselves. As with the male migrants, they were attracted by the profits 
to be made. Their ambition was to use their profits to educate their children, to invest in 
houses, and to retire to a large store.58 The women purchased their wares from the cities and 
hawked them in the countryside where the firms could not penetrate. 
The osomalo women were the most prominent southern traders in the localities, given 
the practice of seclusion (kulle) in Hausaland, which restricts women to the home front.59 In 
Yorubaland, women entrepreneurship has a long history, pre-dating the colonial period. 
Yoruba women engaged in trade to supplement family incomes, usually starting on a small 
scale, using capital from personal savings or relatives and then expanding gradually.60 
Though their influence was constrained by distance and insecurity, the restoration of peace by 
                                                 
55 M. L. Swantz, “Women Entrepreneurs in Tanzania: A Path to Sustainable Livelihood”, in: Small Global 
Employment, vol. 1, (1995), Development: Journal of the Society for International Development, 55-60. 
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58 Ibid. 
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colonialism, the development of the export trade, and the construction of the railway offered 
them enormous opportunities to diversify and extend their trade to the North.61 
One interesting aspect of this trade was connected to persuasion, which was a key 
component of doing business. The osomalo often identified their customers or anybody 
requiring credit and then tricked them into buying, either through persuasion or peer-group 
networks. When a customer was not interested in one of their products, they suggested 
another.62 Their hosts nicknamed them adodoka or dauki dauki ba fada, “pick pick without 
fight”, owing to the way they advertised or attracted their customers. The price of an article 
was always doubled. Informants noted that buyers seemed to continue to service their debts 
endlessly. Buying on credit allowed villagers to live on credit and keep in touch with current 
trends and tastes, especially where textiles were involved.63 The osomalo saved the villagers 
the trouble of going to the city. But they had better not default in their repayments; otherwise, 
the osomalo could get quite provocative.64 
The osomalo profited from the scarcity of imported textiles during the 1930s and 
1940s by selling at higher rates. Their hold over the trade was challenged by the Hausas in 
the 1970s. The increased involvement of the Hausas in the textile trade and the emergence of 
modern textile mills eventually undermined the osomalo hold over the trade.65 Although the 
osomalo are still very much around, they now sell mostly plastic materials. 
 
Foodstuffs trade 
The trade in the staple foodstuffs was another economic activity performed by some of the 
migrants. As with the produce trade, those involved in this trade were of mixed ethnicity, 
comprising Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba (including women). They purchased cereal or grains such 
as beans, maize, and millet, as well as onions and peppers from the communities and 
transported them to the South and the urban centres in Kano and Zaria, where they were 
scarce. As mentioned in Chapter 3, foodstuffs featured prominently in rail-borne traffic (see 
Tables 3.2–3.6, 3.10–3.12, and 3.14–3.15 in Appendix 1) despite the food deficit in some of 
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the communities. The foodstuffs trade was also a part of the service industry of the railway, 
which catered for the railway workers and the southern populations. Since the migrant did not 
engage in food production, unlike their counterparts in the cocoa belt of south-west Nigeria, 
they increased the food deficits in some of the communities. The food traders profited from 
this food deficit. As highlighted in the previous chapter, most of the communities were 
deficient in foodstuffs and had to rely on such traders. As Oshin and Umiunu asserted, the 
railways facilitated foodstuffs trade between the North and the South, which resulted in each 
region specializing in the production of foods for which they were best endowed by nature. 
This singular factor created inter-dependence among the various Nigerian groups.66 
In the 1960s, the foodstuffs trade was affected by the Civil War. The war disrupted 
the inter-regional trade and transportation between the North and the South and created a 
vacuum which was immediately filled by the Hausa.67 The disruption of the transport system 
during and after the war also meant that the foodstuffs were transported by road transport.68 
 
Prostitution 
Prostitution (karuwanci, a term denoting both sexual and economic independence) was 
another economic activity performed by some of the single female migrants. Prostitution was 
one of the service industries of the railway, and it provided single and unattached females 
some degree of social and economic mobility and independence.69 The prostitutes (karuwai) 
were predominantly Hausa from across the North and the localities, with a few other groups 
such as Tiv, Idoma, and women from southern Zaria. As with other migrants, they came in 
response to the economic opportunities presented by the railway and the presence of 
populations of single or unattached males. They concentrated mostly at those centres with 
high economic opportunities and large populations (such as Madobi, Gimi, Dangora, Yako, 
and Auchan). The increasing number of unattached railway labourers and other migrants who 
required sexual relations boosted demand for the prostitutes’ services. As one informant 
commented, “wherever you see labourers, there must be prostitutes”.70 
                                                 
66 Oshin, “Railways and Urbanization”, 115; Umiunu, “Role of Transportation”, 9-10. 
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Although economic factors were one cause of prostitution, divorce was also a 
contributing factor. Most women entered prostitution to escape marriage.71 Kenneth Little 
asserted that all Hausa prostitutes had previously been married.72 Although prostitution is an 
acceptable way of life, it is disapproved of by society, because a good woman is expected to 
be married or live with relatives and avoid multiple sexual relations; otherwise, she will be 
labelled a prostitute.73 
Although prostitution is an ancient practice, it became more lucrative with the advent 
of the railway. The severity of construction and railway work and the fact that the labourers 
were mostly single boosted demand for sex workers. During the time of the railway’s 
construction, prostitutes were permitted at the construction camps to sell sex to labourers.74 
As the construction work was completed, brothels (gidan magajiya) and hotels sprang up 
along the rail line, including in the studied communities, to serve the unattached male 
populations.75 The prostitutes did not evoke opposition from the public, as they were seen as 
doing legal work. Unlike the form of prostitution practised by other Nigerian groups, the 
Hausa prostitutes lived and solicited in a house called gidan magajiya. The houses were 
situated in the migrant quarters and were mostly owned by a magajiya (madam of the 
prostitutes) and the southern migrants from whom she rented and sublet to her girls. An 
informant, Alhaji Yakubu Likoro, stated that prostitution was not the only work they did; 
some also sold food, cigarettes, and kola nuts.76 These additional activities, together with the 
existence of other prostitution-related activities such as hotels and beer parlours, provided 
avenues for sexual networking and the secrecy required by clients. Although it has been 
argued that Hausa prostitutes elsewhere were patronized only by the Hausa,77 the evidence 
from the communities suggests that they were patronized by diverse groups, including 
married men, most of whom were labourers. An informant, Malam Mohammadu Nayi, stated 
that “most labourers spend their money on prostitutes”.78 Although it is difficult to determine 
the profitability of prostitution, some of the prostitutes earned enough to invest in real estate. 
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As mentioned earlier, some of the houses in which they operated were owned by the 
magajiyas themselves, suggesting that prostitution was profitable.79 An informant also 
pointed out that one of the magajiya built a mosque at Yako Sabon Gari.80 
In the 1940s and 1950s, there were efforts to control divorce and prostitution in the 
country. The prevalence of child prostitution, venereal disease, and consummation of 
marriage with underage girls during the war led to a plan to tax prostitutes and discourage 
divorce, with a view to curtailing prostitution.81 The decline of the railway and the decline of 
the migrant communities in the 1970s undermined the activities of the prostitutes. Many 
relocated to the capital cities and the new hubs on the Kano–Zaria road, such as Kwanar 
Dangora and Tashar Mayere.82 
 
Others 
In addition to these activities, there were also artisans such as tailors, bicycle repairers, and 
goldsmiths. There were also casual labourers who earned their living from the trains, loading 
and unloading goods. 
 
5.3 Socio-cultural changes 
Despite attempts by the colonial authority to isolate the migrants into a rigid compartment 
(through a segregation policy), social relations brought them into direct contact with their 
hosts communities, a development which eroded both traditional and official barriers. The 
fact that no human society is self-sufficient also made interactions between migrants and 
hosts very necessary. Besides the trade which fostered physical interactions, inter-ethnic 
relations were fostered through language, religion, and marriage. In their various capacities as 
traders, middlemen, government workers, and artisans, the migrants interacted with their 
hosts through the local language (Hausa), even if the spoken Hausa of many of them was not 
particularly good. This was important because the hosts did not understand the newcomers’ 
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own languages. The migrants also had a further motivation, which was the quest for 
acceptance.83 Just as they learned the host language, some of the locals in turn learned to 
communicate with them in pidgin English, which was the lingua franca among the migrants. 
Pidgin English itself is a language of commerce. 
Religion also played a critical role in fostering social relations between the two 
groups. A number of the migrants, especially the Yoruba, Nupe, Igala, Syrians, and Arabs 
were Muslims and so shared the same faith as their hosts, even if their daily prayers were 
irregular. They observed their prayers in the midst of the hosts and even contributed funds to 
charity. Informants noted that the migrants donated to mosque building and some even 
single-handedly built mosques.84 As the record also indicates, one of the prominent Syrian 
individuals in Madobi, Saleh Bugren, established an Islamic school at Kanwa, near Madobi.85 
Marriage also assisted in fostering social relations between the Muslim migrants and 
their hosts. A number of the Yoruba, Nupe, Igala, and Syrian migrants married women from 
the localities. Muslims are always liberal when it comes to marriage; after all, Islam 
encourages inter-ethnic marriages among the faithful. As oral and archival sources generally 
indicate, the migrants married women from the localities to reinforce their economic and 
political status.86 For instance, Saleh Bugren, the prominent Syrian trader mentioned above, 
married a woman from Madobi to reinforce his economic activities.87 Also, Abdul Rahimi 
Ogunlade, the village head of Madobi Sabon Gari mentioned earlier, secured the village 
headship because he married Turaki Manya, the district head of Kura’s daughter, a 
development which facilitated the integration of his children into mainstream Hausa 
society.88 Informants pointed out that marriages involving railway workers were not very 
successful, as the migrants in question either abandoned or divorced the local women only to 
bring in women from their home towns.89 Marriage between the female migrants and 
members of the host communities was not common during the period considered, perhaps 
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partly due to what A. F. Usman and A. Bako described as the Hausa’s divorce syndrome 
(saki-uku).90 Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s, a number of such marriages were 
recorded in some of the communities 
It should be pointed out that despite the networks the migrants had established over 
years of residence, many of them did not assimilate. This is because they developed a plural 
identity with regards to the host communities. In other words, they did not see migration as 
their final objective. Toyin Falola has argued that not every migrant wanted to integrate; 
some preferred to play the politics of outsider, in which their “outsidedness” was also a 
source of power. According to this argument, migrants who perceive migration as a final 
objective find it easier to integrate than those who see it as a temporary situation.91 Although 
many of the migrants did not integrate, there were some who did, as did their children. As 
Malama Laraba, wife of Wellman Warri Opufou mentioned earlier, stated: “we have no other 
home than Gimi”. Laraba, now advanced in years, still lives in Gimi Tasha, even though her 
husband now lives with their eldest son (Mr Innocent), who teaches at the polytechnic in 
Zaria.92 
Not only did the migrants assimilate; some of them went on to hold important 
positions in mainstream Hausa society. For example, the late Abdu Abdu Rahim—a chartered 
accountant-cum-politician, who was appointed Commissioner for Finance in Kano State 
(1979–1983)—and Alhaji Usman Abdurrahim—who served as Registrar of Ahmadu Bello 
University, Zaria (1981–1992) and also of Kano State University of Science and Technology 
(2001–2005)—were the sons of Abdul Rahimi Ogunlade, mentioned above. Also, Dr Habibu 
Saleh of Physics Department, Bayero University was the son of Saleh Burgren mentioned 
above. There are also a couple of migrants from the north who despite the decline of the 
railway still lives within the communiies while some maintained contact with the 
communities having relocated elsewhere. 93 If the Rahimis and Salehs and others found it 
easy to integrate because of their maternal connections, it was less easy for other young 
migrants with no parental linkage in the localities, due to what an informant described as the 
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politicization of citizenship and the notions of rights and opportunities in post-colonial 
Nigeria.94 
One prominent development arising from the presence of migrants was the 
proliferation of community and home town associations in the communities. The most 
prominent were the community associations, which were established in order to foster 
understanding and interactions among themselves and between them and their hosts. The 
associations performed diverse functions, but at their core they had the development and 
advancement of the migrant quarters. Membership cut across regional ethnic groups.95 For 
instance, the migrants in Gimi established the Gimi Community League (GCL). In 1953, the 
executive members of the GCL comprised the following: Mr. Opufou as President, and B. 
Owulah, E. F. Omgbge, Alhaji M. Ilori, and G. O. Adebayo (positions not indicated) as 
members.96 The meetings were used as platforms for addressing issues of common interest 
and settling disputes, as well as for social interactions. The associations were also 
instrumental in the establishment of schools, postal agencies, and churches at Madobi, Gimi, 
Yako, Dangora, and Auchan.97 
The migrants did not lose touch with home; they also maintained contact through the 
home town associations. The home associations were established in part as a response to the 
problem of adjustment to the new environment, and they brought together migrants from the 
same town. Their core mission was the physical development of the home town and the 
strengthening of ethnic consciousness.98 They also functioned as channels through which 
monetary remittances were sent home or invested in development projects at home. Although 
the remittances were rarely seen physically, they were sent through the postal agencies.99 
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The migrants were also instrumental in the establishment of churches and Western-
education schools, as many of them were Christians. Although missionary activity was not 
the primary motive for their migration, it was one area where their activity was most felt. 
Churches of different denominations were established in the host communities, as Table 5.4 
indicates.100 These churches were established between the 1930s and 1940s (see first column 
on year in the table), a period of intense proliferation of missionary activity in the North.101 
Contrary to the claim that indigenous African churches did not exist in the North,102 one was 
actually established at Madobi Sabon Gari.103 European missionaries did not establish 
missions in the communities, partly because of opposition from the colonial authority and 
party because Muslim-populated areas were not attractive to the missions. The churches were 
pastored by the migrants themselves. As the evidence indicates, membership of the churches 
in Gimi and Dangora was hierarchized along ethnic lines, with the Yoruba and Ibo 
establishing separate churches. E. P. Crampton argued that wherever the Anglicans were 
sufficient in number, they would establish a separate church of their own.104 Also, contrary to 
the claim that southerners did not engage in direct evangelism in the North,105 oral accounts 
suggest that they were instrumental in the conversion of some non-Muslim Hausa populations 
(Maguzawa) around Dangora, Gimi, Auchan, Likoro, Gubuci, Ikara, and Nassarawan Doya, 
due to the neglect of these communities by the Hausa Muslim aristocrats.106 Although the 
numbers involved were insignificant, the bulk converted in the 1980s through the activity of 
the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA).107 
The missions also established Western-education schools (makarantun boko), most 
notably elementary schools (see second column on year in Table 5.4). This is understandable, 
given that Western education arrived with Christianity. The missions always set up schools 
wherever they were established. The schools were initially accommodated in the churches 
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until permanent structures were constructed. Although the schools were established and 
administered by the church, they were funded by the migrant populations, irrespective of 
their religious affiliation. As indicated earlier, many of the migrant workers were not 
educated but wanted to see their children educated.108 As late as the 1930s, the colonial 
authority in the North was still not interested in the education of migrants, although it 
supported the schools through irregular monetary grants.109 
While the schools were established by migrants and for migrant children, they also 
benefited the hosts, as some of them enrolled their children. The colonial authority was not 
opposed to Muslims enrolling in mission schools as long as the parents were informed at the 
beginning that it was a mission school. Mission schools always signed an undertaking at the 
time of registration to explain to Muslim parents who wished to enrol their children that it 
was a Christian school.110 The hosts were at first opposed to their children attending the 
schools, for fear of conversion to Christianity and of losing control over the children. An 
informant, Abdullahi Ibrahim, reported that he withdrew from the Anglican School in Gimi 
because of the Christian Religious Knowledge subject they were being taught. According to 
him, only children from the ruling family in Gimi (the indigenous settlement) enrolled their 
children in the school.111 The schools existed up until the 1970s, at which point government 
primary schools were established in some of the communities. The earlier schools were not 
closed but were taken over by the government. 
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Note: n.a. = not available 
Sources: NAK ZarProf 2015; NAK KanProf 4171; NAK KanProf 6476; NAK KanProf 6575; 
KSHCB 7094, Annual Report Kano Province, 1949. 
 
The migrants also helped in the diffusion of occupational skills such as tailoring, 
barbering, photography, and bicycle repairs, and in the cultural diffusion of staple foods such 
as gari, fufu, palm oil, and fruits. The process of adoption went both ways between migrants 
and hosts. However, migrants also popularized drinking and gambling cultures, which were 
copied by some of the hosts, despite the fact that Islam prohibits such acts. As mentioned 
earlier, the migrants established hotels, beer parlours, and brothels, which provided avenues 
for promoting drinking, gambling, and prostitution in the localities. 
Many of the migrants fled in the 1960s, owing to the pogrom against the Igbo in the 
North. Although there were no attacks in the studied localities, the passing of fleeing Ibos in 
trains and the rumours circulating that mobsters were coming to attack migrants forced many 
to flee.112 Not everyone fled, however; some stayed behind, as the hosts discouraged them 
from fleeing. Malama Laraba, one of the few that stayed behind in Gimi, reported that 
“nobody was molested or attacked”. Laraba, whose husband fled during the crisis, recounted 
that “the village head of Gimi and Fagacin Makarfi appealed to her to stay, and assured her 
of her safety”.113 The departure of the migrants had negative repercussions on socio-
economic activities in the localities, as many things came to a virtual standstill. When they 
returned at the end of the war in the 1970s, they found that the vacuum their absence had 
created had been filled by the hosts. 
Over time, the export trade, which was the main magnet for migrants to the 
communities, ran into difficulties owing to the Sahelian drought and the shift in government 
priority to oil exports. Added to this was the decline of the railway. In consequence, many 
migrants relocated back to their home towns or moved to the newly developed state capitals, 
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which offered better economic opportunities. The state capitals offered the adventurous 
migrants opportunities to work either in government or in industry. J. A. Wiseman, who 
visited Gimi Tasha in the late 1970s, reported that it was “in a state of decay”.114 This also 
applied to the other settlements. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has underlined the effects of the railway on population movements, the 
emergence of new settlement patterns along the rail line, and the implications of these 
migrations for national development. The advent of the railway facilitated the movement into 
the studied communities of diverse Nigerian cultures—peoples, languages, goods, and 
ideas—and the intermingling and reciprocal influence of different ways of life. Migrant 
populations were attracted by employment opportunities in the railway and the commercial 
firms, as well as by trade. As was noted, the migrants concentrated in those centres with the 
greatest economic opportunities, which were where the firms concentrated. 
Attempts to control the migrant influx led to the establishment of segregated 
settlements for their exclusive use along the rail line. Of the several migrant settlements, 
Madobi Sabon Gari was the largest. It was established as an independent village unit, with a 
Yoruba man appointed its village head. Despite the measures taken by the colonial authority 
to isolate the migrants, inter-ethnic relations developed between the migrants and their hosts. 
It was shown that factors such as trade, language, religion, and marriage facilitated 
interactions between the two communities. In spite of the networks they established over 
years of residence, many of the newcomers did not assimilate because they saw their new 
home as temporary. A number of their children, especially those with maternal linkage in the 
host communities, became physically and culturally assimilated to the extent of holding 
important positions within mainstream Hausa society. 
As the chapter has shown, the migrants were agents of social and cultural changes. 
They established churches and schools, which though meant for their own use benefited their 
hosts. They helped in diffusing occupational skills, foods, and culture, while also adopting 
from the localities. The outbreak of the Civil War in the 1960s had a devastating effect on the 
migrants, as many of them fled during the crisis. By the time they returned at the end of the 
war, the export trade, which was the main attraction to the communities, had been taken over 
by members of the host communities. The Sahelian drought of the 1970s negatively impacted 
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agriculture, and increased revenue from oil exports also shifted government priority away 
from agricultural exports. By this time the railway was also in decline. The repercussions 
were that the communities lost their attractions, and many of the migrants relocated 
elsewhere in search of better livelihoods. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE RAILWAY AND CRIMINALITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The advent of British colonialism and its transport innovation was marked by critical 
disruptions in existing social relations of production in Northern Nigeria. Following the 
establishment of British rule, the colonial authority focused on expanding the economy, with 
the aim of promoting trade and extracting raw materials for the metropolitan industries. To 
achieve these imperial goals, the colonial authority monetized the economy and abolished the 
taxes under the Sokoto Caliphate, replacing them with new ones. In order to make people 
produce for British industries, the colonial authority introduced policies which dispossessed 
them of their right to use land and the resources therein and forced them to produce cash 
crops and minerals, which in the long run turned them into wage labourers. 
Under the Sokoto Caliphate, all land was communally held and kept in trust by the 
Emir. The British abolished the tradition by taking control of all land and allocated it to 
European commercial interests. In addition, almost from the start, the new tax regime made 
the production of raw materials and the necessity for wage labour a precondition for 
obtaining cash. In the ensuing socio-economic instability, the colonial authority also 
implemented an import policy which flooded the markets with European manufactured 
goods, with the aim of dislodging the indigenous industries. The advent of the railway, most 
especially its role in the penetration and distribution of manufactured goods into the 
hinterland, indirectly accelerated the decline of indigenous industries, in the long run forcing 
local craftsmen out of business. 
This socio-economic instability eroded the material conditions of many in the 
countryside. People reacted in different ways, including engaging in criminality. Different 
types of crime, such as theft, burglary, and highway robbery, sprang up with the 
establishment of British rule.1 The advent of the railway, with its attendant opportunities, 
bred new crimes and provided platforms for criminals to operate.2 In this regard, rural 
                                                 
1 A. Christellow, Thus Ruled Abbas: Selected Cases from the Records of the Emir of Kano Judicial Council, 
(East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 1994), and “Property and Theft in Kano at the Dawn of the 
Groundnut Boom”, International Journal of African Historical Studies, XX, (1987): 237-243; NAK 
SNP7/950/1911, Zaria Provincial Report Annual; NAK SNP7/957/1912, Zaria Province Report, Annual, 1911. 
2 NAK SNP7/950/1911; NAK SNP7/957/1912. 
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dwellers, particularly blacksmiths, reacted by stealing railway keys and sleepers from the rail 
lines. Those predisposed to banditry reacted by robbing trains. Frederick Engels asserted that 
theft is the most primitive form of protest and that it is caused by poverty.3 It is a form of 
protest and reaction to an established order, as it violates the law. 
This chapter looks at how the railway bred criminality such as iron theft from the rail 
line, provided a platform to banditry and train robbers, and the attempts by the colonial 
authority to combat these crimes. The chapter argues that the crimes were reactions to the 
socio-economic disruptions brought by the advent of colonialism and its transport innovation. 
It also argues that the prevalence of these crimes was due to the existence of large markets for 
stolen goods. 
 
6.2 Theft of railway iron 
Thefts of keys (makuli)4 and sleepers (sikwati)5 from the railway lines were some of the 
crimes which sprang up with the advent of the railway. Many blacksmiths and railway 
labourers in the studied communities made a dishonest living by stealing the iron. The crime 
flourished on the rail lines throughout the North and so was not peculiar to the studied 
communities alone. Sometimes the keys and sleepers were removed from the rail lines in a 
way that compromised the safety of oncoming trains. At times, the keys came loose from the 
tracks of their own accord and were ripe for the picking.  
The appeal of theft was high, as iron was scarce and the demand for it was high. The 
material quality of the keys (the fact that they were made from iron and not copper) and 
sleepers (made from wood or concrete) made them particularly susceptible to theft. Iron was 
required for household and agricultural implements but was scarce in the countryside. In 
order to compensate for the scarcity, blacksmiths and their associates resorted to stealing iron 
from the rail lines. The theft was widespread both on the main and the branch lines in the 
North, causing loss of revenue to the railway authority. This was an infrastructure that was 
                                                 
3 Cited from D. Crummey, “The Great Beast”, in: D. Crummey (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in 
Africa, (Portsmouth NH: Heinemann, 1986), 1-29, 3-4; W. Freund, “Theft and Social Protest Among the Tin 
Miners of Northern Nigeria”, Radical History Review, 26, (1986): 68-86; T. Falola, “Theft in Colonial 
Southwestern Nigeria”, Africa, 50/1, (1995): 1-24. 
4 “Keys” are the metal bolts or rivets that secured the track and the sleepers together. See: P. A. Rogers, “Hausa 
Blacksmiths”; R. W. Harms et al. (eds), Path Toward the Past: African Historical Essays in Honor of Jan 
Vansina, (Atlanta GA: African Studies Association Press, 1994), 371-393, 391 (endnote no. 4) . 
5 A “sleeper” is the foundation or iron on which the track is laid at a perpendicular angle (i.e. a tie or cross-tie). 
On the Nigerian railways, these sleepers were made of iron rather than concrete and wood, owing to the effects 
of the tropical environment on organic material. See: Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”, 391.  
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built for development purposes, but somehow it was appropriated in unexpected ways. 
Attempts to stem the theft through moral persuasion, policing, and prosecutions energized the 
perpetrators even more.  
Despite the sustained attention the theft elicited throughout the colonial period, it has 
attracted very little attention in the literature. Of the extant literature, only one so far has 
concentrated on the theft, though it misinterpreted the real situation in regard to iron in the 
countryside.6 The rest of the literature mentions it only in passing,7 and even the mainstream 
literature on iron-working has ignored the phenomenon.8 This theft of iron needs to be 
understood because, as the literature generally suggests, poverty and unemployment were its 
causes.9 
British colonialism dealt a fatal blow to the iron-working crafts. Right from the outset, 
the colonial authority methodically stripped the indigenous iron workers of their rights to 
prospect for tin and ore and granted the rights to European mining companies. This 
development had devastating repercussions for the rurally based mining and smelting crafts. 
The miners and smelters could neither mine nor smelt, nor even fell wood, as they had 
previously done. Under the new regime, they required a licence to mine and to fell wood, a 
licence which many of them could not afford. Many smelting sites closed down as a 
consequence.10 The colonial authority also flooded the markets with imported iron and scrap, 
which “forced” people to depend on them, in the long run dislodging the indigenous smelted 
iron. These policies had repercussions not only on rural mining and smelting, but also on the 
smithing craft, which relied on smelted iron. 
In the nineteenth century, mining, smelting, and the associated markets for fuel wood 
were rurally based. Urban smiths did not mine or smelt; they relied on rural markets for raw 
materials. At the close of the century, smelting was confined to a few centres close to raw 
materials (i.e. iron ore deposits, fuel wood, water supplies, and clay for building furnaces), 
                                                 
6 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”. 
7 Fika, Kano Civil War, 204-5; M. I. Mukthar, “The Decline and Collapse of Indigenous Iron Industries in 
Northern Nigeria C. 1903-1989”, being a Paper Presented at the Workshop on Iron Smelting and Smiting in 
Northern Nigeria, organized by the Kano State History and Culture Bureau, Kano, at Daula Hotel Banquet Hall: 
(1990), 1-17; N. Abubakar, “Traditional Iron Industry in Nigeria: Beyond the Glorification of an Indigenous 
Technology”, being a Paper Presented at Workshop on Iron Smelting and Smiting, organized by the History and 
Culture Bureau, Kano, at Daula Hotel Banquet Hall: (1990), 1-16; Jaekel, Nigerian Railway, vol. 3, 348-49; 
Ochonu, Colonial Meltdown. 
8 Jaggar, Blacksmiths of Kano. 
9 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”; Mukhtar, “Decline and Collapse”; Abubakar, “Traditional Iron Industry”. 
10 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”; Mukhtar, “Decline and Collapse”; R. A. Cline-Cole, “Political Economy, Fuel 
Wood Relations and Vegetation Conservation: Kasar Kano, Northern Nigeria, 1850-1915”, Forest and 
Conservation History, 38/2, (1994): 67-78. 
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owing to the declining raw materials which faced the industry at the time. Despite the 
declining raw materials, the smithing craft carried on in this manner until the arrival of the 
British. 
The advent of British colonial rule undermined rural mining and smelting and 
reversed the existing arrangements.11 By the 1920s, rural mining and smelting had 
disappeared in most places, though they continued to flourish in some enclaves in altered 
forms. The advent of the railway, especially its role in distributing iron and scrap, indirectly 
accelerated the decline of the indigenous mining and smelting. The iron brought by the 
railway did not circulate widely in the countryside. Although its arrival was a positive 
development, it benefited only the urban smiths, whose location on the rail line gave them 
advantaged access to new sources of iron.  
This differential access to new iron and the consequent scarcity in the countryside 
forced the miners and smelters out of business and led many of them to try out new 
livelihoods altogether. For many rural blacksmiths, this entailed a critical adjustment to their 
livelihood, and this included “forced” reliance on imported iron or scrap and stealing from 
the rail lines to compensate for the scarcity, despite the fact that the iron was not of a high  
quality as the indigenous smelted iron. As the literature generally suggests, the demand for 
European iron was as a result of “iron hunger”,12 which ruined many rural miners and 
smelters, as well as blacksmiths.  
Opinion differs on how far the European manufactured goods delivered by the 
railways competed with indigenous substitutes. Anthony Hopkins asserted that the 
penetration of European manufactured goods had different implications for the indigenous 
crafts.13 Studies on the indigenous crafts in Ilorin by Ann O’Hear indicate that the bead craft 
was obliterated, the male weaving craft declined, and the pottery craft expanded and reached 
its widest market, despite competition with imported substitutes.14 Akin Mabogunje and A. 
                                                 
11 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”; Mukhtar, “Decline and Collapse”. 
12 C. L. Goucher, “Iron is Iron Till It Is Rust: Trade and Ecology in the Decline of West Africa Iron Smelting”, 
The Journal of African History, 22/2, (1981): 179-189; L. M. Pole, “Decline or Survival? Iron Production in 
West Africa from the Seventeen to the Twentieth Century”, Journal of African History, 23/4, (1982): 503-513; 
E. W. Herbert, Iron, Gender and Power: Ritual of Transformation in African Societies, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993); Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”; Mukthar, “Decline and Collapse”; S. T. Yusuf, 
“Stealing from the Railways: Blacksmiths, Colonialism and Innovation in Northern Nigeria”, in: Jan-Bart 
Gewald, Andre Leliveld and Iva Pesa (eds), Transforming Innovations in Africa: Explorative Studies on 
Appropriation in African Societies, (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 275-296, and “The Incidences of Thefts of Railway 
Metals in Colonial Northern Nigeria”, Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 2/2.4, (2011): 1-23. 
13 Hopkins, Economic History, 244-253. 
14 O’Hear, “Craft Industries in Ilorin”. 
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Callaway also reported that the indigenous crafts in Yoruba cities declined owing to 
competition with European substitutes.15 Studies by Phillip Shea and Polly Hill indicate that 
the textile crafts declined owing to competition with European manufactured substitutes.16 
However, in their different interpretations, Peter Rogers and Phillip Jaggar argued that the 
iron-working craft was not like those other crafts because the imported hoes delivered by the 
railway could not compete with the indigenous smelted hoes, as the imports were expensive 
and of lower quality compared with the indigenous smelted ones. According to these authors, 
it was the “forced” reliance on the cheap iron and scrap which competed with the smelted 
iron and accelerated the decline of rural mining and smelting. Jaggar pointed out that 
blacksmithing expanded, but he did not recognize that rural smithing declined and that stolen 
iron from the rail lines was used as raw materials by blacksmiths.17 
Evidence from administrative, railway, and police reports, spanning the years from 
1914 through the 1950s, indicates that rural mining and smelting had declined owing to 
administrative restrictions and forced dependence on imported iron, which consequently led 
blacksmiths to steal from the rail lines to compensate for iron shortage—as a result of the 
previously mentioned differential access to the iron. A mineral survey of the Northern 
Provinces revealed that iron smelters faced competition from imported iron as early as 
1905.18 By the 1940s, the smithing craft had become marginalized in some places owing to  
differential access to the iron brought by the railway.19 The iron brought by the railway did 
not circulate widely in the countryside and was available at a higher rate. The iron dealers’ 
preference for areas not fully integrated into the colonial economy also compounded the 
scarcity. It was in reaction to this ensuing socio-economic instability that blacksmiths stole 
from the rail lines to compensate for the iron scarcity. In this regard, the theft was a reaction 
to and a protest against the totalizing conditions prevalent under British colonial rule. 
Nothing in the records suggests a link to “social banditry” or “populist redistributors” who 
robbed the railway and redistributed to blacksmiths. 
                                                 
15 A. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria, (London; University of London, 1968), 85; A. Callaway, “From 
Traditional Craft to Modern Industries”, in: P. C. Lloyd, A. L. Mabogunje and B. Awe (eds), The City of 
Ibadan: A Symposium on its Structure and Development, (London: Cambridge University, 1967), 153-171. 
16 P. J. Shea, “Economics of Scale and the Indigo Dyeing Industry of Pre-Colonial Kano”, Kano Studies, 1/2, 
(1974/1977): 55-61; Hill, Population, 96. 
17 Jaggar, Blacksmiths of Kano, 35; Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”. 
18 Cited from Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”, 376. 
19 Yusuf, “Stealing from the Railways”, 286; NAK ZarProf RLY/2, Offences on Trains and Railway Stations; E. 
J. B. Gahan, “Notes on Re-laying and Maintenance, Nigerian Railway”, Civil Engineering Problems in the 
Colonies, 16-20 June 1952, 16-20. 
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A further clarification also needs to be made concerning the iron theft and 
blacksmiths preference for stolen or imported iron: working with stolen or imported iron and 
scrap saves labour time for blacksmiths. Unlike the indigenous smelted iron, the imported 
and railway iron were soft and easier to work. It was also easier for blacksmiths to determine 
the material quality of the iron as it was already shaped and only needed to be cut into 
workable units. It was also easier for them to determine their profits than was possible with 
the indigenous smelted iron. 
Contrary to speculations that the iron theft from the rail lines began in the 1920s and 
1930s,20 the evidence indicates that it started much earlier on the Baro–Kano line and the 
Bauchi Light Railway. It started only later on the Eastern Extension because the line itself 
was not completed until the late 1920s. The first iron theft occurred around Dumbi (on the 
Lagos–Kano Line) and Rahama on the Bauchi Light Railway in Zaria Province in 1914. The 
evidence indicates that large numbers of “the keys were removed from the tracks” by force. 
At the end of the investigations, six people were convicted in connection with the theft in the 
Provincial Court and 29 in the Native Court. The theft attracted the attention of the Governor 
himself, who instructed that there be severe penalties for the culprits, and the Emir was 
instructed to watch over blacksmiths’ huts along the rail lines.21 The theft caught the railway 
and the colonial authority off guard. While the railway considered the prevention of theft on 
the railway as part of its primary responsibility of protecting life and property on railway 
formations, it did not have adequate men to police the rail lines in the North. The Railway 
Police in the North, whose duty it was to fight the scourge of theft, was, in addition to being 
in its infancy, poorly organized and inadequate.22 In effect, the railway found itself at the 
mercy of the provincial authorities, who drafted in its Native Authority Police (yandoka) to 
watch over the line. It does not appear that the development had much effect, as the 
provincial record for the following year reported a widespread key theft from the rail line and 
lamented the difficulties in apprehending the thieves. The record mentioned that 27 
convictions were made in the Native Court in 1915 and noted blacksmiths as the principal 
receivers of the iron.23 As indicated above, iron was scarce, so rural mining and smelting had 
                                                 
20 Ochonu, Colonial Meltdown; Jaekel, Nigerian Railway, vol. 3, 348. 
21 Dupigny, Gazetteer of Zaria, 34; NAK SNP10/ ZarProf 175P/ 1915, Zaria Province Report Annual 1914; 
NAK ZarProf 2561/1914, Zaria Province Annual Report for 1914; Yusuf, “Stealing from the Railways” and 
“Incidences of Thefts”. Also see Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”, 377. 
22 NAK SNP 17/15874 Railway Police Formation and Control. 
23 NAK SNP10/138P/1916, ZarProf 138P/1916, Zaria Province-Annual Report 1915; NAK ZarProf 2562/1915, 
Zaria Province Annual Report 1915. 
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declined. The wartime scarcity of iron and scrap and the differential terms of access to iron 
exacerbated the shortage and forced rural smiths to steal from the rail lines to compensate for 
the scarcity. 
One particular strand that runs through the reports is the tendency of the provincial 
authorities to implicate blacksmiths without mentioning the social background of those 
convicted. This is not to suggest that blacksmiths were not the ones stealing the iron, for, as 
the records suggest, the theft occurred during the wet season when farm implements were in 
demand. Also, where the theft was committed by outsiders, blacksmiths were always 
mentioned as receivers of the iron. Phillip Jaggar asserted that blacksmiths profited from the 
wartime scarcity by having to produce substitutes for imported products, as iron imports were 
curtailed during the war. Increased demand for these products simultaneously fuelled demand 
for iron, which was met through illicit channels.24  
Between 1917 and 1918, large numbers of keys and sleepers were stolen from the rail 
lines in Zaria Province. The theft was committed in a way that made it difficult to catch the 
culprits. As the report indicates, while one section of the line was under inspection, another 
was being robbed. At the end of the investigations, 69 convictions were secured in the 
Provincial Court.25 As usual, blacksmiths were mentioned as suspects, and the Native 
Authority Police were called to search their forges and watch over the rail lines. Most of 
those convicted in 1917 were arrested during a search of blacksmiths’ huts. The report did not 
indicate whether they were blacksmiths but did implicate railway labourers. Theft by railway 
labourers was “part of a wider livelihood strategy”.26 The most talked-about conviction in 
that year was the case of a European foreman convicted of illegally selling railway property 
and pocketing the money.27 
                                                 
24 Jaggar, Blacksmiths of Kano. 
25 NAK ZarProf 2475/1917, Zaria Province Annual Report for 1917; NAK ZarProf 163/1919, Zaria Provincial 
Annual Report 1918.  
26 R. Callebert, “Cleaning the Wharves: Pilferage, Bribery, and Social Connections on the Durban Docks in the 
1950s”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 46/1, (2012): 23-38, 32. 





Figure 6.1 Hausa Blacksmiths at work in Kano 
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Sources: Personal collections 
 
Earlier in 1916, the authority suspected that railway labourers were accomplices to the 
thefts, which led to inspection of all railway camps in the province. This, according to the 
colonial authority, would prevent thieves and criminals settling in there. Though nothing was 
found to suggest they were stealing the iron, some squatters found in the camps, who had no 
business being there, were evicted. No cases of iron theft were mentioned in the report for 
that year, and the authority attributed this positive development to its new policy of 
“collective punishment or responsibility”. By this policy, labourers of a camp where a theft 
was discovered had to pay half the cost of the stolen iron. Similarly, village heads under 
whose jurisdiction a theft occurred had to pay half the cost of the stolen iron in their domain, 
a policy which the report indicated was effective in Kano Province.28 
It should be noted that the demand for iron was high, which was the reason the theft 
continued. The villagers along the rail lines also were not cooperative, as they did not see the 
theft as crime. As one senior colonial official pointed out, a village head who knew his 
village was short of iron would not report the arrival of iron, even when he suspected it to be 
stolen from the rail lines.29 Even when they did report the arrival of iron, there was also the 
difficulty of identifying stolen iron and implements made from stolen iron, as some iron 
dealers sold scrap to blacksmiths—though scrap did not became available in commercial 
quantities in the rural areas until the 1920s. Even as it became available, there was a 
differential access to the new iron. The existence of organized ‘fences’ who received the 
stolen iron also fuelled the prevalence of theft. As the record suggests, the farther the iron 
travelled, the higher the prices it obtained. For instance, in 1917 iron keys were obtained in 
Katsina, which had no rail facility at that time, at a rate higher than their original market 
value in Zaria.30 As mentioned earlier, iron was scarce and the prices were high. There was 
also an insufficiency of manpower to police the line. The thieves were aware that the police 
were dispatched only temporarily, and they exploited this to maximum advantage. Some of 
the thieves also went to steal in districts and provinces other than their own, making it 
difficult to track them. 
                                                 
28 NAK SNOP10/97P/1917, Zaria Province Annual Report No. 69, 1916; NAK ZarProf 750/1916, Zaria 
Province Annual Report for 1916. 
29 NAK SNP17/2, 11959 Railway Ordinance 1920 Order in Council Applying. 
30 Yusuf, “Stealing from the Railways”, 287. 
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The fact that Kano has not been mentioned in connection with iron theft does not 
suggest the rail line there was theft-free, although it has been speculated that iron theft did not 
occur in Kano until the 1920s because blacksmiths there continued to receive their supplies 
from the same traditional sources that had supplied them in the nineteenth century, “at levels 
adequate to fulfil regional demand”.31 The evidence does not support this claim, however, as 
the rail line there was also plagued as in Zaria, though not on the same scale. Part of the 
reason the theft was rampant in Zaria was the existence of the two rail lines, which increased 
to four in the 1920s.32 The combined mileage of the rail lines in Zaria was more than that of 
Kano, which was one reason for the difficulty in policing the line. Though the mileage in 
Kano later increased in the 1920s, it was not comparable to that of Zaria.  
The first mention of iron theft in Kano appeared in the annual report for 1919.33 The 
report suggested the theft was common in the close-settled zone between Kano and Zaria, 
most especially around Madobi and Dangora, which led to the stationing of 41 uniformed 
policemen along this short mileage.34 Peter Rogers suggested that the areas may have 
“provided most of the market demand for any stolen iron” in Zaria.35 Part of the reason such a 
number of police were stationed along this short section of the rail line was also the 
occurrence there of train robberies (see next section in this chapter). There was no indication 
to suggest the theft had occurred for the first time. Contrary to the claim that iron was 
abundant and at a level adequate to support regional demand, iron was indeed scarce due to 
the decline of rural mining and smelting.36 Furthermore, the end of the war did not bring 
succour to blacksmiths, as scrap and iron remained scarce in the countryside and were 
available only at high prices. 
As the authority in Kano was busy policing the line, its counterpart in Zaria was also 
fighting sporadic theft of keys and sleepers in the same year (1919). This time around the 
theft was common on the Bauchi Light Railway, especially around the pagan community of 
Pitti in Lere District. The authority lamented the difficulty in tracking the thieves, as the theft 
occurred on wet nights when police were not in sight, and also some of the thieves from 
Bauchi went to steal in Zaria Province, in the same manner those in Zaria went to steal in 
                                                 
31 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”, 378. 
32 The rail lines are as follows: Lagos–Kano Line, Bauchi Light Railway, the Eastern Extension, and the Zaria–
Kaura Namoda. 
33 KSHCB 318P, Kano Province Report no. 57 for half year ending 30th June 1919. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”, 378. 
36 Rogers, “Hausa Blacksmiths”, 378. 
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Bauchi Province. The record did not indicate whether blacksmiths were involved in the theft, 
but it suggested that railway labourers were implicated.37 The accuracy of the report is also 
problematic: in one location it indicated there were seven arrests and five convictions in the 
Provincial and Native Courts. Elsewhere, it mentioned that there were four arrests and four 
convictions.38 
Despite the sustained attention the theft attracted, it did not decrease, as the theft 
assumed a disturbing proportion in the 1920s. This time around, the rail line in Kano was the 
scene of theft, as more than 63,050 keys were stolen from the rail line in Kano in just four 
years. A major report on the theft indicates that in 1921 more than 40,000 keys were removed 
from the line around Dangora alone, with an additional 15,633 from the remaining mileage of 
line. The theft was so rampant that the Railway reported it “cannot ascertain [the] daily 
losses”.39 As usual, blacksmiths were mentioned as receivers of the iron, and their huts were 
searched by police. At the end of the investigations, eight people—including a railway 
overseer, John Jengre—were convicted and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment.40 
The report blamed the theft on the scarcity of iron and the existence of an organized fencing 
or network for stolen iron. As a measure to curtail the theft, a former Resident of Kano 
advised the Railway to import iron and subsidize its distribution to blacksmiths.41 
In the same way that keys were stolen from the rail line in Kano, they were also stolen 
from the Bauchi Light Railway. Sleepers were removed from the rail line in a way that 
compromised the safety of oncoming trains. Large numbers of scrap sleepers deposited along 
the rail line were also stolen near Dutchin Wai Station. The piecemeal and uncoordinated 
manner in which the different sections of the rail lines had been constructed—with respect to 
the gauges and the type of locomotives and cars that could be moved on the lines—along 
with the expansion of the lines in the 1920s, created an accumulation of scrap which provided 
ideal opportunities for thieves. As a solution to the theft problem, the Resident proposed the 
replacement of iron keys with locked ones, emphasizing that the theft would continue as long 
as the keys were iron-made.42 Since the theft persisted, he pointed out that, it was due to iron 
shortage; and unless iron was supplied to blacksmiths at a subsidized rate, the theft would 
                                                 
37 NAK SNP10, 273P/1919, Zaria Province Report no. 74 for half year ending 30th June 1919. 
38 Ibid. 
39 NAK SNP17/2, 11959. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 NAK SNP10/105P Zaria Province Report for 15 months ended 31st March 1921. 
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continue given the high demand. His solution—that the Railway should sell scrap iron to 
blacksmiths at reduced cost—was based on the fact that, according to him, the commercial 
firms did not deal in pig iron.43 Two years later, it was the Resident at Kano that again 
complained of key theft. In the same way, Gimi and Anchau were scenes of key theft.44 
The theft generated a long correspondence between the Governor and the 
administrators of those provinces through which the rail lines passed. The correspondence 
revealed the tension and anxiety within official circles and the attempts to stem the theft. 
While the state considered the prevention of iron theft as its primary responsibility, it did not 
have adequate men to police the lines. The colonial state also amended the penal code to 
accommodate the theft. Two specific ordinances, namely the “Railway Ordinance of 1920” 
and the “Collective Punishment Ordinance” (mentioned earlier) were implemented. The 
former attempted to stem the theft of keys, sleepers, and other railway materials, while the 
latter attempted to hold labourers’ camps and village headmen responsible for the iron theft 
which took place in their domain. Native authorities with judicial responsibility were also 
established in districts where the rail line passed, and the areas where each authority was 
responsible were specified. Similarly, Native Tribunals were established in pagan-dominated 
areas for the same purpose of preventing iron theft on the rail lines and at the mines. The 
correspondence also indicates that many of the keys naturally came loose from the tracks of 
their own accord and were available to be picked up by anyone who wanted to do so. As the 
Resident of Bauchi pointed out, the very motion of the train itself was apt to loosen the keys 
and make them available to passers-by.45 
The theft was not mentioned in the reports again for some time, until the 1930s. This 
time also, it assumed a disturbing scale, spreading to areas previously unaffected by the theft. 
The economic depression and its attendant problems aggravated the situation. One such place 
where the theft occurred for the first time was Benue Province, owing to the Eastern Railway 
Extension and the Benue Bridge works. The theft was common at Makurdi, Abinsi, and 
Ogoja divisions. Attempts to replace the iron keys with copper also failed, as replacement 
could not keep pace with the theft.46 Moses Ochonu asserted that the cut in take-home pay 
                                                 
43 NAK ZarProf 2569/1922, Annual Report Zaria Province for the year 1922, cited in Rogers, “Hausa 
Blacksmiths”, 380. 
44 KSHCB SNP/9/12/1924, Kano Province Annual Report File 635. 
45 NAK SNP17/2, 11959. 
46 Ochonu, Colonial Meltdown, 82. 
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and the retrenchment exercise of the time aggravated the theft.47 Between 1930 and 1932, 
several railway labourers and retrenched employees were convicted in connection with the 
theft. Although the record does not indicate whether those convicted were blacksmiths, it 
mentioned blacksmiths as receivers of the stolen iron. As the Resident of Benue Province 
pointed out, the theft would continue as long as demand for iron was high.48 In an attempt to 
stem the theft, measures were enforced such as making blacksmiths register and report their 
iron sources or be liable to six months’ imprisonment and a ten-pound fine. The “collective 
punishment” (already enforced on the Baro–Kano, the Bauchi Light, and the Eastern 
railways) was also contemplated on the Eastern Extension.49 
Iron dealers circumvented the scarcity and higher prices by selling iron scrap at a rate 
which created opportunities for accumulation and strengthening of clientele relationships. L. 
C. Giles, in his survey of Soba, Jere, Kudan, and Ikara districts in the late 1930s, reported that 
scrap iron was available in the countryside at a higher price, and blacksmiths were obtaining 
it on credit. Those who could not afford the price or had been refused credit borrowed from 
their wives or joined together with others to buy the iron.50 A colonial official touring north-
eastern Zaria in the mid-1930s found that blacksmiths in remote areas were holding farmers 
to ransom by extorting corn and loans from them to buy iron. When farmers denied them a 
loan, they would delay repairs to farming tools.51 The records generally suggest that much of 
the blacksmiths’ income was derived from repairs and maintenance of farm implements.52 
The conditions of scarcity which prevailed in the 1940s also aggravated the scale of 
thefts. During World War II, iron and hardware imports were restricted, which led to an acute 
scarcity. Wartime import restrictions benefited blacksmiths, as the colonial authority 
encouraged local imitation of imported goods, a policy which could have assisted local 
industries had it been fully pursued. As Phillip Jaggar asserted, blacksmiths profited from the 
wartime scarcity by manufacturing imitations of imported goods, which led to the emergence 
of an import-replacing craft within the smiting craft at the end of the war.53 The evidence 
indicates that the scarcity of iron forced smiths to steal from the rail lines to satisfy internal 
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demand. Iron smelting also enjoyed a temporary revival in some places owing to the wartime 
scarcity.54 Increased demand for iron products simultaneously fuelled the demand for iron, 
which was satisfied through the illicit channels. The Eastern Railway was most affected by 
the theft, and keys were stolen from the rail line in large quantities. A special police force 
was raised at an annual cost of £6,000 to prevent the theft. This was in addition to the huge 
sums of money the Railway spent in replacing stolen keys.55 
As the report also suggests, the steel and cast iron keys required for replacement on 
the tracks could not be procured owing to the wartime restrictions. Attempts to replace the 
iron sleepers and keys with wooden ones also failed, for reasons of economics and quality. 
For instance, timber sleepers had a shorter lifespan than iron sleepers. As J. B. Gahan pointed 
out, timber sleepers have a life span of only seven years on bridges and points, as well as on 
crossing works, while steel sleepers have a life span of forty years on the main and branch 
lines, especially in dry climates like that of Northern Nigeria. The timber species that were 
available in the North—Khaya grandifoliola and Khaya senegalensis (dry-zone 
mahoganies)—were unsuitable for the rail line. An added advantage of the steel sleeper was 
that its scrap could be sold, while the timber could not.56 
The end of the war did not bring an end to the theft, as imported iron was still scarce 
and was available only at high prices. Some rural smiths had already gone out of business 
owing to the scarcity. For instance, in 1945, smiths in southern Zaria complained that they 
could not work because they had no iron to work with.57 A police officer also reported that 
iron was scarce and was available only at high prices.58 In a study on the Hausa communities 
in Zaria, M. G. Smith reported that the iron dealers made enormous profits at the expense of 
the blacksmiths. In 1949–1950, for example, iron dealers imported scrap sleepers from Lagos 
at 10s each, paying 1s each for transporting them by rail and 1s each by donkey, and then 
sold them at 18s each.59 Many blacksmiths could not afford the high price and had to rely on 
illicit channels. The Resident of Zaria Province reported that hoes and knives were scarce and 
proposed the distribution of railway scrap to smiths to prevent its being stolen.60 
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As the record indicates, the theft continued unabated from 1946 through into the 
1950s, as keys, sleepers, fish plates, and even spikes (which required skill to remove), in 
addition to level-crossing boards and scrap were stolen from the rail line between Kano and 
Zaria and from the branch lines (see Appendix 2: Table 6.1). During this period (1946–
1950s), the Kano–Nguru line was a major scene of the thefts, where it occurred almost on a 
monthly basis. As soon as the keys were replaced on a section of the line, they were stolen 
again and it was difficult to catch the thieves. The thieves were aware of the lack of sufficient 
manpower to police the line. Blacksmiths huts along the lines were searched, but it was 
difficult to make arrests, due to the lack of evidence. However, both blacksmiths and railway 
labourers were implicated. For instance, a blacksmith was arrested, but was released by the 
Emir, with a warning to him to desist from the act. It is unclear whether the plan to invite the 
special police from the Eastern Railway to patrol the Eastern Extension was implemented.61 
In view of the widespread theft, the idea of distributing scrap iron, which the various 
provincial administrators had proposed, began to gain currency in the 1950s, and the Railway 
began to distribute its surplus scrap to blacksmiths. Although the scrap iron distribution had 
started in the 1940s, the largest distributions occurred in 1954–1955 (see Appendix 3: Table 
6.2).62 Distribution was based on expressed demand and availability. The railway also played 
an important role in distributing the scrap, while the Native Authority coordinated its 
distribution. As with the iron imports, the scrap was offloaded mainly at the urban terminals 
such as Kano and Zaria, whence appointed iron dealers and blacksmiths distributed it to 
various centres of demand. As the table shows, none of the studied communities are 
mentioned as recipients of the iron. It would be interesting to know the immediate impact of 
the scrap distribution; unfortunately, there is no information available on this. It is unclear 
what direction the theft took in the post-independence era, as detailed evidence is not 
available for the period. Inferences from the scattered records, however, suggest the theft 
continued through the 1970s. 
From the discussion so far, it is obvious that British colonialism in Northern Nigeria 
was accompanied by critical disruption for iron workers. The advent of the railway, 
especially its distributive role in iron and scrap transport, indirectly accelerated the decline of 
rural mining and smelting. It has been shown that the material quality of the rail lines offered 
opportunities to blacksmiths and railway labourers to further their livelihoods. Theft by 
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blacksmiths was a reaction to iron scarcity and the decline in their living standards. The iron 
delivered by the railway did not circulate widely in the countryside, as it was confined to the 
urban markets, forcing rural smiths to steal from the line to compensate for the scarcity. 
As noted above, both blacksmiths and railway labourers stole from the line. When the 
iron was stolen by outsiders, it was to the advantage of the blacksmiths. Iron was scarce and 
the demand for stolen iron was high. The colonial state was taken unawares by the theft and 
tried then to prevent it; they were unable to do so, however, owing to insufficient manpower 
to police the line. The thieves were aware of this inadequacy and exploited it to their 
advantage. Attempts to combat the menace by modifying the penal code also failed, as the 
Railway was eventually forced to distribute its surplus scrap iron to blacksmiths. The theft 
continued through the post-colonial period, by which time blacksmithing had become 
marginalized in most places. Those who maintained the craft had to rely on a variety of scrap, 
such as motor parts, buckets, and tins, to continue working. 
 
6.3 Train banditry 
Train banditry or robbery was another form of criminality which sprang up with the opening 
of the railway to traffic. These were not heroic bandits who robbed the rich to redistribute to 
the poor, as in the Western legend of Robin Hood and his Merry Men; rather, they were 
“professional criminals or men of the underworld”, for whom criminality was a means of 
livelihood rather than of defiance.63 
Scholars have asserted that banditry thrives in societies undergoing transformation by 
capitalism.64 Ralph Austen suggested that it “arises in a situation where [the state] has control 
over legitimate violence and the rules for market transactions”.65 It often flourishes in 
marginal areas where the state has limited control, just like the illegal oil bunkers in the Niger 
Delta today. As with iron theft, banditry on the rail line was a reaction to the socio-economic 
transformations under colonialism. This is not to suggest it was colonial in origin—the 
practice is much more ancient—but it became common with the advent of the railway 
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because the railway provided bandits with a platform to operate, as the literature generally 
suggests.66 
Right from the opening of the railway there were train bandits—yan mirgine or yan 
ture, as they were popularly called (from the way they threw or rolled down their loot from 
the trains). These bandits plagued the railway the same way as the iron thieves. The bandits 
were from the communities along the rail line, even though the inhabitants claimed they came 
from elsewhere. These bandits neither stole iron nor robbed passengers; they robbed the 
freight trains (in spite of Austen’s claim that Africans were incapable of attacking railways).67 
Like highway robbers, they worked both in groups and individually. Toyin Falola asserted 
that the most organized robbery is always by a gang.68 The bandits did not rob using horses as 
their counterparts did in the Western world; instead, they jumped onto a moving train, 
offloaded the contents from the freight wagons to their fellow gang members standing by the 
track near their villages, and then jumped off as quickly as possible when they had finished 
their exploits.69 This form of crime, though common in the Western world, was novel by 
local Nigerian standards.70 The train transported valuable consignments, including cash, 
which provided opportunities to criminals. The freight, and particularly the groundnuts 
wagon, was their target. The crime occurred mostly between Kano and Zaria, especially 
between the Kano Middle School (now Rumfa College) and Dangora. The crime was fuelled 
by the existence of large markets for the stolen goods. As with the iron theft, banditry took 
the colonial state and the Railway unawares, and their efforts to stem it proved ineffective. 
Despite the sustained attention it attracted throughout the colonial period, train banditry has 
not received attention in the literature. The only work that commented on it did so in 
passing.71 This section is an attempt to fill in the gap. 
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Contrary to the assertion that banditry on the Nigerian railroads began in the 1940s,72 
the evidence indicates that it started much earlier than that, especially on the rail line between 
Kano and Zaria—and particularly between Kano and Dangora. Complaints about theft and 
loss of goods in transit by Kano traders date back to the very first year the line was opened to 
traffic.73 Compensation should have been paid, but the Railway rarely did so. As the 
incidence of robberies increased, the Railway considered the prevention of theft in transit part 
of its primary goal in maintaining law and order on the rail line. However, as indicated above, 
its police were numerically inadequate and poorly organized. The Railway therefore found 
itself at the mercy of the provincial authorities where the line passed, and these authorities 
drafted their Native Authority Police to crime scenes whenever there was a robbery.74 The 
Native Authority Police were also not fully adequate and so were not always successful in 
suppressing the crime. The bandits, as usual, were aware of this inadequacy and exploited it 
to their advantage. 
What the Kano authority initially reported as minor crime was to become epidemic on 
the rail line between Kano and Lagos the following year. About 79 cases involving freight 
robbery and petty theft in transit were discovered. Of these, seven were discovered in Zaria, 
and two each at Baro, Minna, and Jebba. A train was also robbed to the tune of £100 at 
Kaduna. The remaining robberies occurred in transit between Kano and Iddo.75 As a result of 
the huge compensations to be paid, the incidences attracted the attention of the General 
Manager of the Railway. Although the Railway rarely paid compensation, the General 
Manager pointed out that compensation was paid where railway employees were implicated. 
And many railway workers were implicated in connection with the robberies. The report also 
revealed the existence of organized fencing for the stolen goods, as railway watchmen and 
their wives were caught with stolen goods at Baro.76 This illicit channel, not always 
recognized by the authority, fuelled the demand for stolen goods. Informants reported that 
stolen groundnuts from the train were usually sold to the Lebanese firms.77 
In order to stem the robbery and other forms of theft in transit, it was proposed that 
railway stations should be fenced on the assumption that their openness provided easy access 
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to criminals. It was also proposed that locked wagons be introduced in place of the open 
wagons that were being used. A further idea was to establish a special Railway Police to 
combat robbery on the rail line in the North, just as there was in the South. The proposals 
would have gone a long way to curb the crime had they been implemented, but they were not 
because the Railway was not ready to fund such projects. As usual, it continued to rely on the 
Native Authority Police. While the authorities in Kano and Zaria wanted to fight the crime, 
they disagreed on the extent to which they should shoulder the financial responsibility for 
police posted outside their provinces.78 Between 1917 and 1918, no less than 41 uniformed 
men were stationed on the line between Kano and Zaria, especially around Madobi and 
Dangora. The police did well in stemming the crime, as robbery and transit-related crimes 
were henceforth not mentioned in the records for some years. The records attributed this 
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Figure 6.2 Open groundnut wagons 
Source: The Nigerian Nostalgia 1960–1980 Project  
 
Figure  6.3 Lock-up wagons introduced in the 1940s 








Notwithstanding the impression in the provincial records that the crime had been 
reduced, evidence from the Railway annual reports suggests it picked up again. 
Approximately 58 cases of merchandise robbery were tried before the courts in 1923, 
resulting in 51 convictions and seven acquittals.80 Since the Railway did not have sufficient 
men to watch the line, it continued to rely on the Native Authority Police. As the surveillance 
on the rail line was tight, the bandits switched the scene of their operations to the stations. 
Several freight trains were plundered at Madobi Station in 1924.81 Official response began to 
focus on the rail line and the stations. The police apparently did well in suppressing the 
crime, as the records thereafter were silent on robbery for many years. 
In 1938, a famous train robbery occurred at Gimi, where a downward or local train 
from Zaria was robbed at exactly 2 a.m.. Although the DO gave the impression that it was a 
minor robbery, events of the subsequent months gave the lie to his comments. The report on 
the robbery suggested that it was organized and committed by a gang comprising criminals 
from Gimi Tasha, Mayere, Gubuci, and Karaye in Kano Province. Gimi Tasha was raided 
and searched for criminals, and the unemployed residing there were asked to leave. Although 
the record did not indicate whether the train was a freight or passenger train and whether the 
bandits were arrested or not, the measures adopted by the police indicate that the crime was 
not an insignificant one. 
Vigilante or tough people (yan tauri) from Kudan and Hunkuyi were invited to police 
the Tasha, in addition to those stationed on the rail line. Kudan, as the report indicated, had a 
reputation as a tough town where women arrested thieves and no thief dared to rob the 
town.82 Toyin Falola has argued that thieves were always afraid of vigilantes, because of their 
magical power and capacity to humiliate their victims.83 Curfew was imposed at Gimi Tasha, 
and the Native Authority promised a reward for every thief caught.84 The other towns were 
also watched. The report also implicated some traditional rulers for giving assistance to the 
thieves. The plan to seek the assistance of the District Head of Karaye was suspended, as it 
was alleged that he had co-operated with the criminals.85 The police action seems to have 
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succeeded in stemming train robbery, as the records do not mention the crime again for some 
years. 
The resurgence of the crime in the 1950s attracted sustained attention from the Native 
Authority Police. Two well-known robberies occurred in the studied communities between 
1950 and 1951. A major police report on the robbery, compiled by one Yusuf Lafiagi, 
provided detailed information on the location, the time, and how the robbery occurred. The 
report indicated that train banditry was prevalent between Kano and Dangora, especially 
around Sheka Mai Daki and Jaen. It also suggested the existence of organized fencing, along 
with the connivance of the inhabitants of the communities along the line. 
In the first instance, the report indicated that two southbound groundnut trains 
(numbered 28 Dtg and 86 Dtg) were always robbed at night between Kano and Challawa, 
despite being escorted by the Railway Police. As the report recorded, the bandits were from 
the following communities: “starting from Kano—opposite Kano Middle school, Sheka, 
Jaen, Fanshekara, Yandutse near Challawa, one mile after Challawa, two miles after 
K[wa]nkw[a]so opposite Gora, Madobi, Yako and Dangora Kashama”. Whenever the trains 
approached near these areas, the bandits jumped onto the train and unloaded the contents to 
their members on reaching their villages. As the report specified, between 50 and 70 people 
always stood by the track to collect the loot from the train. The villagers, it reported, did not 
see the robbery as a crime. Also, the village heads were aware of the robberies but failed to 
take any action.86 At the end of the investigation, approximately 30 people, including the sons 
of the village heads of Sheka and Jaen, were prosecuted in 1951.87 
The second robbery occurred in 1951 around Sheka, where a southbound groundnuts 
train (numbered 1289) was robbed of more than 45 bags. By the time the train stopped, only 
five bags were recovered by the Railway Police. There was even a fight between the police 
and the members of the gang (numbering about 70) before the five bags were recovered. The 
Chief Commissioner of Police himself was aboard the train when the incident happened. At 
the end of the investigation, a number of people were prosecuted.88 
As the report repeatedly indicated, the bandits had become so brazen that the presence 
of uniformed men did not discourage them. The police too were hampered because, besides 
their numerical insufficiency, they could not stop a moving train without permission. Before 
the train could stop, the bandits had jumped off and run to their villages, while the other 
                                                 





members moved and stashed the loot. It is clear that the villagers themselves encouraged the 
robbery, as they did not see it as crime. The report also suggested the existence of large 
markets for the stolen groundnuts.89 
Although data are not available on the incidence of train banditry in the post-colonial 
period, inferences from several records suggest that it continued through the 1970s, until the 
introduction of public execution for armed robbery helped to suppress it.90 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown how British colonialism was marked by critical 
disruptions in the social and economic relations of production in Northern Nigeria. The 
stealing of iron from the rail line and train robbery were reactions to poverty and the uneven 
socio-economic transformations engendered by the British. British colonialism and its 
transport infrastructure, even though indirectly, fuelled socio-economic dislocations and 
poverty. People reacted to the erosion of their material conditions by stealing keys and 
sleepers from the rail lines and robbing trains. The penetration of the iron delivered by the 
railway accelerated the decline of rural mining and smelting. The confinement of the 
imported iron to the urban markets forced rural blacksmiths to steal from the rail lines to 
compensate for the iron shortage. The material quality of the rail lines (the fact of their being 
made from iron) and the valuable consignments transported by the trains provided 
opportunities to criminals. 
As the chapter has also shown, both the iron theft and train robberies took the colonial 
state unawares. While the Railway and the colonial state tried to stem the crimes, they were 
unable to do so because of the insufficiency of men to police the rail lines. The criminals 
were aware of the inadequacy and exploited it to their advantage. Although convictions were 
secured in many cases, this did not prevent the crimes. Amendments to the penal code in the 
case of iron theft also did little to stem the crime. The traditional institutions, whose duty it 
was to assist in fighting the crimes, also looked the other way when the crimes were being 
perpetrated. The Railway was forced to make concessions in the case of iron theft, by 
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distributing its surplus scrap to blacksmiths, but this did not prevent the theft, and both crimes 
continued through the post-colonial period, though on a reduced scale. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarizes the major findings of the study. The study set out to explore the 
social and cultural effects of the railway on the rural communities between Kano and Zaria, 
from 1908 to the 1970s. It began with the following questions: Why was the railway built? 
How was it built? How did the communities perceive, appropriate, and domesticate the 
railway? What socio-economic effects did the railway have? What were its effects on 
indigenous crafts? To what extent did it influence the communities’ expansion? 
As the study has argued, the railway had huge effects, much more extensive than were 
previously recognized. The railway made a strong impression on its first arrival, and some of 
its effects differed markedly from what the planners had anticipated. The effects also differed 
between the studied communities. Drawing from oral interviews, new tools of historical 
analysis such as poems, songs, and travelogues, as well as old and new archival records 
which were rarely accessed previously, the study teased out the lived experience of railway 
development in the studied communities. Through these tools, we were able to open new 
vistas on how people encountered and reacted to the experience of railway development and 
how they used it and the challenges that arose from the development, and on how the colonial 
state attempted to manage the situation. 
As the study indicates in Chapter 2, the proposal for the railway was imperialist-
motivated, with the aim to transport cotton from the North. The railway was originally 
conceived as a separate line to rival the Lagos Government Railway. The very notion of the 
railway almost from the start provoked controversy and rivalry among other provincial 
administrators, who perceived it as a rival railway. Contrary to the claim by Tamuno, 
Anjorin, and Carland that the controversy was a result of the lack of a transport policy to 
guide the administrators, the chapter argued that the lack of a transport policy was merely a 
contributing factor. This is so because railway development is always controversial; it is 
always a political and economic endeavour, due to the initial investment and the expected 
returns on investment as well as the issue of control. The controversy dragged on for some 
years, partly because of lack of funds and insufficient knowledge about the region, and partly 
because the British were not yet ready for a second railway, as the Lagos Railway has not yet 
paid its way. Furthermore, the Northern Authority, which wanted the railway, could not 
afford to build the line, being as it was poor and barely surviving on grants in aid. Contrary to 
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the claim that the Northern Authority opted for a tramway because the railway proposal was 
rejected, it was shown that the proposal for a tramway was mooted at almost the same time as 
one for a railway, but for different motives. 
By the time the railway was finally approved, it was sanctioned as a branch line of the 
Lagos Railway—and not as a separate or independent line as the promoter had proposed. As 
was shown, the line was sanctioned as a pioneer line to open up the Northern Territories to 
the sea. The principle of the pioneer railway was to build a cheap railway that would be 
developed to a higher standard when traffic developed. The line was constructed by both free 
and forced labour, comprising peasants and slaves as well as prisoners. As the chapter 
argued, the massive labour recruitment and railway construction provoked mixed reactions of 
fear and awe, contrary to what writers previously assumed, because people did not 
understand what the railway was all about. The singular efforts of the Emir of Zazzau, Aliyu 
Dansidi, were important in managing the situation. The reactions were temporary, however, 
for as people discovered the benefits of steady wages from working on the rail line, they 
quickly offered their labour. The local authority also played a prominent role in ensuring that 
labour and food requirements were met without the work having to suffer. Contrary to the 
claim by Oyamakinde that labourers from the South were not employed on the line and that 
the Northern Authority preferred to delay the work rather than allow southerners do it, this 
study found that southerners were employed on the line, even if on a small scale. As the study 
indicates, the construction of the railway was instrumental in the establishment of Dangora, 
one of the studied communities. 
Chapter 3 recounted how initial encounters with the new transport infrastructure 
produced mixed reactions of fear and awe owing to people’s unfamiliarity with such 
technology. Contrary to the general impression that Nigerians appropriated the new transport 
system almost immediately after it was opened, it was demonstrated that many people did not 
understood what the railway was all about, much less appropriate it. This was so because 
mixed reactions are common responses to new technology; but these reactions were only 
temporary, for as familiarity with the steam engine increased and people understood its 
benefits, they quickly appropriated and integrated it into their daily lives. Nigerian initiatives 
also played an important role in the domestication of the railway. Although the system was 
not built for their benefit, Nigerians somehow discovered ways to use it to benefit themselves 
and transform their lives.  
The colonial authority also educated people on how to intensively use the system to 
advantage. As was shown in the chapter, the railway had dramatic effects on travel time, 
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distance and population movement, and rural–urban and rural–rural interactions, as well as on 
local and regional trade, which in the long run contributed new meanings and modes of 
relationship to people’s lives. 
Chapter 4 argued that the railway activated more cash crop exports from the 
communities than was previously possible. Despite the official belief and hope that the 
railway would stimulate cotton exports, cotton was largely a failure as far as exports were 
concerned. Contrary to the claim by Hogendorn and Okediji that cotton was exported from 
the communities bordering Zaria almost immediately the line was opened, it was shown that 
cotton export from the communities was anything but a marked success. Instead, groundnuts, 
which had not attracted official attention, became the most important export crop from the 
communities immediately after the line was opened. The reason, as was shown, was that 
groundnuts fetched better prices than cotton. Unlike cotton, groundnuts could be grown 
without imperilling local food production, and the goal of farmers was to maintain food 
sufficiency first. Groundnut production and trade also offered employment opportunities to 
many people, unlike cotton and hides and skins. 
The transition to export production was gradual, and it began at the initiative of Hausa 
traders, a fact overlooked by the vent for surplus theory. Increased expansion was achieved 
by a combination of household, slave, free, and forced labour. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, 
the activities of the commercial firms stimulated production. Although the firms were not 
physically established in the communities until the 1920s, they relied on the Hausa and 
southerners to purchase cotton, groundnuts, and hides and skins as well as food crops. These 
firms confined their activities to the more important centres such as Madobi, Gimi, and 
Dangora, a fact which contributed to the towns’ expansion and popularity. The firms were 
most concentrated at Madobi, which made it not only the most important railway town south-
west of Kano City but also between Kano and Zaria. Centres such as Likoro, Challawa, and 
Kwankwaso, which did not have trading firms, gradually declined in importance. 
In addition to the export products, the railway also stimulated production and trade in 
sugar cane. Unlike cotton, groundnuts, and hides and skins, it was grown mainly for internal 
consumption, for chewing and for making brown sugar. The sugar cane trade expanded and 
reached its widest market owing to the railway. Unlike the other crops, it was grown mainly 
in Makarfi District because of the favourable conditions there. As the chapter demonstrated, 
the sugar cane trade unexpectedly stimulated the brown sugar trade. Brown sugar technology 
was originally introduced by missionaries for their Christian converts; but having discovered 
its benefits, people quickly embraced it to transform their lives. The sugar cane and brown 
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sugar trade expanded in the 1920s, reached its peak in the 1940s, and began to decline in the 
1950s. 
Contrary to the proponents of the vent for surplus theory that the expansion of cash 
crops was achieved without a decline in subsistence production, Chapter 4 showed that cash 
cropping did in fact reduce food production, rendering the rural producers vulnerable to 
hunger. The popular assumption among scholars that the communities were self-sufficient in 
food to the extent of feeding the urban populations is misleading, as most communities were 
not sufficient in food, never mind being capable of feeding the cities. Although farmers 
always produced enough to sustain household requirements, this was insufficient. This was 
because production was largely household- and not plantation-based—even though the 
aristocrat and merchant classes made use of slaves and forced labour— production under 
such conditions inevitably led to a decline in food production. In addition, the tendency 
across the communities, including those deficient in food, was to sell their surplus at the 
slightest price increase. The situation was so bad that whenever natural calamities struck, the 
communities became vulnerable to hunger and starvation. 
As the chapter showed, the railway stimulated production in areas far removed from 
the rail line, but it could not intensively exploit these markets. This was circumvented by 
professional animal transporters, who used the situation to their advantage. The colonial 
authority made efforts to stimulate production in such areas by building roads to feed the rail 
line with traffic; however, they were careful to ensure the roads did not compete with the 
railway itself. In the 1940s, when the marketing boards were established, they also invested 
in road development to stimulate production in such far-flung areas. The railway authority 
also operated a motor service to feed the railway with traffic. The roads become more 
important in the 1970s, when road transport became popular. The effect of the roads on 
agriculture and the communities deserves more systematic attention than it has received 
hitherto. 
As Chapter 5 demonstrated, the railway led to the emergence of new settlements and 
an intermingling of cultures along the rail line. The chapter argued that it was the socio-
economic opportunities engendered by the railway and the commercial firms that attracted 
migrants, which in turn led to the establishment of new settlements as melting pots of cultural 
interaction. The colonial authority established these settlements to control and segregate 
migrants politically, economically, and medically. The influx of migrants came via the 
railway, people having heard about the opportunities in the studied communities through 
social networks. These migrants came with their own cultural capital, which made them 
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relevant in their new environment. The migrants concentrated at those centres with the 
greatest economic opportunities, such as Madobi, Gimi, Yako, Auchan, and Dangora (a 
colonial creation), thereby contributing to the expansion of these towns. Owing to the 
concentration of migrants at Madobi, the migrant settlement there was upgraded to a village 
unit called Sabon Gari (new town) and was administered independently of the indigenous 
community.  
Despite the attempts to isolate the migrants from their hosts, social relations such as 
trade, language, marriage, and religion brought the two groups together, which facilitated 
national integration. The migrants, as the study showed, were agents of change, though the 
relationship between the two groups was symbiotic. When the Civil War broke out in the 
1960s, many of these migrants fled. By the time they returned at the end of the war, the 
former attractions of export trade and the railway were in decline, leading to migrants’ 
relocating elsewhere in search of new opportunities. 
Chapter 6 discussed how the railway bred criminality and offered a platform to 
criminals to operate. The chapter argued that various types of criminality were actually forms 
of protest and reaction to poverty and the uneven socio-economic transformations engendered 
by British colonialism. British colonial policies undermined rural mining and smelting, while 
the railway—and most particularly its distribution of imported iron and scrap—indirectly 
accelerated the eventual decline of these occupations, forcing many into criminality such as 
iron theft from the rail line and train robbery. Contrary to the claim by Jaggar and Rogers that 
iron was abundant and that smithing expanded in the countryside, the chapter demonstrated 
that mining, smelting, and smithing declined. Iron was scarce in the countryside and was 
available only at high prices. The iron delivered by the railway also did not circulate widely; 
it was confined to urban centres, which forced rural smiths to steal from the rail line to 
compensate for the scarcity. 
The chapter also showed that the iron theft and train robbery were fuelled by the 
existence of a demand for, and an organized fencing of, stolen goods. The rise of the crimes 
took the Railway and the colonial state unawares. Their attempts to stem the crime rate failed, 
as neither had enough men to police the line. The thieves were aware of this insufficient 
manpower and exploited it to their own advantage. Amendments to the penal code in the case 
of iron theft also did not stem the incidence of the crime. Inhabitants of those communities 
where the lines passed encouraged the crime, as they did not see it as something bad and 
often participated in the activity or turned a blind eye to what was occurring. The Railway 
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authority was eventually forced to placate the smiths by distributing its surplus scrap to them, 
a policy which, as was pointed out, still did not prevent the incidence of theft.  
 
This study has attempted to write the story of the experience of railway development 
in the rural communities between Kano and Zaria. It is the first systematic discussion of the 
interrelationship between these communities and the railway, though some of the 
communities have previously elicited comments in the literature. It is hoped that the study 
has provided insights that will stimulate further discussion on some of the issues raised. If 





As from the end of the 1970s, which was the terminal date for the issues covered in this 
study, the railway was in decline. It emerged from the Civil War in a critical condition and 
carried on in that manner until its eventual collapse in the 1990s. Despite several attempts to 
resuscitate the system,1 its fortunes, freight, passenger traffic, and rolling stock further 
declined, its position increasingly challenged by road transport. Passenger and freight 
services did not stop abruptly, however, and they continued at a reduced level until the 
stations were eventually closed down. These closures were to affect passengers, freight 
services, local trade, and livelihoods.  
The increased importance of the Kano–Zaria road diverted traffic from the rail line to 
the road. The road did not pass through the studied areas but instead followed a new route 
previously isolated from the rail line. Unlike the railway, road transport is much more flexible 
and has entered the remotest areas.2 New centres have emerged and expanded along the road, 
while centres on the rail lines have declined in importance.3 In a similar manner, agricultural 
production and exports across the communities also declined. The increased wealth from oil 
exports was marked by neglect of agriculture and the disappearance of cash crops from the 
export list, leading to the collapse of food production in the 1980s. A condition of near 
famine developed in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s, and the government had to import food 
to keep the nation alive. Many rural dwellers, in search of better economic opportunities, 
moved out of rural areas to the cities, thereby compounding the crisis in agriculture. 
At present, the communities are mere ghosts of their former selves. At the time of the 
field work for this study in 2010 and 2011, the stations were locked up and most of their 
                                                 
1 For instance, between 1978 and 1999, no less than three different reforms of the Nigerian Railway Cooperation 
have attempted to resuscitate the system. From 1978 to 1982, Indians were contracted to rehabilitate and turn 
around the system. This was followed by its management under a sole administratorship under Samuel 
Ogbemudia in 1989–1992. From 1995 to 1999, the Chinese were contracted to resuscitate the system. For 
details see J. A. Odeleye, “Politics of Rail Transport Development in Developing Countries: Case of Nigeria”, 
Journal of Civil Engineering and Architecture, 6/12, (2012): 1695-1702; J. A. Odeleye, “Public-Private 
Participation to Rescue Railway Development in Nigeria”, Japan Railway and Transport Review, 23 March 
2000, 42-49; A. Adesanya, “Bringing the Nigerian Railway Back on Track: Challenges and Options”, being a 
Paper Presented at Monthly NISER Seminar Series, Held at the NISER Conference Room on 13 November 
2010, 
2 O. O. Oladipo, ‘The Nigerian Motor Transporters since the 1920s”, International Journal of Humanities and 
Social Science, 2/12, (2012): 230-237. 
3 Dottridge, “Aspects”, 25-6.  
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workers had been sent on forced retirement, as was the case of workers on the rail system 
generally. The only visible evidence that suggested the communities had once been bustling 
centres were the rail tracks, now covered with grass, the rundown stations, the dilapidated 
stores of the commercial firms, and the migrant quarters which stand independent of the 
indigenous communities. There is little indication of a government presence in these 
communities, except in the case of Madobi, which became the headquarters of a local council 
in the 1990s. It also housed a government radio agency and a private fertilizer company at the 
beginning of this century. Besides the government educational institutions in the other 
communities, they have all been neglected by government. 
When the Kaduna State Government inaugurated the state’s Railway Mass Transit 
Service in 2008 as part of its urban transport scheme, Likoro, Gimi, and Auchan were served 
by the railway once again. The scheme was a joint initiative between the state government 
and the Nigerian Railway Corporation. Despite the many challenges which beset the system, 
it proved invaluable in re-stimulating activities in the communities, at least as far as 
transportation of people and goods was concerned. The project was terminated in 2013, 
following the recommencement of operations by the new Nigerian Railway, funded and built 
by the Chinese. The project is ongoing and is expected to be completed in 2021. At present, 
the train stops only at Madobi and Kwankwaso, but there is a renewed optimism that, when 








Appendix 1: Freight traffic at the stations 
 
Sources: The data  for the following tables were compiled from the Railway Department 
Annual Reports for the periods covered in the tables. 
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Table 3.2 Beans freight, 1916–1919 
Station 
1916 1917 1918 1919 
Outward Outward Outward Outward 
 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
G/Dabosa 1 0 0 11 11 £32.8s.6d. 0 10 3s. 2 7 £7.9s.1d. 
Anchau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1s.4d. 0 0 1s. 
Faiki 2 0 £5 0 15 £1.1s.4d. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dangora 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8s.3d. 2 5 £7.16s. 
Madobi 1 0 £2 6 13 £20.4s.5d. 19 3 £40.5s.1d. 14 15 £18.1s.2d. 
Challawa 28 0 £99 527 18 £1636.3s.7d. 110 17 £352.8s.5d. 324 14 £1104.1s.8d. 
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Table 3.3 Guinea corn freight, 1916–1919 
 
Station 
1916 1918 1919 
Outward Outward Outward 
 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Likoro 0 0 0 0 4 5s.2d. 0 0 0 
G/Dabosa 6 1 £4.9s. 3 6 18s.5d. 27 5 £3.42s.5d. 
Anchau 4 16 £2.9s.4d. 1 2 £1.6s. 1 2 11s.0d. 
Faiki 1 11 £1.16s.9d. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dangora 0 0 0 2 14 £4.2s.2d. 1 2 6s.8d. 
Madobi 5 19 £11.7s.2d. 0 3 1s. 27 6 £22.6s.8d. 





Table 3.4 Locus bean freight, 1916–1923 
 
Station 
1916 1917 1918 1919 1923 
Outward Outward Outward Outward Outward 
 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Likoro 0 1 1s. 0 1 1s. 0 10 18s.1d. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G/Dabosa 0 0 0 70 19 £109.8s.11d. 43 15 £104.11s.9d. 36 12 £18.11s.7d. 0 0 0 
Anchau 0 0 0 3 7 £6.7s.9d. 3 16 £12.7s.7d. 0 10 15s.11d. 0 0 0 
Faiki 1 0 £2 23 2 £50.16s.3d. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dangora 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 12 £62.1s.4d. 61 6 £152.12s.9d. 0 0 0 
Madobi 1 0 £4 23 17 £64.4s.10d. 29 15 £85.19s.3d. 59 1 £173.7d. 0 0 0 






Table 3.5 Pepper freight, 1916–1919 
Station 1916 1917 1918 1919 
 Outward Outward Outward Outward 
 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
G/Dabosa 1 0 £1 1 5 £1.4s.7d. 0 2 4s.7d. 1 0 £1.1s.2d. 
Anchau 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 £1.3s. 1 2 £1.1s.2d. 
Faiki 0 0 0 0 2 18s.5d. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dangora 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 19s.9d. 6 12 £12.17s.5d. 
Madobi 0 0 0 0 2 3s.6d. 0 1 3s.6d. 2 1 £6.16s.4d. 





Table 3.6 Shea nut freight, 1913–1917 
Station 
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 
Outward Outward Outward Outward Outward 
 ton ton ton Ton Ton 
G/Dabosa 408 10 123 0 740 
Anchau 0 0 0 0 75 
Faiki 163 0 0 7 99 
Table 3.7 Livestock freight, 1916–1923 
Station 
1916 1917 1918 1919 1923 
Outward Outward Outward Outward Outward 
 no £.s.d. No £.s.d. No £.s.d. No £.s.d. No £.s.d. 
G/Dabosa 0 0 2 6s.5d. 2 13s.6d. 0 0 1 8d. 
Anchau 0 0 0 0 5 £2.16s.3d. 0 0 2 3s.1d. 
Faiki 21 £29.5s. 60 £77 1 4s.6d. 0 0 0 0 
Dangora 0 0 0 0 0 0 154 £34.1s.6d. 6 £1.1s.10d. 
Madobi 5 £1.2s. 0 0 4 10s.9d. 0 0 210 £67.8s.5d. 
Challawa 1 5s. 480 £91.2s.6d. 220 £36.8s.3d. 242 £60.16s.6d. 2 16s. 
Yako 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 16s. 
Kwankwaso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 £2.15s.5d. 
 
 200 
Table 3.8 Tin ore freight, 1916–1923  
Station 
1916 1917 1918 1919 1923 
Outward Outward Outward Outward Outward 
 ton cwt £.sd. ton cwt £.s.d. Ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Faiki 13 0 £350 61 5 £562.4s.6d. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 






Table 3.9 Kola freight, 1916–1919 
Station 
1916 1917 1919 
Inward Outward Outward 
 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Likoro 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 £3.3s.7d. 
G/Dabosa 1 0 £1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Anchau 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Faiki 9 0 £80 0 12 16s.6d. 0 2 1s.8d. 
Challawa 0 0 0 0 18 £1.9s.1d. 0 0 4s.7d. 








 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Likoro 1 16 £1.12s.9d.   0 
G/Dabosa 2 7 £2.15s.17d. 0 0 0 
Anchau 0 2 2s. 0 0 0 
Dangora 0 0 0 0 2 1s.8d. 
Challawa 0 0 0 0 1 1s. 
 




 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Likoro 0 1 1s. 0 0 0 
Dangora 8 6 £8.16s.15d. 10 14 £17.5s. 
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Madobi 2 0 £3.2s.2d. 0 16 £1.5s.6d. 
Challawa 0 12 16s.4d. 5 17 £19.14s.2d. 




 ton cwt £.s.d. ton cwt £.s.d. 
Madobi 1 0 £3 0 1 2s.7d. 
Challawa 0 0 15d. 0 2 £1.10s.11d. 




 ton cwt £.s.d. 
Madobi 6 0 £16 
Faiki 2 0 £16.0s.1d. 




 ton Cwt £.s.d. 
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Likoro 1 9 £2.10s.2d. 
 
 
Anchau 0 8 £1.19s.18d. 
Gimi 2 4 £3.0s.5d. 




 ton cwt £.s.d. 
Faiki 0 2 1s.1d. 




Appendix 2: Keys, sleepers and other iron materials stolen from the 
railways in Northern Nigeria, 1946–1956 
 
Table 6.1 Keys, sleepers, and other iron materials stolen from the railways in 
Northern Nigeria, 1946–1956 








06/3/1946 Dangora 643 - - - 1 level-crossing sign board 
27/3/1946 Dangora 643 84 84 - - 
15/3/1946 Kano-Nguru 668¾-669 158 158 - - 
23/3/1946 “ 674-674½ 127 - - - 
30/3/1946 “ MG-KN 26 - - - 








125 125 - - 
16/4/1946 Dabi 745¾-743 133 133 - - 
9/5/1946 KC 677½-678 92 92 - - 
“ “ 680-680½ 44 44 - - 
22/5/1946 “ 672½-673 92 92 - - 






18 18 - - 
25/9/1946 - 483½ - - - 1 fish plate 
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8/10/1946 Likoro 622-622½ 150 - - - 
“ Madobi 677-677½ 141 - - - 




88 88 - - 
25/10/1946 MC-Kano 677-677½ 141 - - - 
28/10/1946 - 489 - - - 2 fish plates & 8 bolts 
14/11/1946 - 460½-461 50 - - - 












120 - - 





899 - - - 
“ “ 669-699½ 162 - - - 




31 - - - 
04/12/1948 - 491-492½ 90 - - - 
09/12/1948 - 4½-8½ 100 - - - 
23/12/1948 - 19¼ 50 - - - 
24/12/1948 - 56¾-Jos 253 - - - 
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28/12/1948 - 482¾ - - - 1 fish plates & 4 bolts 




200 - - - 








45 - - - 
19/1/1949 - 491 36 - - 2 fish plates & 8 bolts 
19/1/1949 - 496½-500 40 - - - 
2/2/1949 - 12¾-17 40 - - - 
3/2/1949 - 485¼ - - - 
1 fish plate 
& bolts 












708-712 165 - - - 
27/6/1954 Challawa - - - 30 Large quantity of fish plates 
14/02/1955 Zakirai - 69 -  - 




- 55 - - - 
6/04/1956 Kajuru 535-538 31 - - - 
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29/10/1956 Challawa - - - - 
Brakes gear of wagons 
removed several times 
 
Sources: NAK ZarProf RLY/2, Offences on Trains and railway stations; NAK KanProf 






Appendix 3: Keys and sleepers distributed to blacksmiths 
across the Northern Provinces, 1954–1955 
 
Table 6.2 Keys and sleepers distribution to blacksmiths across the Northern 
Provinces, 1954–1955 
Province Native Administration Quantity 
Adamawa Muri 3,048 
 Adamawa 1,000 
Bauchi Katagum 300 
 Misau 100 
 Bauchi 3000 
Borno Borno 1000 
 Fika Iron worth £100, including freight charges 
 Bedde Iron worth £50, including freight charges 
 Biu Iron worth £40, including freight charges 
Ilorin Ilorin 1000 
 Pategi 80 
 Lafiagi 120 
 Kaima 200 
 Bussa 250 
Kabba Kabba 200 
 Yagba 500 
 Igala 500 
 Bassa Komo 50 
 Kwarra 60 
 Igbira 2000 
Kano Kano 10,000 
 Gumel 350 
 Hadejia 180 
 Kazaure 200 
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Katsina Katsina 1200 
 Daura 400 
Niger Bida 400 
 Agaie 200 
 Kontagora 80 
 Zuru 200 
 Gwari 100 
 Kamuku 40 
 Abuja 200 
 Lapai 150 
Plateau Jamaa 200 
 Pankshin 200 
 Kanam 150 
 Lowland 150 
 Jos 700 
 Southern 450 
Sokoto Sokoto 900 
 Sokoto 1100 
 Gwandu 1700 
 Argungu 160 
Zaria Zaria 1100 
 Birnin Gwari 100 
 Kagoro 200 
 Jaba 200 
 Moroa 100 
 
Source: National Archives Kaduna (NAK) RLY/15, Distribution of scrap sleepers by 
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                                         Samenvatting 
This thesis examines the social and cultural impact of the railway on the rural communities 
situated along the rail line between Kano and Zaria in Northern Nigeria, from 1908-1970s. It 
is a critical re-examination of the history of the railway and its consequences. Using old and 
new tools of historical analysis, the study argues that the railway was the most important 
innovation that transformed the communities in to important centers on the rail line. The rail 
line had many more consequences than previous studies had actually recognized. 
The study contributes to our understanding on how the Nigerian communities 
perceived, appropriated and integrated the railway technology into daily life and how 
initiatives resulted in the appropriation of the railway. It also contributes to our understanding 
of how the railway bred criminality and provided platforms for criminals to operate; and also 
how the railway led to the emergence of new settlements and intermingling of Nigerian 
cultures along the rail line. These are in addition to re-examining the cash crops production 
and trade engendered by the railway. 
The construction of the railway as the study demonstrates was an imperialist creation 
to transport cotton from the landlocked Northern region to industrialized Britain. Right from 
the onset of the British administration in Northern Nigeria, the idea to build the railway came 
from government and not businessmen or speculators who wanted government guarantees. 
Chapter two indicates that the idea to build the railway provoked reactions of rivalry and 
controversy from the Southern Nigerian authorities who perceived the line as a rival railway. 
The proposal to build the railway conflicted with their agenda of extending the southern 
railway to landlocked Northern Nigeria. The controversy dragged on for six years, after 
which the railway was sanctioned for construction in 1908. Contrary to the well established 
narrative that the reactions to railway construction did not go beyond flight, the chapter 
demonstrate that fear and awe as well as anti-colonial resistance were the reactions to the 
railway work, as people were not familiar with the railway technology, including railway 
construction, but as the familiarity increased and they understood the benefits of working on 
the railway  for wages, they quickly appropriated it to transform their life. 
The study also describes how the local inhabitants encountered and perceived the 
locomotive and train. Contrary to the popular assumption that Nigerians appropriated the 
railway immediately it was completed, chapter three demonstrate that its appropriation was 
not immediate, but was something worked out over time. The chapter argues that mixed 
reactions of fear and awe were the response to the new transport technology, as Nigerians did 
not understood what it was all about, much less of appropriate it, but as they became familiar 
 
 226 
with it and understood its benefits they quickly apprehended it in distinctive ways to 
transform their life. The colonial authority also educated the people how to intensively use 
the system. The completion of the railway to traffic almost immediately revolutionized 
transportation and transformed the experience of travelling. It made the colonial authorities 
control of the communities much easier administratively and economically. The new 
transport also increased mobility and connected them to the global economy much more 
easily than had previously been possible. 
As the study also demonstrates, the opening of the railway to traffic almost 
immediately activated cash crop production and trade. Chapter four argues that the 
anticipation that the railway would stimulate cotton export failed, because famers exploited 
the opportunities provided by the railway to grow crops that were not anticipated during the 
planning and construction of the line. This was because cotton had always been grown for use 
in the indigenous textile industry and also because the price offered by the European buyers 
was much lower than that offered by the Hausa. Nevertheless, cotton export became popular 
over time. As has been shown, the trade in the cash crops began at the initiatives of the 
indigenous traders who channeled their money, expertise and network into the trade. Of the 
many crops that were activated by the steam, groundnut was by far the most popular, because 
it was easier to grow and could finance tax much more than the others. 
The railway also has limitations; it stimulated production in far distant areas, far 
removed from the line, but it could not intensively exploit the new markets. This was 
circumvented by professional transporters who exploited it to their own advantage. The 
colonial authorities also tried to open up such distant areas by bringing them closer to the line 
of rail through road constructions. Right from the beginning, the colonial authority envisaged 
a coordinated transport system in which the road would feed the railway of traffic, but efforts 
were made to ensure it did not compete with the railway. The cash crop trade opened up a lot 
of opportunities to the locals and outsiders who depended on it for their livelihood. 
As the study further demonstrates, the railway led to emergence of new settlements 
and intermingling of Nigerian cultures along the rail line. It is argued in chapter five that the 
opportunities to work on the railway and for the commercial firms as well as for trade were 
the pull which attracted populations to the communities. This in turn made the colonial 
authorities establish segregated settlements to house the migrants, as a form of control. As the 
study shows, the migrants concentrated at the main centers with high economic opportunities, 
thereby contributing to those centres’ expansion. Despite the attempts by the colonial 
authority to control the migrants into rigid compartments, social relations brought them into 
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direct contact with locals, a development which not only eroded official barriers, but also led 
to their integration into the communities. The migrants were agents for change in the 
communities; they were instrumental in the establishment of western education schools and 
postal facilities as well as the diffusion of southern based foods and technical skills in the 
localities. However, it was not one-way traffic, as they too also learnt and copied from the 
hosts. There was a significant decline in the migrant population in the 1970s, due to the civil 
war, the decline of export trade and the decline of the railway in the 1970s. 
The study also further understanding on how the railway engendered criminality and 
unexpectedly provided a platform for criminals to operate. Chapter six demonstrates that the 
railway was something of a paradox. It opened new frontiers of opportunities and indirectly 
endangered many, most especially the indigenous crafts which forced the operators into 
criminality such as stealing of iron from the rail line and train robbery. The crimes took the 
colonial authority unaware, despite attempts to combat them they continued abated, until the 
decline of the railway in the 1970s. As the chapter argues, the crimes were reactions to the 
socio-economic disruptions brought by the advent of colonialism and its transport innovation. 










In dit proefschrift worden de sociale en culture gevolgen onderzocht van de aanleg van het 
spoor op de plattelands gemeenschappen langs de spoorweg tussen Kano en Zaria in het 
noorden van Nigeria vanaf 1908 tot de jaren zeventig. Het is een kritisch onderzoek naar de 
geschiedenis van de spoorwegen en gevolgen van de aanleg hiervan. De studie maakt gebruik 
van oude en nieuwe methodes van historisch onderzoek en gaat uit van het idee dat de aanleg 
van het spoor een zeer belangrijke innovatie was die kleine gemeenschappen deed veranderen 
in belangrijke knooppunten. Het gevolg van de aanleg van de spoorweg had veel meer 
gevolgen dan eerdere studies aanvankelijk hadden verondersteld. 
De studie probeert duidelijk te maken  hoe de Nigeriaanse gemeenschappen 
reageerden op de komst van de technologie van de spoorwegen en hoe deze initiatieven 
uiteindelijk leiden tot de toe-eigening van de spoorweg. Het proefschrift probeert inzicht te 
geven in het feit dat de aanleg van de spoorwegen zorgde voor een verhoogde criminaliteit en 
de criminelen een uitvalsbasis gaven voor hun activiteiten, maar ook  dat de aanleg leidde tot 
de stichting van nieuwe nederzettingen waardoor er langs de spoorlijn een vermenging 
ontstond van verschillende Nigeriaanse culturen. Daar komt bij de aanleg van het spoor 
leidde tot een toename van de verbouw van gewassen die op de markt konden worden 
verkocht. 
Zoals de studie aantoont was de aanleg van het spoor een imperialistisch besluit, met 
als doel het vervoer van katoen vanuit de  noordelijke regio naar het geïndustrialiseerde 
Engeland.  Vanaf het begin van het Britse bestuur in Noord Nigeria kwam het idee om de 
spoorlijn aan te leggen van de regering, en niet van zakenmensen en speculanten, die 
daarvoor eerst overheidsgaranties eisten.  
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft hoe het plan om de spoorweg aan te leggen leidde tot rivaliteit 
en tegenstellingen tussen de autoriteiten in Zuid- en Noord-Nigeria. De eersten beschouden 
de spoorlijn als concurrent. Het voorstel om de spoorlijn aan te leggen botste met hun eigen 
plannen om de zuidelijke spoorweg uit te breiden tot aan het afgelegen noordelijke gedeelte 
van Nigeria.  
Het meningsverschil sleepte zich zes jaar voort tot er in 1908 eindelijk toestemming 
werd verkregen voor de aanleg. In tegenstelling tot het algemeen geaccepteerde idee dat de 
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aanleg van de spoorlijn de mensen op de vlucht joeg, toont het hoofdstuk t tevens aan dat er 
reacties waren van vrees en ontzag, maar ook anti-koloniaal verzet, omdat de mensen niet 
bekend waren met de technologie van de aanleg van spoorwegen. Maar toen de bekendheid 
en gewenning toenam hadden zij al snel oog voor de positieve kanten van de aanleg. De 
lonen die aan de arbeiders werden betaald stelden hen al snel in staat om hun levensstijl aan 
te passen.. 
De studie besteedt tevens aandacht aan de vraag hoe de lokale inwoners de komst van 
de trein en de locomotief ervoeren. In tegenstelling tot de gangbare gedachte dat de 
Nigerianen de komst van de spoorwegen direct na de aanleg  accepteerden en waardeerden, 
toont hoofdstuk drie aan dat dat deze acceptatie er niet onmiddellijk was. Het hoofdstuk 
beschrijft hoe de nieuwe transport technologie met gemengde gevoelens van angst en ontzag 
werd beschouwd omdat de Nigerianen nog geen beeld hadden wat de spoorlijn voor hun 
betekende maar nadat zij aan de spoorlijn gewend raakten begonnen ze de grote voordelen 
ervan in te zien.  
De koloniale autoriteiten gaven de bevolking ook voorlichting over de wijze waarop 
ze van de nieuwe vervoersmogelijkheid gebruik konden maken. Door de voltooiing an het 
spoor  veranderde de wijze van vervoer op spectaculaire wijze. Het stelde de koloniale 
autoriteiten in staat om op economisch en administratief gebied beter toezicht te houden op 
de plattelands gemeenschappen. Het nieuwe vervoermiddel verhoogde ook de mobiliteit en 
zorgde voor betere aansluiting op de wereld economie dan eerder mogelijk was. 
De studie toont ook aan dat de verbouw van landbouwgewassen en handel 
onmiddellijk steeg. Hoofdstuk vier stelt dat de vooronderstelde stijging van de katoenexport 
uitbleef omdat de boeren onvoorzien bleken te zijn overgegaan op de teelt van andere 
gewassen. De reden van de achteruitgang van de katoenexport was het feit dat de katoen 
altijd werd geteeld voor de inheemse textielindustrie maar ook omdat de prijzen die door de 
Europese kopers werden geboden veel lager waren dan die van de Hausa handelaren. Toch 
werd de export van katoen langzamerhand belangrijker. Zoals eerder betoogd waren de 
inheemse handelaren de eersten die met de handel in landbouwgewassen begonnen: ij 
bundelden daarvoor hun geld, kennis en netwerken. Van de vele gewassen waarvan de 
verbouw door de komst van de stoommachine  werd gestimuleerd waren aardnoten veruit het 
belangrijkst. Aardnoten waren makkelijk te telen waardoor de boeren sneller in staat waren 
om belasting te betalen. 
De spoorweg had ook beperkingen. De aanleg stimuleerde weliswaar de productie in 
verafgelegen gebieden maar zorgde er niet voor dat de nieuwe markten intensief ontsloten 
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werden. Dit werd veeleer gedaan door professionele transporteurs  die gebruik maakten van 
de ontstane mogelijkheden. Het koloniale gezag probeerde de afgelegen gebieden ook te 
ontsluiten door hen dichter bij de spoorlijn te brengen door middel van de aanleg van nieuwe 
wegen. Vanaf het begin streefde het gezag naar een gecoördineerd transport systeem waarin 
de weg weliswaar de toeleverancier was van het spoor maar hiermee verder niet 
concurreerde. De verbouw van landbouwgewassen opende vele mogelijkheden voor zowel de 
lokale bevolking als voor niet-lokalen die hiervan voor hun levensonderhoud afhankelijk 
waren. 
Zoals de studie verder betoogt bespoedigde de aanleg van het spoor de stichting van 
nieuwe nederzettingen en ontstond daardoor een vermenging van Nigeriaanse culturen. In 
hoofdstuk vijf wordt betoogd dat de mogelijkheden om werk te vinden bij de spoorlijn, de 
handelsfirma’s als in de handel zelf aantrekkelijk waren voor de bewoners van de landelijke 
gemeenschappen. Op hun beurt zorgden de koloniale autoriteiten voor de bouw van 
gesegregeerde huisvesting waardoor er toezicht kon worden gehouden op de migranten. De 
migranten vestigden zich in de belangrijkste centra met de beste economische mogelijkheden. 
Zij droegen daardoor bij aan de uitbreiding van die centra. Ondanks de pogingen van de 
autoriteiten om de migranten strikt gescheiden te houden zorgen sociale contacten ervoor dat 
er toch directe relaties ontstonden met de lokale bevolking. Deze ontwikkeling had tot gevolg 
dat de strikte scheidingslijnen afbrokkelden en dat de migranten uiteindelijk integreerden in 
de lokale gemeenschappen. De migranten waren de schakel  tot verandering: zij zorgden voor 
de stichting van westerse scholen, de mogelijkheden van de posterijen, de kennismaking met 
voedsel uit meer zuidelijke gebieden en de beheersing van nieuwe technische mogelijkheden. 
Maar het was geen eenrichtingsverkeer want de migranten namen ook kennis over van hun 
lokale gastheren. Vanwege de burgeroorlog was er in de jaren zeventig een scherpe daling 
van het aantal migranten. Om diezelfde reden daalde ook de export en werd het spoor veel 
minder belangrijk. 
De studie onderzoekt ook waarom de aanleg van de spoorlijn zorgde voor een 
verhoging van de criminaliteit en de criminelen een onverwachte uitvalsbasis voor hun 
activiteiten gaf. Hoofdstuk zes stelt dat de spoorlijn ook een paradoxale kant had: Zij opende 
weliswaar nieuwe mogelijkheden maar indirect bracht zij ook velen in gevaar, in het 
bijzonder de inheemse ambachtslieden, die soms gedwongen werden tot criminaliteit zoals 
het stelen van ijzer en het beroven van treinen. De  criminaliteit verraste de koloniale 
autoriteiten en ze konden die niet tot stilstand brengen, zodat de criminaliteit bleef bestaan tot 
aan de neergang van de spoorwegen in de jaren zeventig. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat de 
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criminaliteit het gevolg was van het uiteenvallen van het sociaal economische netwerk door 
de komst van het kolonialisme en de vernieuwing van het transport systeem. Het hoofdstuk 
beschrijft ook dat de toename van de criminaliteit te wijten was aan de aanwezigheid van 
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